Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, June 26, 1959, 7 p.m.

2970. Rome also for Lister. Paris also for Embassy.

1. Foreign Minister Averoff asked me call this morning. Said yesterday’s Soviet formal note¹ proposing conference to examine creation of an atom-free zone in Balkans and Adriatic area and proposing that security and independence of countries in this area be guaranteed jointly by interested countries was exceedingly clever and intelligent move and would cause GOG some difficulty vis-à-vis Greek public opinion.

2. Foreign Minister said this put Greek Government probably Italian Government and perhaps some others squarely on the spot with respect public opinion, which inclined view proposal either as good idea, or at very minimum idea which deserves serious consideration. He said “parenthetically” that Soviets once again have shown themselves able seize initiative to embarrassment of West, and that it unfortunate initiative so often lacking on Western side.

3. Said Karamanlis government has considered Soviet note and regards it as propaganda move and trap, and offering no security. Foreign Office plans comment semi-officially through “authoritative government source” but will at this juncture avoid either immediate or direct answer to Soviet proposals, as it must take care not provoke public criticism here that government rejecting proposals out of hand and means to go ahead with bases in spite of double guarantee (i.e. US and Soviet) offered by Russians. Averoff said he had taken soundings on Soviet proposal and was surprised at number solid citizens who felt proposal may be indication of Soviet sincerity and merits serious consideration.

4. Averoff said it was up to West, and especially US, to make early answer to Soviet proposal on lines it was trap, propaganda move, and offered no real security. He thought best tactic would be to put responsibility for reply on European shoulders, but care must be taken to avoid simple “nyet” to proposal. What was needed was clear, forceful and reasoned reply that people would understand and accept. He hoped US would take initiative to obtain such a statement, and would make immediate contact with other governments to assure that no soft or divided answer was given Soviet note. In this connection he said yesterday’s statement by US spokesman denying UK favored nuclear-free zone² was very good and very useful, and would disabuse many people who have come to think UK well-disposed to idea of nuclear-free zone and in disagreement with US on this matter.

5. Averoff said he had not yet had opportunity for full discussion Soviet note with Spaak, hoped do so today.³ He speculated that might be advisable to call special meeting of NATO Council to consider note to insure unified reply “as some countries may be inclined to be soft,” but thought this might present complications and perhaps best method was to have recourse to usual diplomatic channels. Essential thing however was to get agreement on a forceful reply.

6. Averoff said he thought Soviet note would have bad effect in Italy and cause Italian Government real trouble.

7. Finally Averoff said all of foregoing not merely his views but represented considered views of Karamanlis government.

8. Comment: I believe Averoff not exaggerating probable public reaction here to Soviet proposal which in some respects similar to proposal Markezinis⁴ has been propagandizing here for some weeks. We have had some indications that despite favorable public reception to strong government replies to Khrushchev speech in Koritza, and Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian notes, Karamanlis has been troubled by undercurrent of uneasiness in respect to idea on advanced weapons bases in Greece, and by a certain popular disposition in Greece to sincerely examine nuclear-free zone concept before deciding on bases. This, I think, explains several reports we have received that Karamanlis still undecided on advance weapons bases.⁵

Berger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/6–2959. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Belgrade, Moscow, Ankara, Rome, and Paris for USRO.
1. The Soviet note was delivered to the Governments of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. For text of the Soviet note and the U.S. reply, see Department of State Bulletin, August 3, 1959, pp. 160–161.
2. This statement has not been further identified.
3. Spaak visited Greece June 24–30 for a vacation and for talks with Greek leaders.
4. Progressive Party leader Spyros Markezinis visited Moscow in late April for talks with Khrushchev and Mikoyan. On his return to Greece, Markezinis endorsed a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans and increased Greek trade with Eastern Europe.
5. In telegram 3418 to Athens, June 27, the Department of State indicated that it favored separate replies to the Soviet note by the NATO nations addressed and appended a draft U.S. reply. (Department of State, Central Files, 660.00/6–2759)