Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece⁰

Washington, July 16, 1959, 9:33 p.m.

143. Paris for USRO, Thurston and West. Athens 2879 rptd Topol 160. Secto 241 rptd Athens 18, Paris 329. Secto 258 rptd Athens 21, Paris 339. Paris 4664, rpted Athens 106.¹ Over last year Karamanlis and Averoff have repeatedly given impression they prepared go ahead on IRBMs once certain current or prospective and potentially troublesome events were behind them. Initially, they desired to wait until after municipal elections. More recently they were apparently deterred by impact of Soviet Bloc campaign for denuclearization of Balkans, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] decision in favor of IRBM bases had been made but announcement to be withheld until after conclusion East-West conferences. These conferences could go on in one form or another for some time. Moreover, prospective emergence of Grivas on Greek political scene² may again deter Karamanlis and we may find ourselves faced with still further delays. Possibility has also occurred to us that Greek tactics on this problem might be related to efforts to get more US aid in support of Greek defense cost burden.

We aware of political problems IRBMs create for GOG and need for GOG prepare ground thoroughly. Only recently Secretary assured GOG in letter that this is decision to be taken by GOG at “whatever time it feels appropriate” and that we have no wish “to press for early decision if that should in any way be embarrassing to GOG”.³ Continued delay is however holding up action on NATO program to meet essential military requirements. If this delay is likely to continue indefinitely, it may be necessary to deploy elsewhere in near future IRBM squadron now scheduled for installation Greece.

We understand Norstad has seen this problem as we do and is bringing no pressure on Greeks, taking line that while deployment of IRBM’s in Greece is militarily desirable from NATO viewpoint, it is up to Greek Govt to make decision. We understand his last contact with Greeks on this subject was with Dovas through Thurston in April. In view of dilemma with which we now faced and Defense desire know one way or another, we propose, subject to your views, to consult SACEUR and ask if he believes it now timely and appropriate for him to follow up on earlier contacts with Greeks. He could point out without prejudice Secretary’s letter that NATO has an urgent military requirement to meet and that he desires latest Greek thinking so that alternative deployment can be developed if GOG decides it cannot now or in reasonably near future accept deployment in Greece.

Your estimate of current situation desired together with your comment on wisdom of SACEUR approach along lines outlined above.⁴

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.4097/6–1859. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Owen T. Jones, cleared in EUR and NEA and in the Department of Defense, and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Paris as Topol 131.
1. In telegram 2879 from Athens, June 18, Briggs reported on discussions with Karamanlis over the legal and technical issues involved in the placement of IRBMs in Greece. (Ibid., 611.4097/6–1859) Regarding Secto 241, see footnote 2, Document 261. Regarding Secto 258, see footnote 2, Document 262. In telegram 4664 from Paris, June 16, Houghton reported that Norstad’s conversation with the Greeks had not yielded substantive results. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/6–1659)
2. Grivas, the leader of the EOKA terrorist underground during the Cypriot crisis, returned to Greece on March 17 and became active in politics.
3. Reference is to the message from Herter to Averoff; see footnote 2, Document 261, and Document 262.
4. Telegram 269 from Paris, July 20, reported: “When reference telegram brought to Norstad’s attention today, he expressed hope that utmost discretion be employed in US soundings Athens so that if we decide to disengage from this particular project and to proceed to alternative deployment, we can do so without adverse impact on Greek confidence in NATO and US.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/7–2059)