Office of the Historian

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State0

Helsinki, July 29, 1959, 7 p.m.

80. Re Department telegram 76.1 Apparently I did not make myself completely clear in my previous messages. My proposal was simply that as soon as possible I be given standby authority to give assurances to the Government of Finland that limited US economic assistance along lines offered last fall would be available to soften effects of new Soviet economic pressures if and when, and only if and when, circumstances warranted. I envisaged that circumstances might warrant such assurances if (1) Finland had made clear its definite intention to associate with the OS; (2) Soviet pressures were being applied or clearly threatened; and (3) Finnish authorities gave indication that they intended to stand firm in face of Soviet pressures. As I pointed out in my previous messages, I am by no measure sure that these circumstances will arise. If they should, however, I feel it essential from the standpoint of our national interest that we be able to back up the Finns to the extent feasible and without delay. In other words, I am requesting that preparations, including necessary clearances and decisions, be made in advance of a crisis which admittedly may never arise but which if it does arise will require fast action on our part.

I would also like to make clear that I am not now asking for a policy decision as to what steps, if any, the US should take if Finland decides not to join the Seven and finds itself in position where it will have to get special treatment from Western countries including the US, or fall into increased economic dependence on USSR. This is an important question and I feel that both the Department and the Embassy should give serious thought to it. However, it is a different question entirely from the one posed above. For it I agree that a basic study of the type requested at end of your telegram is required and such a study will be prepared by the Embassy as quickly as possible.

My comments on six numbered points in reference telegram are:

(1)
I agree that negotiations on broader FTA between the Outer Seven and EEC would raise second hurdle for Finland in relations with USSR but I do not see that Finnish participation in OS will measurably slow progress toward FTA. I doubt that other participants at that stage will be greatly influenced by Finland’s special needs and Finns probably [Page 545] will have to find ways of meeting conditions or dropping out. I am influenced in this by expectation that Finns will probably be associate rather than full member even in OS. If this point was intended to imply that Finland would be some kind of ‘Trojan horse” for Soviets, I find no evidence to support this view. If the Soviets accept it, they probably are deluding themselves, just as they may have done in 1955 when they consented to Finland’s entry into the Nordic Council.
(2)
I agree that the dollar loan component of a standby aid program could be quite limited and I am thinking strictly within the limits of an initial authority of the type granted to me last fall. I entirely agree that this might prove inadequate in the long pull if there were a complete break in Finno-Soviet trade. I feel, therefore, that we must also give thought to what we could and should do in this circumstance, although I agree that further basic studies will be required before any decisions are made on this particular point.
(3)
Composition of the present Sukselainen Government is not at issue here, since I had no idea of extending the assurances of aid in the absence of evidence of will to resist Soviet pressures. Minority Government naturally not as good as Fagerholm government, but it never was intended to be permanent solution. Also should be remembered that Fagerholm government, with best will in world, was hampered in standing firm because it lacked support of President, partly because it was vulnerable to charges of being anti-Soviet. Present government in much better position to stand firm because it is closely identified with it in the eyes of the Soviets.
(4)
It was not my thought that a crisis could be avoided through our aid, particularly such as we might be prepared to offer in an initial stage, but only that the effects of a crisis could be ameliorated at least during a period of transition which it would be in our interest to facilitate. In the longer pull, we would have to face up squarely to the issue of whether we were prepared to let Finland fall prey to Soviet economic pressure.
(5)
Critical Finnish move probably will not come before September at the earliest and may well be some months off. This should not, however, bar advance planning on our part.
(6)
No comment at this time; bearing of this on our problem not clear to me.2

Hickerson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60E/7–2959. Secret; Limit Distribution.↩
  2. Document 209.↩
  3. No telegraphic response to this message was found in Department of State files, but see Document 211.↩