209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland0
76. Embtels 31, 64, and Emdes 34.1 Dept appreciates important effect offer US assistance might have on Finnish decision associate with OS as well as desirability being ready on standby basis to make such offer.
However, several additional factors bear on problem: (1) As Embassy aware might prove difficult reconcile Finnish participation OS at this time with realization OS accommodation EEC. (2) MSP funds extremely tight and it would have to be clearly demonstrated that any aid program with dollar loan component (which necessarily quite limited) would in fact be essential and effective quite apart from immediate psychological impact. (3) Compared to situation last November, present Government much softer toward Soviets and therefore less reliable than Fagerholm Government. (4) Question whether present Govt would challenge Soviets if drastic trade sanctions and attendant economic, social, and political crisis in prospect. (Such crisis could only be partially ameliorated by US aid regardless of size, not avoided.) (5) Dept not convinced critical moment yet near since Finns not contemplating decision at least until fall. If Finns remain outside OS, Finnish economy not likely be struck crippling blow in early stages OS and therefore Finns may be inclined delay decision indefinitely, possibly hoping for change in Soviet attitude. (6) Moreover, commercial policy aspects would require thorough study.
Dept does not consider it feasible develop standby assistance program until above uncertainties clarified.
Embassy’s comments on foregoing would be helpful in getting full picture for evaluation present situation and for pending policy review. In particular, Dept needs detailed analyses products, markets, industries, foreign exchange, employment factors involved if Finland (1) joins OS in near future and Soviets employ trade sanctions, (2) remains outside OS, (3) delays decision for year or two.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60E/7–1759. Secret. Drafted by Nelson and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ivan B. White, who signed for Dillon.↩
- Telegram 31 from Helsinki, July 13, is briefly summarized in despatch 34, Document 208. Telegram 64 from Helsinki, July 22, reported that Finnish leaders appeared willing to persevere in their attempts to join the “Outer Seven” despite apparent Soviet objections. (Department of State, Central Files, 440.002/7–2259) On July 19, Pravda had published an article critical of Finland’s association with any Western trade bloc. (Despatch 42 from Helsinki, July 20; Ibid., 440.002/7–2059)↩