Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

42. Memorandum From Colonel D. J. Decker of the Joint Middle East Planning Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)¹

Washington, May 19, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Meeting at Department of State, 1115 Monday, 19 May 1958²

1. Meeting in Mr. Dulles’ office, 1115–1200.

a. Mr. Rountree discussed the apparent differences with the British as to the circumstances under which U.S.–U.K. would intervene. From the outset the British have shown an enthusiastic attitude. They would like to see Chamoun informed that the U.S.–U.K. were prepared to move militarily. They have urged that the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors be provided with the combined plan. They have proceeded with Iraq and Jordan to the limit of their agreement with U.S. The British are urging that Lebanon take its case against Syria to the United Nations.

b. Mr. Rountree can see circumstances where the U.S. should intervene militarily to save the country but the current internal political situation is a powerful factor for staying out if possible. If we intervene the U.S. will be in the position of supporting the continuance of Chamoun in office against the present terms of the constitution and possibly without Army support. The U.S. has good contact and good relations with Chehab who is pro-West. Chehab would not like to see the U.S. intervene in the present circumstances as it would be most damaging to our future influence in the Middle East. Chehab would probably support a pro-West Christian for President.

c. The problem is to “get off the hook” of one’s individual government. Mr. Rountree suggested the possibility of urging Chamoun to announce publicly that he puts the welfare of Lebanon above himself and looking to find a solution to the internal political problem. Mr. Dulles suggested the possibility of a postponement of the September elections or an extension of Chamoun’s term for one year.

d. The theme of the discussion was to find a solution for the internal political problem in Lebanon and to cool down the British on their enthusiasm for immediate action. The military now have the situation in the country fairly well under control but it still has great explosive potentialities.

e. The urgent problem of providing a statement for the press at a 1200 conference was discussed.³ Mr. Dulles felt that we should treat the Russian statement opposing interference by the West in Lebanon⁴ as a repetition of the numerous similar statements which are made in similar situations every time U.S. protection of its nationals seems required.

2. At 1200 the Secretary of State left and the meeting assembled in Mr. Herter’s office. Mr. Herter had two points in connection with the Lebanese situation upon which a position must be taken.

a. United Nations. The U.K. is pressing the U.S. to urge the Lebanese to take the case before the U.N. immediately. Mr. Malik, the Lebanese representative at the U.N., has developed a series of points upon which the case could rest but the Department of State has not seen the documentation of these points. The U.S. feels that the case must be airtight before it is presented and it is doubtful if such a case can be made. There are disadvantages for Lebanon to take a case against another Arab nation before a non-Arab body such as the U.N. At the present time the disadvantages of taking the case to the U.N. seem to outweigh the advantages and it is presently planned that the U.S. will sit tight and take a neutral attitude. State considers it undesirable for the case to be presented. State will endeavor to discourage the British and Lebanese from pushing it.

b. The second and more difficult point was what to do in Lebanon. It was quickly concluded that we should deemphasize the prospect of military action and play down military preparations. The problem of continued readiness over a long period was mentioned.

c. State telegram to Beirut No. 4353 of 16 May⁵ was discussed. This message states that consultations are being held with UK and that preliminary reaction is that Ambassadors might inform Chamoun of their concern over the possible development of confessional strife and that a prompt political solution is necessary to avoid this. Such an approach would serve to put Chamoun on notice that he should take steps to remove the principal cause of strife without withdrawing the support which has been assured him.

d. The necessity of maintaining Chamoun’s morale and confidence in face of further trouble was mentioned. “We can not deal Chamoun out.” If there is to be civil war we had better have Chamoun in. The Army would probably support Chamoun in such circumstances at least until elections.

e. It was agreed that efforts must be made to induce Chamoun to find a solution to the internal political problem without reducing his strength in the present situation. Alternate means were mentioned but it appeared that he should not be given a selection of solutions but should be left to come up with a solution on his own. Mr. Rountree was to draft appropriate instructions.

f. Mr. Allen Dulles stated that the Syrians are anxious to move and have a tremendous amount of hardware collected and ready to move into Lebanon. However, he doubted that they would openly deploy military forces into Lebanon. They will continue their infiltration tactics into the country. It was felt that they have pretty free access from Syria into Northern Lebanon.

g. Mr. Irwin pointed out that overflight and staging rights would be required in case of military action. The messages that have been prepared to send to our Ambassadors on execution were mentioned. Admiral Burke stated that Wheelus was not essential. “You send the messages, we send the planes.”

3. The meeting broke up at 1240 after which Admiral Burke, Mr. Allen Dulles and Mr. Irwin met for a few minutes alone.

4. The meeting in Mr. Dulles’ office was opened with a short summary of the U.S.–U.K. military situation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives.

5. A list of those attending is attached.⁶

Very respectfully,

D.J. Decker⁷

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Lebanon TS Sensitive. Top Secret.
2. A list attached to the source text indicates that the participants in the meeting included Dulles, Herter, Rountree, Rockwell, Andrew H. Berding, R. Gordon Arneson, John W. Hanes, and Joseph J. Sisco from the Department of State; Allen Dulles and Norman Paul from the CIA; and Burke, Irwin, and Decker from the Department of Defense.
3. Dulles’ comments concerning Lebanon and the applicability of the Eisenhower Doctrine at his May 20 press conference are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 938–939.
4. On May 17, the TASS news agency in Moscow issued a statement warning that U.S. or other Western intervention in Lebanon could have serious consequences for Lebanon and for peace in Middle East.
5. See footnote 4, Document 38.
6. See footnote 2 above.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.