Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

BeirutAugust 15, 1958—4 p.m.

1130. Admiral Holloway and I had a lengthy review of situation this morning with General Chehab. Following points emerged:

1. Effect of US withdrawal: General Chehab said he was pleased with results of retraction second Marine Battalion. It had had effect he had predicted on opposition. Already he had noted a lessened stridency in their propaganda output; and he was certain from internal information that more moderate leaders had been enabled to get a firmer grip on rank and file than before. So far as Loyalists–Christian element was concerned withdrawal of Marine Battalion had not had repercussions which certain elements had feared. For example Gemayel and his phalangists had taken matter calmly and more reflective Christian elements such as the intellectuals had been forced to begin thinking on ways and means to find compromise solutions which would end Lebanese internal crisis.

2. He thought in a guarded way it would be possible to contemplate withdrawal of an additional battalion before his inauguration September 24. It was agreed however there would be no recommendation prior consultation keeping in mind political effect of such a movement. Chehab thought however it would have a beneficial result coming before he takes office.

3. General said several times during conversation that presence of US forces in Lebanon had been of decisive beneficial effect. He said that had we not arrived with strength we deployed in Lebanon, it would have been difficult to see how country could have been saved from complete anarchy.

4. Continuing on this theme the General said he had yesterday been approached by UNOGIL to ascertain his thinking on possibility of establishing a small UN armed police force in Lebanon. Chehab said he had told UN observers he was firmly opposed to any UN police force which might have internal responsibilities in this country although he was willing to study possibilities of establishing a small UN force which might do guard duty on the frontiers. In general however he felt UNOGIL should not expand its numbers and he is personally opposed to having its members armed. He plans to discuss this with Chamoun tomorrow.

Chehab said “The President and I look upon this matter in an inverse light; I regard it with a view to the future and he looks on it with a view to the past. So far as Chamoun and company are concerned, they would be willing to have any number of foreign troops in Lebanon. However, I must look to a solution reached by the Lebanese people themselves and I do not think it can be accomplished by the perpetual stationing of foreign forces in Lebanon whether American or UN.”

General said as he sees matters now UN could play useful psychological role in maintaining its small observer corps here for a short interval after final withdrawal of US forces. However, throughout our interview he made it very clear he does not desire nor would he request withdrawal of US troops until security situation has been restored; he also made it clear he did not himself favor replacement of US forces by any UN armed forces.

5. General confirmed information I had already received that Deputy Ali Bazzi had been sent by him to Damascus to discuss Syrian-Egyptian intentions regarding Lebanon in future. Chehab said he was extremely pleased that in addition to lip service assurance Ali Bazzi received from Serraj, his emissary had more explicit and affirmative assurances from Hakim Amer himself. In fact the Field Marshal gave instructions to Serraj in Bazzi’s presence for withdrawal of UAR “commandos” from the Basta. Chehab said first detachment of these commandos left Beirut yesterday; he hoped their entire member would be withdrawn into Syria in immediate future. With departure of these foreign hardcore agitators he hoped opposition in Basta would commence go although he did not think fact there would be cases of violence, of kidnapping, and extortion for some time to come.

6. As to security in Lebanon generally Chehab was guardedly optimistic. He said that despite constant individual reports of free-looting and banditry (some of which were highly colored) he had from his own intelligence sources as well as from tribal and religious leaders clear evidence that the security position was steadily improving. He was particularly heartened by offer of rebel leaders north of Tripoli to permit Maronite patriarch to send a mission to the Akkar area to see for themselves that security was being restored by opposition leaders in that area. The General likewise predicted security in South Lebanon would soon be back almost to normal; and added that he was receiving good cooperation from Jumblatt in restraining acts of vengeance and vandalism in the Chouf.

7. I observed to Chehab that in order to expedite restoration of security situation it seemed to me that in addition to police-type action by armed forces and gendarmes, it was likewise important to reestablish economic life of country. As root cause of much violence was fact men were becoming desperate because their families needed funds and food. I asked if army could not arrange for convoying truck caravan from Beirut to Syrian frontier. If we could open transit trade once more to Syria, Jordan and Iraq, Beirut would commence to regain its old position as an entrepot and thus by economic means we might redress security posture. Chehab said he would gladly guarantee security of truck convoys to Syrian frontier but asked what I could do with Lebanese Government. Specifically Sami Solh (which had by decree closed the border). I said I would very gladly approach Lebanese Government to get this decree rescinded. I also said I had been heartened by estimate of my colleague in Damascus who is currently visiting Beirut that Syrian authorities would probably be ready to give assurances for safe return of Lebanese trucks once normal commerce was restored. I plan to see Prime Minister and Chamoun to get Lebanese Government to open frontier.

8. Our general impression of Chehab was that of a man with much increased confidence in his own ability to confront a thorny situation and a man who is determined not to yield to partisan importunity or pressure from either side, whether opposition or government, Christian or Moslem. Certainly insofar as his attitude toward our armed forces and CINCSPECOMME is concerned, it could not be more cooperative and sympathetic.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–1558. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Damascus, Cairo, London, Paris, and USUN.