211. Letter From the Ambassador to Finland (Hickerson) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Willoughby)0

Dear Woody: Your letter of September 91 was, as you no doubt expected, not encouraging as regards prospects for a decision favorable to prompt action in the event we are asked in the coming months for emergency assistance to Finland. The main opposition to our proposal, namely that we are over-burdened with world commitments, must be placed against the stark fact of Finland’s vulnerability to Soviet pressures and the risk we run if Soviet influence is permitted to expand into northern Europe. I cannot believe, for the scope of envisaged needs here, that the opposing argument has essential national security validity, but you have the battle to fight in Washington and I trust you will let us know if further information or support from here is needed. If crisis action at the time is the only way, experience has shown that it could be more costly, run the danger of losing timing impact and thus possibly the game, while possibly not helping our relationships with the Finns during and following a period of uncertainty.

More serious to my mind are basic misconceptions, presumably in the Department and elsewhere, concerning our proposal shown in the counter-arguments you list, which sometimes might be grasped to justify the theme of over-commitment which you mentioned. There must be an adequate fund of readily available basic factual intelligence reports and studies, not to mention our Embassy messages, both in the Department and other concerned responsible government agencies, which could not be questioned by proponents of some of the points you list.

Let me take up points one and two, the danger of lapsing into “massive aid” and the current shortage of MSP funds. Such aid would not be wanted and would be refused by the Finns even if proposed, since the latter action would be to misread the entire situation known to us. It is important to appreciate that while the proposed aid would be limited to the dimensions already known to the Department, within the Finnish environment its chief value could well be psychological in convincing the Finns that we would stand behind them if they in turn stand firm in maintaining their economic independence from the USSR. Thus there is the real likelihood of only a portion of the trump suit proposed would be actually used to win the hand.

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The point three, that proposed aid might encourage the Finns to take rash action, would be far from the case. It seems to me that what we must seek by our own moves is to discourage any trend toward progressive accommodation to the Soviets. The Finns are most cautious and are equally alive to the dangers of their situation as we and intelligence reports in Washington, including a current Embassy despatch on the Finnish Government soon to go forward, should be adequate to counter the observation you list.

Points four and seven are similar. One is to the effect that United States aid might be related by the Soviets to possible Finnish participation in the Outer Seven and induce the Russians to put pressure on the Finns to remain outside. The other idea is that we should not help the Finns join the Outer Seven until we are sure of the consistency of this proposed organization with our commercial policies. I do not think it is necessary to link the Outer Seven with our proposed action for Finland, since the contingency could arise apart from the Outer Seven. If we first need a U.S. policy toward the Outer Seven before discussing our proposal for Finland, you are best aware of the time this might entail to the detriment of our taking any serious action with respect to Finland. The cautious attitude of the latter toward the Outer Seven is only too clear and at present, as you know, presumably partially at the request of the British, Finland does not even have observer status at the current sessions of the proposed club members.

The fifth point you mention, doubt whether any offer of aid could shore up Finnish resistance and whether our efforts of last November had any real effect, we think could be answered in the following fashion. Any possible counter-productive elements in our approach at that time resulted from the risk that President Kekkonen might regard our action as being either aimed at him personally in Finland’s domestic politics, or mainly at achieving a U.S. propaganda victory over the Russians. The leaks to the press during and after the crisis may have tended to reinforce his suspicions on both counts. At the time of any future crisis, our problem will not be to convince the Finns of our readiness to help, but rather to make good on what the Finns will expect of us as a result of our approach last year. Were we to fail to respond promptly in the future to a request for aid in a similar crisis, the “counter-productive” suspicions present last year would be confirmed and thus we would directly contribute to the growth of the type of undesirable neutralism the Soviets are now seeking to promote in Finland.

The point seven to the effect that we should first explore the willingness of other western countries to aid Finland, is a desirable principle but we wonder whether the increased danger of publicity is worth expected benefits. You may recall I was concerned for this reason over a decision to raise this issue in the NATO Council last year. However, my [Page 548] impression is that our allies are now alert to the possible recurrence of Soviet pressures. Advance consultation with so many countries could cause obvious difficulties and varying assessments which could have a most inconclusive outcome. On the other hand, if pressure actually develops, I would expect, on the basis of the views of my foreign colleagues here, that the response of our allies would be generally favorable.

My comments set forth above may be of use to you in connection with the problem we are both facing and, in conclusion, all best wishes.

Sincerely,

John D. Hickerson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5–MSP/9–3059. Secret; Official–Informal.
  2. Not found in Department of State files.