Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

264. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, August 11, 1958—2 p.m.

1041. Joint message Admiral Holloway and Ambassador. Department pass JCS and DOD. We called this morning on both General Chehab and President Chamoun further to discuss question of a token withdrawal of US forces. We had in mind valuable comment set out Deptel 779.²

General Chehab said he had given considerable reflection to ideas put forth as indicated Embtel 993 and had discussed question of withdrawal with leaders of opposition. He had now come to mature conclusion that a token withdrawal would be to Lebanon’s advantage. It would for one thing help moderate leaders of opposition to bring their more obdurate followers under control. In particular, it would undercut Syrian and Egyptian hard core element in the Basta. Chehab also had indications that opposition were sending an emissary to Damascus and Cairo to make urgent request that UAR cease and desist from further indirect aggression against Lebanon. Given this situation, General thought retraction of a BLT would not only serve as a catalyst in bringing opposition to terms but would place UAR on the defensive. He said if after this evacuation of one battalion infiltration continues, even Lebanese opposition itself will begin to ask “who is occupying power?”

On timing General Chehab said he thought it important for retraction of a Marine BLT to take place before GA session on Wednesday. He pointed out that if we started promptly to move voluntarily after conferring with Lebanese authorities, Russians would not have had their say and in consequence no one could accuse us of leaving under threat from USSR or under pressure applied by UAR (Deptel 779).

Chehab thought it important that there be a unilateral communiqué from US side recalling statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on temporary and emergency character of our troop intervention in Lebanon. Communiqué could then point out that US forces in Lebanon are presently in excess of local security requirements. Communiqué would add that Lebanese and US military authorities were agreed that there had been a gradual but steady improvement in international security situation. In consequence, withdrawal of a BLT to increase strategic mobile reserve in Sixth Fleet was a logical movement and would still leave in Lebanon US forces of such strength and firepower as to be fully adequate to requirements of their primary mission; assisting Lebanese Government to maintain integrity and independence of the Republic and to protect American lives and property.³

On security situation Chehab said that although instances of terrorism and banditry would continue for months to come, he was in general convinced that nation-wide the situation has materially improved. He cited calm in Tripoli which has persisted almost since arrival of US forces; absence of fighting in the Chouf; and diminution of incidents even in Beirut. However General admitted that center of insurrection is now Beirut and his measures of pacification both by negotiation and use of his armed forces would be addressed problem in the Basta.

We subsequently saw President Chamoun and went over elements of our conversation with Chehab. President concurred that US military resources in Lebanon are currently in excess of their task and said he would have no objection to withdrawal of a BLT this week. For President’s comments on UN situation, see subsequent telegram.⁴

Our next following telegram sets forth suggested language of a possible US communiqué to be issued either by President, Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State in Washington or, if Washington prefers, by Admiral Holloway as Commander-in-Chief.⁵

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–1158. Secret; Niact.
2. In telegram 779 to Beirut, August 10, the Department responded to the request from McClintock and Holloway for discretionary authority to organize a limited reduction of U.S. forces in Lebanon, outlined in telegram 993 from Beirut, August 7. (Document 259) The Department indicated that it had in mind the psychological value of such a reduction, but was “deeply concerned” to avoid the interpretation that by withdrawing troops the United States was giving way before threats from the USSR or under pressure applied by the UAR. This consideration, the Department noted, was particularly pertinent in the context of the special session of the U.N. General Assembly. The problem was receiving careful and urgent attention. “Regret unable provide discretionary authority you request, but will keep you fully advised.” (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–758; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Admiral Holloway sent a message to Admiral Burke on August 11 proposing to initiate the withdrawal of one of the Marine battalions from Lebanon on August 13. (Telegram 1645 from CINCSPECOMME to CNO, August 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. In telegram 1048 from Beirut, August 11, McClintock reported that he had discussed the special session of the General Assembly with Chamoun and Chehab. Chamoun felt strongly that Malik should lead the Lebanese delegation, and that Lebanon should maintain its original position with respect to intervention by the UAR. He also felt that the United Nations should not be allowed to dictate when the U.S. forces must leave Lebanon. Chehab noted that the opposition was violently opposed to Malik as a spokesman for Lebanon, and added that he was fearful that if Malik was named to head the Lebanese delegation, serious trouble would break out again in Lebanon. He conceded, however, that it might be possible to send a delegation including Malik and some opposition figures. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5780/8–1158; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. Telegram 1044 from Lebanon, August 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–1158)