Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

276. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 16, 1958¹

New York, August 16, 1958

SUBJECT

• Lebanon and the Special Session of the UNGA

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Lodge, USUN
• Mr. Rountree, NEA
• Mr. Bergus, NE

Dr. Malik said he had postponed his arrival in New York so as to have an opportunity for detailed discussions with Lebanese leaders, particularly President Chamoun and President-elect Chehab. They had two large questions in their minds of equal importance. The first was that of the presence of US forces. Both felt (Chehab even more than Chamoun) that too early a withdrawal of these forces could spell disaster to Lebanon. General Chehab was beginning to feel the weight of responsibility. They were concerned at press and other reports regarding the concerted onslaught of the Communists and their fellow travelers against the presence of US forces in Lebanon and apprehensive lest this affect US policy.

Their second question was what would come out of the present General Assembly with regard to Lebanon. If it were only words, this would be too meager an outcome for the genuine excitement which had gripped the world. What could the UNGA do to give Lebanon peace of mind? General Chehab had told Dr. Malik that he hoped that nothing would be done which would have the effect of tying his hands before he assumed power. Dr. Malik replied that he had no intention of tying General Chehab’s hands but felt that Lebanon should take advantage of the present situation. Dr. Malik had undertaken to keep in close touch with General Chehab.

The Secretary stated that we had been working intensively, particularly over the last twenty-four hours, on a possible UNGA resolution which touched upon both matters. There was a desire to get some assurances from countries such as the UAR, Iraq and even Israel that they would keep their hands off Lebanon and Jordan and to make such countries realize that if they did not, they would be subject to serious condemnation. It was not possible to get ironclad guarantees which we could be sure would work. The formula we were working on now would contain a reference to UN objectives including those contained in the “Essentials for Peace” resolution² and link them to Lebanon and Jordan. The resolution would then go on to authorize the Secretary General to work out further practical measures.

With respect to withdrawal of US forces, we had in mind a US declaration which might contain the following elements:

1. The reasons why our forces were in Lebanon.

2. The conditions under which they would be withdrawn, including:

a. a request from the duly constituted Government of Lebanon;

b. a United States decision that it was satisfied that Lebanon’s independence and integrity had been assured; (The Secretary stated this provision was essential so that we could retain our freedom of action.)

c. a UNGA request for withdrawal on the grounds that the forces’ continued stay in Lebanon was no longer required for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Secretary pointed out that this last element was similar to a declaration made with respect to our Greek-Turkish aid program. It would require a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to bring it into being, a possibility which we thought highly unlikely. We had not yet made this suggestion to others, but the Secretary planned to discuss it with Foreign Minister Lloyd very shortly. This proposal might be more dangerous to the British. There seemed to be fairly widespread recognition in the Assembly of our reasons for sending troops to Lebanon and our intention to withdraw them as quickly as possible. There was, however, some suspicion that the British might want to remain on in Jordan. We were quite certain that this was not the British intention. The Secretary thought that the course of action we had in mind would serve to protect Lebanon. Dr. Malik thought it might be better if we could dispense with point 2 c. The Secretary said that the British might not want to include such a point, in which case we probably would withdraw the suggestion.

Dr. Malik said he did not know how to disassociate the cases of Lebanon and Jordan, but they were very different. If Hussein went, Dr. Malik did not know what the future of Jordan would be. If Chamoun went, or if ten Chehabs went, there would still be a majority of people in Lebanon who wished to maintain the independence and integrity of their country. The Secretary agreed that the cases were different. He referred to Jordan’s unviability, need for foreign subsidy, etc., and the fact that our primary interest in Jordan was to prevent a reopening of the Arab-Israel war. He did not know what the future of Jordan was. Dr. Malik said that the Lebanese would be “insulted” to be bracketed with Jordan. Lebanon had a right to exist indefinitely. Perhaps some drafting device could be employed. The Secretary was not sure that this could be done.

Ambassador Lodge felt that about the most that could be done would be to make a distinction between the two in speeches in the Assembly. This General Assembly had, however, been called on questions relating to troops in both countries. The Secretary felt that it would be difficult to persuade the British to accept two separate resolutions. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that in all frankness this was a situation where we had a stronger case than the British and it was a matter of the stronger trying to carry along his weaker friend.

Dr. Malik said he planned to speak in the Assembly on either Monday or Tuesday. His speech would be simple, straightforward, conciliatory and non-provocative. He would state how Lebanon feels about itself and how it envisages its future. The Secretary expressed the hope that Dr. Malik would not drop entirely the statement that the disturbance in Lebanon had been fomented from without. This could cut the legal ground from under us. Dr. Malik assured the Secretary that he would make this point clear but in a way calculated to avoid controversy.

Dr. Malik asked how long the Assembly would last. The Secretary said he did not expect to be in New York beyond Monday. If a resolution were tabled this weekend the Assembly might terminate by Wednesday. The Secretary hoped this would be the case.

Dr. Malik asked whether the Secretary thought that the US views as outlined above were the maximum obtainable from this Assembly. The Secretary felt that they were. There could emerge from these proceedings a recognition by Nasser that he should keep his hands off Lebanon and Jordan for two different reasons; in Lebanon, its traditions and special situation; in Jordan, the possibility of reopening the Arab-Israel war. Even Gromyko accepted this latter view. Fawzi professed to, but one could never be certain of exactly what Fawzi said. The Secretary did believe that this consideration had caught them short.

Dr. Malik wondered if Nasser had really been caught short. He said that infiltration and inflammatory broadcasts were still going on. The Secretary referred to the President’s idea of a UN monitoring system. We probably could not get action on it during this special Assembly but intended to put it on the agenda of the next regular Assembly. The Secretary discussed briefly the problem of getting firm evidence of such activities. Often a broadcast which the press described as inflammatory turned out, upon examination of a tape recording, not to be that bad.

At this point the Secretary and Ambassador Lodge left to attend a meeting with Foreign Secretary Lloyd. Mr. Rountree continued the discussion.

Mr. Rountree had the general impression that the atmosphere in the Assembly was about as good as could be expected. The reaction to the President’s speech had been very good. While nothing dramatic in the way of concrete assurances could probably be obtained, there was a good prospect of getting a resolution which could establish a proper atmosphere in the area. The theme which the USSR and the UAR had been pressing was the need to get the US and UK forces out and only then discuss constructive measures. Against this background the USSR resolution³ had been judged by some delegations as moderate, even, in some quarters, constructive. Our effort, in which we had had some success, was to make it clear that the object of this special session was not to bring about the withdrawal of the troops but to create a situation in which the troops could be withdrawn. It was unfortunate, in Mr. Rountree’s view, that we had been delayed in getting a resolution tabled which would focus things in their proper order. He hoped we could table a resolution with the least possible delay, perhaps during the weekend. Mr. Rountree envisaged multiple sponsorship of such a resolution. In order to achieve wide support such a resolution could not represent the best of all possible worlds. It could, however, be very constructive. Dr. Malik hoped he could see the resolution as soon as possible. Mr. Rountree agreed and said that we wished him to see the resolution as soon as we were in a position to show it to him; hopefully this might be this afternoon.

Dr. Malik inquired as to how much the US Government really felt that there would be stability in Lebanon. Mr. Rountree replied that, while our evaluation was not, of course, as valid as that of the Lebanese themselves, we hoped that outside interference would, as a result of action being taken here, greatly diminish. On the internal side, we believed that the election of a new President would have a useful effect. Our evaluation was that in the absence of unforeseen developments, the chances of stability in Lebanon were good. We assumed that President Chamoun would serve out his term. We assumed that this would mean the continuation of some opposition and some disturbances in Lebanon. This could be justified in the light of the need to maintain constitutional procedures in Lebanon. After the new President assumed office, the opposition might assume a different attitude.

Dr. Malik seemed to accept the fact that from this session of the UNGA little more could be expected by way of guarantees to Lebanon. He felt, however, that there was a need for more ironclad guarantees with perhaps great power backing. He felt we should be working toward this end. Mr. Rountree discussed briefly in general terms various suggestions that had come to his attention with regard to attaining some sort of recognition of Lebanon’s status. Dr. Malik indicated that he intended in his forthcoming speech to point out Lebanon’s historic background and the fact that it has had a special position in the Middle East over a number of centuries. He felt the thinking on this question needed more time to mature so that an international instrument affecting Lebanon could in due course be worked out.

Dr. Malik inquired as to the prospects of a great power meeting. Mr. Rountree felt that the Soviets would continue to press for one and to create artificial crises which seemed to require one. As to a summit conference, our position remained unchanged. We would be happy to attend one if proper preparations were made. We would not discuss Lebanon and Jordan at such a conference as this was a matter for handling by the UN.

Dr. Malik asked if the US and the West intended to continue with full vigor a campaign to expose and point out the dangers encountered in the processing of indirect aggression and subversion. Mr. Rountree felt that the whole effort in which we were presently embarked demonstrated our intentions in this regard. Dr. Malik inquired as to how we intended to move forward on the President’s six-point program. Mr. Rountree said he hoped that most of the points would be incorporated in the resolution which would be tabled in the UNGA.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Bergus. The source text indicates that the conversation took place in the Secretary’s suite in the Waldorf Towers.
2. Reference is to the “Essentials of Peace” resolution of 1949. (UNGA Resolution 290 (IV))
3. Reference is to the resolution introduced by Gromyko on August 12 calling for the strengthening of the U.N. Observer Group in Lebanon and the establishment of a similar group in Jordan to supervise the immediate withdrawal of U.S. and British forces from the area. (U.N. doc. A/3870, printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p.1031)