Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

41. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, May 18, 1958, 4:30 p.m.¹

Washington, May 18, 1958, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
• Lord Hood, British Minister
• Foy D. Kohler, EUR
• Philip Farley, S/AE

The British Ambassador called at the Secretary’s request at his home at 4:30 p.m.

Following discussion of the Khrushchev letter,² the British Ambassador said he would like to bring up three points regarding the Lebanese situation.

The first was the question of what the Ambassadors would be authorized to say to President Chamoun about his own personal position. In this connection he showed the Secretary a telegram from the British Ambassador at Baghdad, Sir Michael Wright, calling attention particularly to the opinion of King Feisal and Crown Prince Abdul-ilah that in the absence of an adequate alternative it was better to support Chamoun for reelection even at the price of a civil war now, rather than having a civil war later under a weaker regime. Sir Harold indicated that British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd agreed with this opinion. The Secretary said this view was persuasive; obviously if someone dependable were available to succeed Chamoun, this would be the ideal solution. Lord Hood commented that we had tried to find another adequate candidate but had failed. The only possibility had seemed to be General Chehab, but he had proved unwilling.³ The Secretary pointed out, however, that Chehab opposed Chamoun. The British Ambassador said that it was important, in any case, that we should at least not give Chamoun the impression that we were going

to pull the rug out from under him. If we could not decide now affirmatively to support him, at least he would not indicate that we had made a contrary decision.

The British Ambassador’s second point related to what should be told Chamoun with respect to the military support the United States and the U.K. are prepared to give him. The Ambassador said that he had understood that we would give Chamoun rather full information on the first installment of help and say that more would follow as required. During this phase of the conversation, the Secretary consulted Assistant Secretary Rountree by phone and indicated the latter felt that if we were too encouraging in what we said, Chamoun would be tempted to call our help forward rather than persevere in solving his own problem; that it might be better to leave him on the “anxious seat.”⁴ The Ambassador replied that the Foreign Office feels that it is important that the Ambassadors received discretionary authority to inform Chamoun at least the order of magnitude of the first installment—say 5000, in a proportion of 3 to 2—available within 24 hours. The Secretary indicated general agreement, but emphasized that the Ambassadors should not volunteer this information but produce it only if asked by Chamoun. The Ambassador agreed.

After further discussion by phone with Assistant Secretary Rountree, the Secretary told the Ambassador that the Department would send guidance tomorrow to our Ambassador at Beirut along the lines of this discussion, indicating that in absence of a satisfactory alternative we would not refuse our support to Chamoun. He observed in this connection, however, that the French felt Chamoun should get out.

The Secretary went on to say that the Department would also get out instructions to our Ambassador tomorrow, after checking with the military, authorizing him to inform Chamoun of the order of magnitude of our support.

The Ambassador then raised his third point as to whether we should encourage Lebanon to go to the U.N. In reply to the Secretary’s question, Sir Harold said the telegram from Baghdad indicated that Iraq would support the Lebanese in the Security Council. The Secretary commented that Ambassador Lodge was rather nervous about the adequacy of the evidence which would be available. The Secretary said he had replied that while the evidence was important the votes were more important. In this connection, he commented that while some evidence is not usable we know that the conspiracy exists on the part of the United Arab Republic to overthrow the government of Lebanon; consequently, if we have the votes we can, in good conscience,

support proceedings in the Security Council. However, the Secretary said that he had no present opinion as to the timing of possible action in the Security Council.

The Secretary asked whether the Ambassadors in Beirut were working closely together. Sir Harold replied that they were indeed working closely together—but the trouble is they are all reaching the wrong conclusion. However, the answer to the question was that they were working together “admirably”. The Secretary commented that if they disagreed at least one of them would be right, and the interview concluded on this note.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–1858. Top Secret. Drafted by Kohler.
2. Apparent reference to the May 9 letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower concerning Soviet proposals for aerial inspection zones. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1386–1387.
3. McClintock confirmed Chehab’s reluctance in telegram 4012 from Beirut, May 18. In a conversation with McClintock that morning, Chehab had expressed satisfaction with the success of the army in restoring order in Beirut, but added that he had no intention of agreeing to build on that success by accepting the prime ministership or the presidency. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–1858)
4. This conversation was transcribed in the Secretary’s office. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations; included in the microfiche supplement)