Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

268. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, July 30, 1959, 1 a.m.

275. Rome for Liaison Officer.

1. Following telegram bears on general subject Greek Government desire for higher level economic aid from US. For purposes of better focus, submit these observations thereon:

2. Relationship between ward and benefactor never is altogether easy one, and US for so many years has been in position of foster parent that appreciable portion energies Greek Government vis-à-vis US appear to have been directed towards demonstrating that (A) while our aid deeply appreciated, (B) it is inadequate to needs posed by conglomerate of Soviet pressures, difficult internal political position, and manifold and possibly endemic economic problems. As my predecessors discovered, it is normal for newly-arrived US Ambassador¹ to hear such phrases as “we deeply grateful, but more aid essential”, or “we stretch to utmost, and, if further defense effort required, US must bear burden”. This is not to gainsay elements truth these statements, for, as Department knows, Embassy questions ability Greek economy absorb further military burdens, or even to carry on with present extent military program.

3. Fact my arrival approximately coincided with (A) US Congressional action on aid authorization, and (B) time when total aid availabilities are to be apportioned amongst world-wide beneficiaries, may have led to enhanced propensity for Greek officialdom to make pitch for further and greater aid. In any case, this latter has burden observations made to me in past three weeks by virtually every high official with whom I have spoken.

4. My chancery colleagues are in agreement that Greek officials may exaggerate dangers to which they subjected by Soviet rocket rattling, campaign for Balkan denuclearized zone, and consequent or incidental domestic political difficulties. On other hand, they believe that Greek economic situation in fact difficult, with rising tide unemployment, drift from farms and islands to Athens–Piraeus, and fragile balance of payments picture. One of most cogent arguments I have heard since my arrival in favor greater US economic aid has been based on our failure take more account of laudable Greek record in fiscal matters, and Greece’s staunch adherence to West, contrasted our willingness bail out such nations as Turkey (and now Spain) as prodigal sons.²

5. In face what perhaps can be interpreted as emotional blackmail, but which I prefer (as of now) to consider in terms cumulative factors set forth above, it is my conclusion that sooner we can clarify totality our anticipated aid, better off both we and Greek Government will be. This pertains not only to defense support field, but to such pending DLF projects as Acheloos (and later Salonika highway). It also would be helpful in our efforts to reassure Karamanlis administration and Greek public opinion that we place high value on Greece’s adherence to West if we could reach early and sympathetic attitude toward projected Prime Minister visit to US (see Embassy despatch 65, July 23, 1959).³ Crucial geographical position Greece, its demonstrable resistance to Soviet threats and blandishments, and county’s real economic needs, render concrete steps on our part not only desirable but necessary.

Briggs

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/7–3059. Secret. Repeated to Paris and Rome.
1. Ellis O. Briggs was appointed Ambassador to Greece on April 8 and presented his credentials on July 15.
2. Reference is to “stabilization” loans provided to Turkey and Spain through Development Loan Fund loans, in an effort to counter inflationary pressures on their currencies.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8111/7–2359)