Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

127. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m.¹

Washington, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Congressional leaders (list attached)²
• The Vice President, Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary Macomber, Secretary Anderson, Mr. Allen Dulles, Governor Adams, General Persons, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Harlow, Mr. Martin, Secretary Quarles and General Twining (after first ten minutes)

The President began by thanking the Congressional group for coming up. He said the situation in the Middle East has changed drastically for the worse within the past few hours. President Chamoun has asked us to come in to assist, and American lives and property are endangered in Lebanon. In Iraq the Crown Prince has been murdered and Nuri Said may have been murdered as well. Substantial parts of the Army have gone over to the rebels, but it is not clear that the bulk of the forces have done so. The rebels are of course tied in to groups that are led and influenced by Nasser.

At the President’s request Mr. Allen Dulles gave an intelligence review,³ paralleling his report to the President earlier in the day, and giving information concerning the situations in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel in particular.

At the President’s request Secretary Dulles next reviewed the political situation. He started with a discussion of the situation in Lebanon, stating that Cairo has been whipping up sentiment on calling for violence by radio. That situation had been showing signs of stabilizing up until the Iraq coup. Chamoun had decided not to run to succeed himself, and it looked as though the problem would work out without loss of Lebanese independence. Chamoun now says he is no longer able unaided to preserve Lebanese independence, and we agree, unless the Iraqi forces outside of Baghdad remain loyal to the former regime—this we consider unlikely. Thus, we are faced with the question, should we respond to Chamoun’s appeal. If we go in, our action is likely to accentuate the anti-Western feeling of the Arab masses. While the governments of Iraq [Iran?], Saudi Arabia and Jordan want us to intervene, it is not clear that this action will prevent them from being overthrown. Neighboring states such as Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco would probably also like for us to intervene, but their leaders do not dare to say so. Our intervention would not therefore be likely to be a quick and easy solution. However, if we move quickly and decisively the Soviet Union—which is undoubtedly behind the whole operation—may feel that Nasser has gone too far too fast and may call on him to pull back. Secretary Dulles did not think that the Soviets wished to risk general war. Their long-range missiles are not ready, and they are far inferior in long-range aircraft. Undoubtedly, their violent propaganda against us will continue, and there will be danger to our people in the area. While we will probably be able through the presence of our forces to hold Lebanon’s independence, we would be drawn into the area and it is not clear how we could withdraw.

The opposite side is that it does not appear we can hold Lebanon free if we do not go in. The first consequence of not going in would certainly be that the non-Nasser governments in the Middle East and adjoining areas would be quickly overthrown. Thus, whether we go in or not the result will be very bad within the Middle Eastern area. Elsewhere, the impact of our not going in—from Morocco to Indo–china—would be very unfavorable. Although popular feeling in these countries tends to oppose the West, the governments are anti-Nasser in orientation, even though they do not publicly stress this. With regard to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, it is clear that they would feel—if we do not act—that our inaction is because we are afraid of the Soviet Union. They will therefore lose confidence. We could expect Turkey to continue to work with us but with less firmness and resolution. The question of Iran is much more difficult. The Shah tends to vacillate emotionally, and the popular situation is not good. We would therefore have to expect a rise in neutralism and an increase in the influence of the Soviet Union. Pakistan would stay with us while they are getting equipment from us but would not stand up to the Soviet Union.

In summary, in the Secretary’s judgment, if we do not act we will have to take losses greater than if we do. We would soon be faced with a stronger Soviet Union, with a worsened and weakened situation on our own side.

We must anticipate an immediate effect on the pipelines and tanker transit through the Suez. Offsetting this to some extent is the fact that oil is in better supply than at the time of Suez.

From the standpoint of the United Nations, our action to send forces in is entirely consonant with the provisions regarding collective defense. We would be putting troops where we could act if we found that the disorder arises from a group which is influenced by Communist controlled countries. The Secretary said he had just talked with Hammarskjold.⁴ Last week the two had agreed that the situation could probably be worked out without intervention. The Secretary today told Hammarskjold that the situation has drastically changed. He also said we would keep in close touch with the United Nations. Hammarskjold himself recognized that the situation had altered. At this point the President asked if we had heard anything from the British and Mr. Dulles said we had not.

Mr. Dulles said we had assumed up until now that if it were necessary to go into Lebanon we and the United Kingdom would go in with approximately equal numbers of troops, we going in first. He understood General Twining thought that it might be desirable if the United Kingdom held back, and formed a reserve for possible use in Iraq. He had told Lord Hood of this line of thinking. He was confident the British would want to participate in stationing armed forces in Lebanon in order to uphold their Middle East position.

The President then asked Speaker Rayburn if he had any comments. Mr. Rayburn asked if we go in and intervene and our operation does not succeed, what do we do then. He thought the Russians would threaten general war. The President said it is not possible to prophesy the exact course of events. If we do or if we don’t go in, the consequences will be bad. He thought it was better if we took a strong position rather than a Munich-type position, if we are to avoid the crumbling of our whole security structure. Mr. Rayburn thought that intervention would intensify resentment against us throughout the area. The President agreed that, at least on the popular level, that would be likely to be true.

Senator Knowland said he thought we must respond to the appeal from Chamoun or see the whole area go down the drain piece by piece. Throughout the world a failure on our part to act would be a tremendous victory for Nasser. In his opinion we are in fact at a turning point in history. The President pointed out we would be going into Lebanon at the request of Chamoun, and that our action would be a symbol of American fortitude and readiness to take risks to defend the values of the free world. If Iraq and Jordan ask the British to come in, we would have to consider what our own action should be. Senator Knowland suggested calling the UN Security Council into session. He thought a token force from Iran and Turkey would also be needed.

Speaker Rayburn asked if these are not civil wars. The President said that they have that appearance, but in fact they are being fomented by Nasser. He stressed the danger there would be to the West to be cut off from Middle Eastern oil. Mr. McCormack asked what agreements expressed or implied we have with Lebanon that would require us to come to their support. Secretary Dulles said that they received at the benefit of the Middle East resolution in three respects—first, economic and military assistance to those that desire it to preserve their independence; the declaration that the integrity and independence of the countries of the area are vital to the security of the United States; and third, the President’s authority to intervene to oppose an armed attack by a country dominated by international communism. He added that we are not planning to act under the third category above. It is our thought that the presence of our troops will stabilize the situation. In addition, the tri-partite declaration of 1950 extends to the countries of the area. He recalled that he had said that we wouldn’t send in forces if the United Nations could handle the situation. Today the new situation is such that it could whip through the entire Middle East if left unchecked. Senator Russell asked what we plan to do in Iraq. Secretary Dulles said he had no present plans because we do not know enough. We must find out the thinking of the United Kingdom, Turkey and Iran. Senator Russell said he had no doubt that our troops will be engaged in hostilities if we go into Lebanon. However, he said he was prepared to see us go if our security requires it. Secretary Dulles said we must certainly expect some sniping, but we have some grounds to hope that full-scale opposition will not develop. However, he felt that if the world comes to believe that we will not take risks we are heading for a series of disasters. He recognized that going in has many liabilities. Hostilities may spread, and we may take a heavy beating in propaganda. Senator Russell said that the Soviet prestige is also committed. Mr. Dulles pointed out it has not yet been committed, and that this is why we must act quickly. Senator Russell said he had hoped that, if we had to intervene, we could intervene on a basis in which world opinion would be with us.

Mr. Martin said that there is not much of a choice in his view. If we do not go in we are likely to lose our whole position in the Middle East. He thought that the British should put at least a small force into Lebanon with us.

Secretary Dulles commented that Lebanon is the one country that joined the Middle East resolution. They feel that for that reason they have undergone extra pressure. They feel that we are morally bound to help them.

Senator Mansfield said that he did not think the tri-partite agreement would hold because this is a civil disturbance. He considered that we would be getting into a civil war, and hoped that before American troops go in we would put the matter before the United Nations.

Congressman Vorys asked what our forces would do. General Twining said that three battalions and two battle groups would be landed in Beirut to protect lives and property and support the Lebanese government. They would be under the command of Admiral Holloway. He did not think there would be heavy fighting and did not anticipate they would have to fight their way ashore.

Senator Saltonstall asked whether reasonable men would think we have broken our word to Lebanon if we do not go in. Secretary Dulles said that governments will feel that we have reneged on an agreement. World opinion will be divided. Generally our friends will think that we did the right thing if we go in, and the wrong thing if we do not. Our foes will take just the opposite view. Senator Saltonstall thought that we gained world respect at the time of the Suez incident. Secretary Dulles pointed out some of the differences in the situation. In the present case a country is under attack and has invited us in. Because this is a civil war the situation is unclear and therefore more difficult. He recalled, however, that the Soviet had claimed that Korea was a civil war. The key point is as to whether the strife is fomented, inspired and aided from without. We have a great deal of intelligence as to the money, arms and forces that have been sent in from outside. If we were to adopt the doctrine that Nasser can whip up a civil war without our intervention, our friends will go down to defeat. He cited the “essentials of peace” resolution in the United Nations which provided that nations should refrain from fomenting civil war.⁵ It also brought out that we must look to the real source of the impetus for internal strife.

Congressman Albert asked whether we could not retaliate in kind, and outdo Nasser and Syria in subversion. It was pointed out that we have no successful record in this regard.

Senator Fulbright recalled that the United Nations had found that the strife is not being supported from the outside. Secretary Dulles said that this finding was that, at the moment the inspection was made, support was not moving across the border, but was silent as to earlier movement. The United Nations sent observers and the situation was tending to calm down, but had now been greatly stirred up.

Senator Russell asked whether, if the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian governments were to fall, we would have to go in. Secretary Dulles said we have no relation with them comparable to Lebanon. They could, however, seek to invoke the Middle East doctrine. The President commented that Saud has sent us word that if we do not come in we are finished in the Middle East. Senator Bridges said that he believes we have a commitment to go to the aid of Lebanon and that we must keep it. He thought that control of the Middle Eastern oil is of determining effect on the free world’s future. If the Middle East goes, all of Africa immediately goes as well.

Congressman Vinson stated that we must make up our minds to go the distance—that he thought we must envisage deeper involvement. The President said he believes that when we decided to resort to force we must be ready to use whatever force is necessary. The whole group knew how repugnant to him the resort to force would be. He did believe, however, that free government is on trial. While this could be a terrible thing he would welcome suggestions if anyone could tell him a better line of action. Really we are standing for just what we have stood for since 1947 and the attack on Greece. Mr. Vorys recalled that the Soviets had claimed that the Greek affair was a civil war and Secretary Dulles agreed.

Senator Saltonstall asked when, if our operation succeeds, we will be able to get out. The President said there is one thing about war he would stress—we must expect it to be different from what was initially anticipated. The free world is going to have to make sacrifices if it is going to win through. He recognized that even this group, with all its wisdom, would find this a terribly difficult decision to make. However, we are faced with war-like struggle, and we must accept the burdens of defense.

The President asked how soon an emergency session of the United Nations could be called. Mr. Dulles said it could be done within minutes after a decision was taken. He commented that by the following day it should be possible to see the situation more clearly in Iraq. Mr. McCormack asked whether it would not be better to send our troops in before calling the emergency session. Secretary Dulles said that it would be—thus we would put our prestige on the line before the Soviets do. Accordingly, we cannot allow much time to pass before acting. Mr. McCormack asked whether the President would act by legislation or under his powers as Commander in Chief. The President said he thought legislation would be needed before too long, but that if he tried to act after a debate the Soviets would be able to forestall us. He therefore thought he would be obliged to take action, were he to decide on this course, and then put the matter before Congress. Secretary Dulles said that we would not be sending our troops in to fight, but on a basis more like that by which they are now in some twenty-five other nations in which we station troops.

Senator Fulbright said that it is not clear that this crisis is Soviet-or Communist-inspired. He said that perhaps Nasser is playing his own game. The President commented that there is not enough hard intelligence to be completely sure. It is clear, however, that whatever Nasser may think he is doing, the Soviets have a tremendous interest in this. Mr. Allen Dulles recalled that Nasser had recently visited Moscow and that his presence at the present time in Yugoslavia is the result of long-standing arrangements. Senator Fulbright asked whether CIA had had notice of the coup in Iraq. [1 line of source text not declassified] Senator Green commented that we do not know the full facts of the matter as yet. He said there is much that we could lose in war, but more that we could lose if we don’t make good on our agreements.

Senator Wiley asked whether we have consulted our allies—specifically the British and the Turks. Secretary Dulles said the Turks have been pressing us hard to take this action. The British believe the action should be taken. Also the Israelis, the French and the Iranians have been pressing us. Senator Wiley said he had two further questions—is it necessary in the interest of America that this should be done, and what will public opinion be throughout the world. Secretary Dulles recalled his earlier statement that reaction will follow existing division. The West will applaud us and probably Latin America also. In Asia, India and Burma will oppose. There is not much vocal expression in Africa. He did feel it is clear that the backbones of our friends will dissolve if we do not go in. Senator Wiley asked as to the strength of Egyptian forces and Mr. Allen Dulles said that they are not in a high status of military capability. The principal problems facing our forces would be the people of the area and its great spaces.

Mr. Morgan asked whether, if we do go into Lebanon, the Soviets are likely to go into Iraq. Secretary Dulles said that they might send in volunteers but he would not see it as likely unless the British, Turks or Iranians send in their forces. Mr. Morgan said the North Koreans are demanding the removal of our troops from South Korea and asked if there is any connection between this and the Middle Eastern events. Secretary Dulles did not think so.

Congressman Chiperfield thought that we had no possible choice but to send our troops into Lebanon. Senator Fulbright asked whether, if the Soviets were not involved, this would make any difference to us. For example, if we felt that Nasser is independent and not subject to direction by the Soviet Union, could we not then hope that he would collapse of his own weight. But with a close working arrangement between him and the Soviets, a victory for him is a victory for Soviet communism. The President commented that one crucial question is what the victims believe. Chamoun believes it is Soviet communism that is causing him his trouble.

Senator Russell asked whether, if we send in forces, we would have to mobilize and strengthen our own forces. The President did not think it would be necessary immediately, but said that two divisions would be alerted and made ready to move. Mr. McCormack asked what the NSC had thought of this. The President said that he had met with the statutory members of the NSC in his office and that they had laid out alternatives and had seemed to feel that the alternative of doing nothing was worse than the other. He did want to stress, however, that this is not a matter of a decision already taken—that he wanted to hear the full views of the group and then try to reach a decision. General Twining commented that if we do not go in we must expect to lose the Middle East and Africa and encourage Communist expansion in the Far East. We must recognize, however, that the situation might spread if we do go in. In that case our forces are ready.

Senator Mansfield said that there are questions of prestige and policy involved and suggested consideration of the possibility of requesting a United Nations emergency session and going in on a multilateral basis. Secretary Dulles said that in his talk with Hammarskjold they had discussed the need for some way to make Lebanon a ward of the United Nations. He did expect to have a meeting of the United Nations Security Council tomorrow morning. He recalled that under Article 51 member states are allowed to act until the United Nations can itself take action. Anything that we do will be in the nature of an initial reaction to the situation, until an adequate UN force replaces us. We cannot, however, wait to see what they will do. The President asked what we will do, supposing we went in and the UN were to condemn us. Mr. Dulles said he thought we would have to pull out. Speaker Rayburn said he felt that if we are going to do this we should not wait for the United Nations. Senator Knowland asked concerning statements to the press, referring to the question of leakage before the President and the government take action. He hoped the discussion within the meeting could be kept secure and simply say that it was a briefing on the Middle East. The President said he knew that everyone was conscious of the need to avoid even inadvertent disclosures and suggested that there had simply been an examination of alternatives. Mr. Rayburn said he would say simply that there was discussion on the situation in the Middle East. Senator Russell suggested that the President should make a statement at once. The President said we would be working on one, and in addition studying our probable needs for money for which we would have to make a request to the Congress.

Mr. Rayburn concluded by saying that only one person should make a statement on the matter, and that should be the President.

G
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 16. Another memorandum of this conversation was prepared by Bryce Harlow. (Ibid.,Bryce N. Harlow: Records, 1953–1961, Middle East; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. The attached list indicates that the Congressional leaders attending the meeting included Senators Mike Mansfield, Theodore Green, William Fulbright, Richard Russell, William Knowland, Styles Bridges, Leverett Saltonstall, Alexander Wiley, Everett Dirksen, and H. Alexander Smith, Speaker Sam Rayburn, and Congressmen John McCormack, Carl Albert, Thomas Morgan, A. S. J. Carnahan, Carl Vinson, Clarence Cannon, Joseph Martin, Robert Chiperfield, John Vorys, John Taber, and Leo Allen.
3. On July 18, Allen Dulles sent a copy of the briefing notes which he used for this meeting to the White House, under cover of a memorandum to Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, 1958 Iraqi Coup Effects in the Mid-East; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. See supra.
5. See footnote 2, Document 102.