128. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 14, 19581
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Dulles,
- Mr. Allen Dulles
- General Twining
- Secretary Quarles
- Mr. Hagerty
- General Goodpaster
Following the President’s meeting with the Congressional Leaders, the above group stayed in his office to fix firmly upon specific action steps.
Secretary Dulles said that Lord Hood had talked with him, indicating the Prime Minister is available for phone conversation with the President, should the President so desire, and also that Selwyn Lloyd thinks he should come over to talk with us (Mr. Dulles did not think this is necessary), and finally that, if we go into Lebanon, the British would have to go into Iraq, and they would want to know if we can help and support them there. The President said that it might be better to put our troops into Lebanon unilaterally. Mr. Dulles recalled that we had been working closely with the British on this whole matter. He also said that the United Kingdom has been asked by King Hussein of Jordan for help. The President said he thought we could give them logistical support, but did not see how we could commit ourselves quickly to do more (since this would exceed his constitutional authority without legislative action).
There was next discussion as to when our forces should be put ashore, and when any statement should be made about it. The President stressed strongly that he did not want to make any statement until the landing is actually taking place. It must be done with complete surprise—otherwise opposition could be organized, and we [Page 227] should be under great pressures politically. He thought Chamoun could be notified about an hour and a half ahead of the landing (later he agreed this might be as much as three hours).
He thought a platoon or so should be sent in ahead to clear and secure a direct space. He would prefer the landing to be made at the dock rather than over the beach in anything like combat style.
Mr. Quarles thought that a decision now to go ahead would leave us free to move immediately to the United Nations. He thought there was great merit in giving notice to the United Nations in advance of a landing.
Mr. Hagerty said that some of the Congressmen who were in attendance this afternoon have already been leaking to the press information about the meeting. The President said there was a lot of difference between leaks and an official statement as to intentions.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that we cannot depend on Chamoun to be able to hold his position too long, and that we must therefore plan to move at the earliest possible time.
After further discussion, Secretary Dulles said that we could now take an action in the form of announcing a call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council for a time as early as possible tomorrow morning. The President thought that our best course is to put our forces ashore in Lebanon, with the United Kingdom holding its force ready for Iraq or Jordan. He asked how long our First Marine battalion would be on the ground by itself, and General Twining indicated that it would be something like twelve hours.
There was discussion as to what could be said at the UN meeting if we have put our forces ashore just prior to that meeting. Secretary Dulles said he could stress that events have taken a grave turn, that we have been invited in, and that we are going in. The President interjected that we could add that we seek to stabilize the situation until the United Nations can act.
Mr. Hagerty stressed that we will need a statement to put out at about 4 or 5 AM tomorrow, assuming that our forces go in to land just twelve hours from the time of this meeting. The President suggested that the landing be at about 3 PM Lebanon time. Mr. Dulles would have a statement ready at 8 AM our time to be given out by Mr. Hagerty at the moment we know our forces are ashore. We could include in this announcement a statement that the President will have a statement to the Nation at about noon.
During the discussion it was made clear that Defense should order the landing of the advance Marine contingent at 3 PM, should order elements of the Sixth Fleet now in the Western Mediterranean to move at once to the Eastern Mediterranean (it was recognized that the press would undoubtedly take some notice of this) and that the two battle groups to be moved down from Germany should receive their movement [Page 228] orders at approximately the same time as the initial landings in Lebanon (i.e., should begin their assembly some time tomorrow afternoon Wiesbaden time).
Brigadier General USA
- Source: Eisenhower library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 15.↩