Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, May 28, 1958—8 p.m.

4302. At meeting of three Ambassadors today following information was exchanged and course of action decided upon:

(1) Pro-Chamoun Druze religious Sheikh Rashida el-Hamadeh told British Ambassador Druzes were seeking to compose their differences and hoped compromise could be found based on Jumblat taking a long trip abroad. They were impressed by Sami Solh statement yesterday (Embtel 4272)² and told British Ambassador at least their faction of Druzes would agree to support any candidate for presidency acceptable to western powers.

(2) In opposition camp there is indication of some readiness to consider compromise political formula.³ Philip Takla, moderate opposition deputy, went to both Middleton and Roche indicating he had been authorized by Saeb Salaam, Abdullah Yafi and Rashid Karame to convey proposals back and forth. His initial suggestion that Chamoun appoint a new government headed by Rashid Karame or Hussein Oueini would have, however, been tantamount to capitulation by having invited heads of rebellion to form cabinet. British and French Ambassadors indicated such a proposal would be out of question. Nevertheless, French Ambassador has secret word from Abdullah Yafi intimating a Chehab government might be acceptable provided General did not ask for open support from opposition.

(3) Third force of wealthy anti-Chamoun Christians is now thoroughly frightened and is importuning all three Ambassadors to intervene with General Chehab to take over government as Prime Minister.

(4) Present Prime Minister, Sami Solh, has indicated to British Ambassador [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] he is ready to stand down only in favor of Chehab as his replacement.

(5) Former Minister of Public Works Lahoud told me this morning that yesterday he, former Finance Minister Mikkawi, and Emile Bustani received assurances from Patriarch latter would agree to Chamoun remaining in office for full length of his constitutional term. This is a change in Meouchi’s attitude as hitherto he has been lending comfort to opposition demand for Chamoun’s instant resignation. Three deputies requested patriarch to use his influence on opposition in favor of Chamoun remaining until September 23.

(6) Chehab continues to view military situation with deep pessimism. Attaches of our three Embassies concur he is now stretched to maximum and could probably do little more than checkmate partisan bands without having sufficient strength to prevent massive infiltration from across Syrian border if that should be decided upon by UAR.

(7) Most secretly former gendarmérie chief, General Nofal, sent word to me this morning he had been approached by circles “near Chamoun” to inquire if he would be willing to take command of armed forces in replacement of Chehab. Nofal said he was a close friend of Chehab and would be reluctant to do so but would only consider offer if he were certain US Ambassador primarily and British Ambassador secondarily gave their support, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] I am checking out with Chamoun this offer to Nofal.

(8) Three Ambassadors decided:

(A) Middleton will see Chamoun tomorrow to attempt a bit of shock therapy, saying that now Sami Solh has removed issue of Chamoun’s re-election from political arena we suppose need for allied forces to be on alert no longer exists. We think this will bring Chamoun more out into open as to his real intentions. All three Ambassadors fear from evidence cited my recent telegram Chamoun may still have in mind calling on foreign intervention not only to keep him in office to end of term but to perpetuate him for second term.

(B) French Ambassador will call on Patriarch tomorrow morning to reaffirm our desire Chamoun fill out his constitutional period as President and to say we hope Patriarch will use his influence on opposition to agree.

(C) French Ambassador will likewise make contact with Abdullah Yafi along similar lines and indicate hope opposition will find ways and means promptly to end civil strife.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–2858. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, London, and Paris.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. In telegram 4297 from Beirut, May 28, the Embassy had reported, however, that initially the opposition had reacted intransigently to the statement by Solh. Saeb Salaam, speaking for the opposition national front, declared that no solution short of the immediate resignation of Chamoun would be acceptable. The opposition press reflected the same attitude. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–2858)