Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

275. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 15, 1958.

Dear Chris: I hesitate to burden you with another memorandum, but I have included in succinct form in the attached memorandum some thoughts regarding a Middle East settlement. The present opportunity would seem to be the best that has presented itself for a long time to make progress in this complicated problem. If we could settle on the lines of a program for the area, we might have some chance of success. Without a well defined line I should think our chances of losing out would be very much enhanced.

RM

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM²

From numerous conversations with a variety of personalities and information from other sources in the Middle Eastern countries visited by me during the period July 16 to August 12, the following thoughts emerge:

1) A temporary if precarious balance of power has been achieved between the determination manifest by the United States and United Kingdom in the deployment of military forces on the one hand, and the popular dynamism of Arab unity as symbolized by Nasser on the other. This breathing space should be utilized to launch a program which will promote a constructive era and peace and stability in the area.

2) Propaganda. The United States should make an effective effort to appeal to the Arab masses, to their desire not only for better economic conditions and especially their craving to be treated with dignity and as equals.

3) Lebanon. Coincident with the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, and the establishment of law and order, some form of international guarantee of the independence of Lebanon should be provided.³

4) Jordan. This is the focus of the present danger in the area. The untenable position of the U.K. forces in Jordan requires that we carefully synchronize our withdrawal in Lebanon with theirs if possible. [10½ lines of source text not declassified]

[4 paragraphs (24 lines of source text) not declassified]⁴

5) Middle East Neutralization. With any success in dealing with the immediate problem of Jordan, the Conference could propose a neutralization of the area. The Powers in the Conference, having established the new boundaries of Syria, Iraq and Israel, could provide a form of guarantee of the boundaries of those states and Lebanon. A more ambitious program might include guarantees of the boundaries of the U.A.R., Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Sheikdoms. An inherent feature of the program would be the establishment of a form of international control of arms in the area.⁵

6) A treaty would establish the Middle Eastern settlement. Its provisions could deal not only with the political features of the area but the economic and financial as well. It would contemplate large scale economic development and raised standards of living.

[Here follow Murphy’s recommendations with respect to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Oil, and Nasser.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/8–1558. Top Secret. The full texts of the attached memorandum by Murphy, and the assessments of the memorandum by Dulles and Berry, cited below, are scheduled for publication in volume XII. An August 22 memorandum from Hanes to Herter summarized IO’s comments on the Murphy memorandum, and an undated memorandum, attached to the source text, contains an assessment prepared in S/P of Murphy’s recommendations. (Both ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. Top Secret.
3. Dulles prepared his comments on Murphy’s memorandum on August 23, and noted in a handwritten observation at the end of the comments: “These are quick reactions, not to be given great weight.” His comment on Murphy’s recommendation with respect to Lebanon reads: “OK, if practical. Perhaps the ‘guarantee’ will have to be implied rather than formally expressed.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/8–1558) In an undated memorandum to Herter, Deputy Assistant Secretary Lampton Berry offered NEA’s comments on Murphy’s recommendations. NEA’s reaction to Murphy’s recommendation with respect to Lebanon reads as follows: “It is our hope that out of the present session of the United Nations will come an expression of United Nations interest in the Lebanon which will help preserve the independence and integrity of this country. It is clear that the Lebanese themselves have not reached a clear idea as to whether they desire an international guarantee of the future status of their country.” (Ibid.)
4. [8½ lines of text not declassified] NEA concluded that the best prospects for avoiding a serious upheaval in Jordan lay in obtaining an expression of interest by the United Nations which would permit the orderly withdrawal of British forces. Thereafter, NEA anticipated that with some change in the political situation within Jordan, Jordan’s Arab neighbors could be brought to recognize the importance of maintaining an independent Jordan.
5. Dulles expressed his doubts as to whether Murphy’s proposal for Middle East neutralization was either feasible or desirable, and NEA concurred, pointing again to the danger of involving the Soviet Union in such an undertaking. Dulles’ comments and NEA’s objections also applied to Murphy’s suggestion that a treaty be negotiated to establish the Middle East settlement.