129. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 14, 19581
SUBJECT
- Iraq and Lebanon
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Ali Gholi Ardalan, Iranian Ambassador
- Mr. Ali S. H. Urguplu, Turkish Ambassador
- Mr. Mohammed Ali, Pakistani Ambassador
- NEA—William M. Rountree
- NE—Richard B. Parker
Mr. Rountree said that it had been a very disturbing day. There was little firm news from Baghdad. King Faisal’s and Nuri’s whereabouts were unknown. Fadhil Jamali, Abdul Ilah, Nuri’s son, and a number of others were reported killed. There was no clear indication as to the extent of resistance, if any, to the coup d’etat. The rebels appeared to have firm control of Baghdad radio. The British Embassy had been sacked. The situation had all the earmarks of a pro-Nasser, anti-Western coup.
The situation in Jordan was precarious, but King Hussein was determined and was in control. He had recently announced his assumption of the functions of Chief of the Arab Union.
Mr. Rountree continued that the purpose of the meeting was to consult with the Ambassadors and to express to them our concern over the situation in Iraq. A great deal of thought had been given to this matter at the highest level in the U.S. Government. We were concerned because we believed perhaps there was a connection between the situations in Iraq and Lebanon. We had asked for a meeting of the Security Council for the following morning. This would be a very [Page 229] important meeting. He wished he were in a position to tell them what we were planning but the details were still being worked out and he could say only that we would take action responsive to the situation.
The Pakistani Ambassador asked if Mr. Rountree meant by this that we were planning to take action in Lebanon. Mr. Rountree replied affirmatively. The Pakistani Ambassador asked how this could be effective if we did not at the same time back up Jordan which also was seriously threatened by the events in Iraq. Mr. Rountree replied that we were seriously concerned with the situation in Jordan and were watching it closely but that we would have to cross that particular bridge when we came to it. Our planned action in Lebanon would be evidence of the seriousness of our concern for the situation throughout the Middle East. The Iranian Ambassador asked if the Security Council was being called to discuss Iraq or Lebanon. Mr. Rountree replied that Lebanon was to be the subject of the discussion and that at the meeting we would inform the Security Council of the action we were taking and the reasons for it.
The Iranian Ambassador said that this was a very wise decision. The Pakistani Ambassador said that the real showdown had come. Our action now would determine whether we would make a strategic retreat or face up to the Soviet menace in the Middle East. The Iranian Ambassador said that as he understood our plans, by giving support to Lebanon we would give support to Hussein and would let our friends in Iraq know that we were still a force to be reckoned with. The people of the area would know that the United States was serious in its intent.
Mr. Rountree said that in general he agreed with this analysis. The difficulty with the Iraqi situation was that as yet we did not have many facts about it. There might be loyal elements or the coup might be completely successful. The Iranian Ambassador said that he wished to be forgiven for mentioning it but two years ago the Iranians had been informed that their fears regarding Syria were exaggerated. Events had proved the Iranians correct. A year ago he personally had told the British Ambassador that something was going on beneath the surface in Iraq. The Turkish Ambassador said that he and his colleagues had not been surprised by the coup and felt that now was the time to stop the steady decline of the Western position in the area.
Mr. Rountree replied that the trend of events in the Middle East over the last several years had been fairly clear to us. The danger of Communism had been clear. The danger of the spread of Nasserism had been even clearer. We had realized the tremendous appeal of Nasser throughout the Arab World. It was obvious that this was a problem with which only local governments could deal. We had tried to work with these governments and support them. He agreed that the coup in Iraq was not totally unexpected, but the rapidity of action, not preceded by rumors of an impending coup, was most unusual in the [Page 230] Arab world. As a result of rumors and reports regarding a similar situation in Jordan, King Hussein had been much more on guard than King Faisal and had been able to take action to forestall a planned coup.
The Turkish Ambassador said that this was an important moment in which the United States should join the Baghdad Pact in order to save the situation. This was the time to show that the United States was really concerned. He asked if it was not necessary now to reconsider U.S. policy toward Nasser. Mr. Rountree inquired what the Turkish Ambassador considered to be U.S. policy toward Nasser. The Turkish Ambassador replied that because of our desire to get along with Nasser we had been lukewarm in our support of the Arab Union.
Mr. Rountree replied that this was absolutely fallacious. We had wanted to help and had supported fully the Arab Union. We had offered large amounts of money to cover the Union’s budget deficit. We had been carrying Jordan on our shoulders for a year and one-half. We were willing and ready to support the Arab Union but we could not do everything. We could not put the Iraqis and Jordanians together and force them to cooperate effectively. This was something they had to do for themselves. With regard to our policy toward Nasser we had not resumed economic aid to him and our release of frozen Egyptian assets had been made because there was no legal justification for retaining them in the U.S. after a settlement had been reached between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company. We understood Nasser. Our troubles with him were not concerned with the situation in Egypt but with Nasser’s desire to subvert other states while we were committed to support their independence and integrity.
The Pakistani Ambassador referred to statements made in the Congress earlier in the day critical of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact. He said that such statements were very disturbing to people in the area, who did not understand the American constitutional system and who thought these were official statements of the U.S. Government. Mr. Rountree noted that this was one of the difficulties of foreign policy in a democratic state where freedom of speech and expression were maintained.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/7–1458. Secret. Drafted by Parker on July 16.↩