Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, July 21, 1959, 5 p.m.

193. Paris for USRO, Thurston and West. Reference A–Deptel 143; B–Paris 249 [269] to Department-Athens 10.¹

1. Embassy has for some time been conscious of two considerations affecting US policy on IRBMs for Greece which are difficult to reconcile. First is belief it would be unwise to push GOG to decision it is obviously reluctant to make, and for which Greek public opinion is currently poorly prepared. Second that in absence of some impetus from without, GOG may continue indefinitely to hold issue in suspense, to prejudice of SACEUR’s military plans.

2. Re first consideration, although Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have indicated desire to proceed with IRBM program there are signs that at least some leaders of GOG apprehensive of internal political reaction. Department will recall for example that Minister to Prime Minister, Tsatsos, who has principal responsibility in field public relations, revealed nervousness on whole subject atomic weapons during course 144 B negotiations² and was upset at text proposed news release which referred to agreement as in furtherance NATO atomic stockpile program. So far as Embassy can judge, these apprehensions are exaggerated and although announcement decision to conclude IRBM agreement would be greeted by storm from left, government should be able to ride this out without real danger. However, GOG obviously has not felt sure enough on this score to move ahead purposefully.

3. If there were definite signs that GOG attempting prepare public opinion, and shape events so as support eventual affirmative decision, Embassy would recommend they be allowed work matter out for themselves. There are few such signs, however. Issue of IRBM’s has been freely ventilated in press for more than year and particularly in past few months, in relation to atomic cooperation agreement, Khrushchev’s threats, and various proposals for atom-free zone in Balkans and Adriatic. Throughout this period, GOG has reiterated denial that IRBM is active issue, as far as Greece is concerned.

4. Embassy forced to conclude that while GOG has propensity in favor IRBMs, there is no positive plan to move toward early decision, and any manifestation public opposition is met with administration of sedation. GOG policy seems limited to hoping that something will turn up which will ease internal problem. In absence of external stimulus Embassy sees little reason to expect GOG to resolve its doubts and take affirmative decision in foreseeable future.

5. Therefore, if there are urgent military reasons for deciding on location of IRBM squadron in question, Embassy considers that approach by SACEUR to Greek [Government] along lines suggested reference telegram A is appropriate and desirable.

6. It has seemed important to Embassy to maintain position that deployment of IRBMs in Greece was in first instance matter for agreement between GOG and SACEUR. We have therefore never taken initiative in discussing this question with Greeks though we have of course been as responsive as we could when Foreign Minister raised matter with US. Present assessment based on general information available Embassy and does not represent results of any fresh “soundings”, which in Embassy views should be made at this juncture by SACEUR. Agree Norstad’s views cited reference B, that utmost discretion required in dealings with Greeks on this issue. Our estimate is that if pressed make decision odds are they will agree proceed with IRBM’s if US prepared foot virtually total bill.³

Briggs

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/7–2159. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris.
1. Telegram 143 printed as Document 266. Regarding telegram 269, see footnote 4 thereto.
2. Reference is to the negotiations that concluded with the May 6 agreement on the exchange of defense-related nuclear information between the United States and Greece. See Document 258.
3. In Cahto 184 from Geneva, July 31, Herter commented:

   “Before approaching GOG along lines Deptel 143 hope consideration can be given these questions:

   “1. Is this type approach consistent with President’s ‘serious reservations regarding any attempt to encourage Greeks to take IRBMs in present circumstances’ (Tocah 110 of June 16) and his view that we should make clear ‘that we were not pressing GOG to come to decision except at time of its own choosing’ (Tocah 122)? You will recall this led to revision first para Secto 241 to include US feels that decision on missiles is one to be taken by GOG at whatever time it feels appropriate,’ and we have no wish to press for early decision if, as Athens 193 indicates, this will require us be prepared foot virtually total bill. In view this year’s congressional cuts in bedrock FY 1960 MAP request, would this mean further reductions in conventional military aid to Asian allies and perhaps NATO which would outweigh advantages early IRBM deployment Greece?” (Department of State, Central Files, 781.5612/7–3159)