Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

259. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

BeirutAugust 7, 1958—11 p.m.

993. Joint message Admiral Holloway and Ambassador. Pass JCS and DOD. We called this afternoon on General Chehab to discuss his view on a possible symbolic withdrawal of some element of US forces from Lebanon. It seemed to us this would have political advantages both from limited Lebanese point of view and from the aspects of US policy. From aspect of Lebanese political situation, opposition forces would find themselves undercut since they had so vigorously clamored for US withdrawal and would now find that US by voluntary agreement with Lebanese Government and President-elect was in fact initiating such a withdrawal.

From wider aspect of US policy objectives, it seemed to us there would be advantages if a symbolic re-embarkation commenced prior to convening of special session UNGA. It would likewise go far to disarm criticism of US by Russian and Cairo Radios over alleged “intervention”.

General Chehab was quick to see these advantages and said he agreed with idea in principle. However (so far has he come from his original attitude toward landing of US forces), he very much hoped we would not make more than a token withdrawal but would leave bulk of our forces intact in Lebanon until peace and security of country had been assured. General also said he could use concept of a token withdrawal as a bargaining point with opposition. He did not want “to give them this free.” General said he had some hope of being able to form interim government of non-political figures, and evacuation of our forces might be used, possibility as bargaining point in arranging for such a government. However in general, Chehab concurred in advantages of a partial redeployment provided our main strength remained here.

Accordingly, we recommend that discretionary authority grant be given CINCSPECOMME to initiate withdrawal of at least one and possibly two Marine battalions if this is concurred in by General Chehab. We are firmly of belief that a spectacular re-embarkation of one battalion across the beaches with attendant publicity if undertaken soon would have beneficial political impact both here and abroad. We have a date to meet General Chehab 1100 hours Monday 11 August to get his final review of situation and recommendation. If DOD and State concur, we would propose to commence redeployment one battalion early next week.

Other points discussed with Chehab may be summarized briefly:

1. Security situation: Although there were many individual acts of banditry, kidnapping and arson as well as a certain amount of internecine village fighting, Chehab said he would on the whole discern a distinct improvement in internal security. In fact he said he had concluded that situation had improved at least 50 percent in last few days. Much of this development he attributed to desire of the opposition to end insurrection and return to normal life. Through negotiation with various leaders (he named Jumblat, Saeb Salaam and Rashid Karame), he felt there was a general trend toward a return to peaceful conditions. By way of example he cited fact that yesterday at his request Rashid Karame had succeeded in reopening coastal road from Tripoli to the frontier. He added that Jumblat was sending a representative to Damascus to request Syria to keep hands off Lebanon and for UAR to cease any further intervention.

2. Safety of Americans: I told General I was currently reviewing security situation in view of my responsibilities toward Americans resident in Lebanon. He said he would not wish to give an outright estimate because since Chamoun had not indicated any intention of leaving country while still retaining his title as President, he could give no assurance that there would not be a recurrence of terrorism. He could see his way more clearly on a final security estimate within ten days.

We then discussed need for liberty for US forces aship and ashore. Admiral Holloway indicated joint staff planning between Lebanon and US forces had come up with an agreed plan for liberty within strictly delimited area of Beirut which would be under full joint US-Lebanese military police patrol at all times. Chehab said he accepted this in principle but wished merely to assure himself that zones agreed upon were in fact of a character as to prevent acts of provocation against our people on liberty. We shall go ahead in principle with initiating liberty on these terms tomorrow.

We likewise raised question of curfew and made suggestion that as security situation improved stores in Beirut increasingly opened, and idea of shore leave took hold, it might be possible to commence a gradual lifting of curfew restrictions. I suggested, for example, possibility of making curfew hours less onerous than at present. General said he thought this a good idea and made a note of it.

3. Censorship: I told General that although any nation had a complete right to censor news, as a good friend of Lebanon all I could say was that present censorship both military and civilian was building up a vast store of ill will, particularly in the very numerous and influential foreign press corps in Beirut. General took another note, and I plan to follow this further with Chamoun and Malik.

4. Admiral Holloway made a pleasant reference to highly effective services of Colonel Simon, Liaison Officer with General Admams, who is fourth senior ranking officer Lebanese Army, a recent graduate of Command Staff School Leavenworth and an officer who might possibly reach supreme command of Lebanese Armed Forces. Chehab fully reciprocated Holloway’s estimate of Simon’s qualities.

It is interesting that Simon has informed Admiral Holloway and Admiral there a universal feeling in higher echelons of the Lebanese army and public of friendliness toward US. Colonel added reservation that too obvious an association with UK (which is not held in equal high esteem) might seriously jeopardize US position.

Summary: We feel distinct progress is being made with General Chehab as a general and as a president-elect. Would appreciate prompt instructions on concept of a token or phased withdrawal of US forces. Holloway will report separately in more detail on this tonight.²

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–758. Secret; Priority.
2. In CINCSPECOMME telegram 0724 to CNO, August 7, Holloway outlined plans for an initial withdrawal of one battalion of the Marine landing force, as well as for the subsequent phased withdrawal of the entire U.S. force in Lebanon. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files; included in the microfiche supplement)