53. Editorial Note
In briefing the National Security Council on May 29 on significant world developments affecting U.S. security, Allen Dulles provided an assessment of developments in Lebanon which promoted a brief discussion:
“Mr. Dulles observed that information coming in last night and this morning on the situation in Lebanon, was somewhat more favorable in tone, but the situation essentially seesawed back and forth, and must be regarded as very delicate indeed. The rebels controlled a large part of the countryside, and some of the towns and cities, as for example, the Moslem quarter of Beirut. There were continuing reports of the infiltration of Syrian irregulars across the long and uncontrolled Syrian-Lebanese border.
“Eighteen U.S. light tanks had arrived in Lebanon yesterday by sea and would be promptly turned over to the Army. A government announcement to the effect that it had no intention of amending the constitution in order to permit President Chamoun to have another term of office, had had a disappointingly slight impact upon the rebel forces, who were anxious to get rid of Chamoun at once. Accordingly, the outlook over the longer term was very bleak. The Syrian ‘volunteers’, [Page 80] with Nasser’s backing and plenty of weapons, can continue to send in as many people as they want. The virtual civil war in Lebanon provides these people with admirable cover.
“Chief of Staff Chehab’s attitude was hard to analyze. He had started out vigorously to clean up the situation, but recently had appeared to be sitting on his hands. The time may therefore well be near at hand when President Chamoun and his Prime Minister will feel it necessary to call for U.S. and U.K. intervention with military forces. To make matters worse, in parts of the country the situation has degenerated into a struggle between the Christian and the Moslem elements of the population, a development which the Central Government had desperately tried to prevent. Accordingly, the United States must prepare to receive a possible request for the intervention of our armed forces, perhaps within a week if the situation continues to deteriorate.
“Mr. George Allen warned that if the United States and Britain were actually to intervene, such a course of action would inevitably be regarded an intervention on behalf of the Christian element in Lebanon’s population. The Lebanese had for many years tended too much to place reliance on the protection of outside powers—the Turks, the French, the British, and, lately, ourselves. It would be very much better if somehow the Lebanese could win through with our political and military backing, but without the actual intervention with U.S. troops. If they did succeed this time, they would not in future continue to look to Paris or London or Washington for their own protection.
“Mr. Herter, the Acting Secretary of State, pointed out that Lebanon’s case against the United Arab Republic was presumably to be considered by the Arab League on Saturday. There had accordingly been a delay in considering Lebanon’s complaint against the UAR in the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, the U.S. Government has insisted to the Government of Lebanon that we could not contemplate intervention in the hostilities until the UN had considered Lebanon’s complaint and until we received a request for intervention, which should come not only from President Chamoun but from the Government of Lebanon as a whole. We wanted a sympathetic Lebanese Army if our own forces were to enter the country.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 367th Meeting of the National Security Council, prepared by Gleason on May 29; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)