Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, May 19, 1958—8:57 p.m.

4400. Deptel 4353.² We have agreed with British, and British tell us French concur, re following approach to Chamoun which should be made separately by three Ambassadors in Beirut. You authorized concert with your UK and French colleagues, unless you perceive serious objection to proposed course. Approach to be as follows:

We are very concerned danger of civil war in Lebanon, with its possibilities of interference from UAR, and have been considering, as President no doubt also has, whether anything can be done to avert it. We would be grateful for President’s views. One possibility would be to broaden government and we wonder whether President has considered this.

If, but only if, President replies that broader government would not be possible without his renouncing a second term, you should say that this of course matter for him to judge but it seems to us really important thing is to insure continuous existence of a genuinely independent Lebanon and the continuation of the pro-Western policies which he has done so much to establish and which we believe are in the true interests of Lebanon.

We would appreciate your views on following:

Does Chamoun at moment believe that political solution is urgent?

If so do you believe he would be prepared to give clear indication he has decided against seeking second term?³ We note (Embtel 3826)⁴Chamoun’s thorough concurrence in appraisal of three Ambassadors that what is at stake is national existence of Lebanon and not of any particular person. We continue believe however (Deptel 4353) that it would be undesirable for three Ambassadors now to press Chamoun to indicate publicly his willingness to step down. We would have a different reaction if there were good reason to believe that Chamoun has already reached conclusion this is proper course of action and needs some sign that we agree.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–1958. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and cleared by Rountree, Herter, and Dulles. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. See footnote 4, Document 38.
3. McClintock responded to these questions, on the basis of previous conversations with Chamoun, in telegram 4071 from Beirut, May 20. He noted that Chamoun did believe that a political solution was urgent, but preferably on his own terms. McClintock also felt that Chamoun was reluctant to give a clear indication that he had decided against seeking a second term, but might be persuaded to do so secretly. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–2058)
4. Document 27.
5. In telegram 4077 from Beirut, May 20, McClintock reported that he saw Chamoun that night and conveyed to him the second paragraph of telegram 4400 to Beirut. Chamoun responded that he had discussed the situation with General Chehab, and Chehab had reversed his previous position and indicated that he was willing to accept the post of Prime Minister in a revised Chamoun government. Chamoun said that he deplored asking Sami Solh to stand down but would accept the sacrifice if the good of the country demanded it. On the question of renunciation of a second term, Chamoun said that if the opposition would accept the “Chehab formula,” he would abandon any thought of reelection. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–2058; included in the microfiche supplement)