Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

99. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Ogorevo, July 26, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Vice President Nixon
  • Dr. Milton Eisenhower
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Foy Kohler
  • Mr. Alexander Akalovsky
• USSR
  • Chairman Khrushchev
  • First Deputy Chairman Mikoyan
  • First Deputy Chairman Kozlov
  • Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov
  • Mr. S.R. Striganov
  • Mr. Yuri Zhukov
  • Mr. Troyanovsky
  • Mr. Lepanov

The open air luncheon at the Soviet Government dacha began at 3:30 p.m. and continued until 8:45 p.m. Mrs. Nixon and the wives of the three top Soviet leaders were present throughout.

After about one-half hour of casual table talk Khrushchev launched the serious phase of the conversation with a discourse on Soviet rocket and atomic prowess. He said that he had had a long session yesterday with Soviet scientists who had presented plans to him for launching rockets into the earth’s orbit with a payload of 100 tons. This, he said, was sufficient for all kinds of instrumentation; it was also sufficient to carry man and equipment for his return to earth. This project was only in the planning stage at present, but solidly based and clearly realizable without difficulty. He then referred to the accuracy of modern missiles, citing a Soviet ICBM launching about a week ago over a 7000 kilometer course with a final deviation off target of 1.7 kilometers in distance and less than 1.4 kilometers to the right. However, he continued, accidents were always possible. In this connection, he wanted to divulge a secret: a month ago the Soviet Government had been very worried when an ICBM of the same type (Mikoyan contradicted him at this point and said that this was a different missile) had a malfunction in the engine cutoff system and had overshot its intended course by 2000 kilometers. The Soviet Government had feared it might land in Alaska but fortunately it fell into the Ocean. While this missile had carried no warhead, its accidental landing in Alaska, he realized, could have created a grave incident. Khrushchev said that he supposed that we had monitored these shots. In fact, he said, he knew that we did and confirmed that the Soviets do too. The Vice President pointed out that in this field it was very difficult for great nations to do things that are not known to the other side, to which Khrushchev agreed. The Vice President said that this was the reason why the U.S. had been happy to show Mr. Tupolev our missile production—the U.S. felt that no secrets had been revealed.

Khrushchev stated that Tupolev had told him upon his return from the U.S. that he had not been able to see much there—all he had been shown was the cigar-shaped final product, from which one could not tell anything, and he had not been shown the actual rockets.

The Vice President replied that Mr. Kozlov had been invited to observe missile launchings at the Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral launching sites, but had not availed himself of that opportunity.

Khrushchev said that he knew about that, but the USSR felt that the time was not yet ripe for such things. The proper time for such visits would come after the U.S. bases had been liquidated—then the USSR would show the U.S. its launching sites and missiles. The reason for this was a simple one: U.S. bases are some 300 kilometers from the borders of the USSR, while the USSR is several thousand kilometers away from the U.S.

The Vice President observed that this situation was a two-way street and then referred to Khrushchev’s statement to Mr. Harriman to the effect that the USSR had given China missiles to shell Quemoy.¹

Khrushchev denied this and asserted that all he had said was that the USSR would supply China with missiles if it were attacked by the U.S. He also said that in view of the insignificant distance of 70 kilometers between the Chinese mainland and Formosa, the USSR could, if necessary, supply China with a large number of missiles capable of covering that distance, but again asserted that at the present time the USSR was not furnishing missiles to anyone.

The Vice President then referred to the high cost of missiles, stating that it was unfortunate that so much money had to be spent for building missiles, when the money needed to build one missile could buy 153,000 TV sets, or endow several universities, or buy shoes for several million children.

Khrushchev expressed surprise at these figures and said that the U.S. missile production was too expensive and that it was much cheaper in the USSR. He went on to say that, as he had told Mr. Harriman, the USSR was in possession of “U.S. operational plans,” the authenticity of which, of course, was not certain in view of possible U.S. counterintelligence operations, and that it was possible that the U.S. had Soviet operational plans too. Soviet specialists, he said, had told him that to paralyze vital centers in the U.S. as well as in Europe, Asia, i.e., the U.S. bases on these two continents, rockets costing a total of 30 billion rubles were needed. This figure was based on the Soviet missile production costs, and it had been reported accurately by Mr. Harriman. He added that this figure included the cost of both ICBMs, which were the most expensive, and IRBMs as well.

The Vice President inquired whether Mr. Khrushchev was referring to what the Soviet Union had or what it needed.

Khrushchev replied that this was what the USSR had. (However there was at this point considerable discussion between Soviet leaders and interpreters. Consensus of Russian-speaking Americans present was that Khrushchev was talking in terms of present Soviet capabilities rather than of actual stocks of missiles already on hand.)

The Vice President then remarked that this meant that the USSR had 3 billion dollars worth of missiles to knock out vital centers of the U.S., Europe, and Asia.

Khrushchev replied that ICBMs would be used only against the U.S., while the U.K., Germany, and even Spain could be hit with IRBMs, i.e., missiles with a range of 2000 kilometers; the next higher range of ballistic missiles, he added, was 4000 kilometers.

The Vice President then commented that, as far as the U.S. was concerned, the main cost was involved in launching sites rather than in missiles proper, and inquired whether this was also true in the USSR.

Khrushchev replied in the negative, saying that launching pads were cheap and that the USSR was building mobile launching pads so that they could change positions.

The Vice President asked Mr. Khrushchev whether mobile launching platforms were built for use in the air or on land. Khrushchev replied that they were not intended for use in the air.

The Vice President then wondered why the Soviet Union continued to build bombers when ICBMs were available.

At this point Mr. Khrushchev interrupted the substantive conversation in order to toast the health of the President of the U.S., Mrs. Nixon and the Vice President, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and all American guests present, as well as friendship between the Soviet and American people.

The Vice President replied in kind and also raised his glass to the day when the U.S. might receive Mr. Khrushchev.

Reverting to the substance of the conversation, Mr. Khrushchev replied to the Vice President that the Soviet Union had almost stopped the production of bombers. Bombers and fighter aircraft were being built only in numbers sufficient to maintain the training of Soviet air personnel so that this investment would not be lost. He said that perhaps these bombers could be useful for some limited purpose, but it was not likely. Missiles were much more accurate and not subject to human failure or human emotion. He said that humans were frequently incapable of dropping bombs on assigned targets because of emotional revulsion, a factor not present in missiles. He cited an incident in World War II when Russian bomber crews had claimed to have hit an advanced target, but when the territory in question was recovered the target was found intact because the personnel involved had simply jettisoned their bombs harmlessly without even reaching the target area. Khrushchev went on to say that he felt really sorry for the Navy, it being an obsolete element in arms, which could only provide “fodder for sharks.” In view of their slow speed, cruisers and aircraft carriers were completely useless, “sitting ducks,” and the USSR had stopped building them.

The Vice President observed that Khrushchev apparently did not include submarines in his analysis of modern naval capabilities, since the Soviets had been reported to be building submarines in quantities.

Khrushchev confirmed the Soviets were building as many submarines as they could. However, Mikoyan intervened at this point and said “as many as needed.”

The Vice President commented that submarines were highly useful for launching missiles and that they would be particularly useful when solid fuel had been developed.

Khrushchev agreed but said that the Soviets believed that launching from land was much better than from the sea.

The Vice President observed that this depended on the strategic situation of the nation involved.

Mr. Khrushchev then said that he wanted to reveal another secret—submarines would be used by the USSR for destroying ports, suburban areas [sic]² and the Navy of the enemy. Destruction of the enemy’s Navy would paralyze his sea communications, a factor which would be of great importance, since the Soviet Union’s potential enemy would be highly dependent on sea communications. He said that Soviet submarines would carry ballistic missiles and anti-vessel rockets, the range of which was now 600 kilometers, but would be increased to 1000 kilometers in the future. The latter range, according to Soviet scientists, would be entirely sufficient.

The Vice President then pointed out that the main problem in missiles was fuel and said that the USSR had been reported as having made good progress in this field, which was evidenced by the thrusts it had attained. It was obvious that the future called for the development of solid fuels, which were easier to store and maintain in readiness. Solid fuel would particularly answer the problem of submarine-carried missiles.

Khrushchev confirmed that the Soviet Union had attained success in the development of rocket fuels, saying that without that its achievement in rocketry would not have been possible. However, he declined to discuss the question of solid fuels, saying that this was a technical subject which he, being a politician rather than a technician, was not qualified to discuss.

At this point Mrs. Nixon intervened to express surprise there was a subject Khrushchev was not prepared to discuss. To her Khrushchev was “one-man government” seemed to know everything and to have everything firmly in own hands. To this Mikoyan observed that even Khrushchev did not have enough hands to handle everything and therefore needed others to help him.

The Vice President then referred to Mr. Khrushchev’s statements in Albania, in which he had said that it was better to station intermediate range rockets in Albania than in the USSR.³ Since press reports may be interpreted in different ways, the Vice President said, it would be interesting to know what Mr. Khrushchev actually had in mind.

Khrushchev said that the U.S. had made arrangements for stationing missiles in Italy, arrangements which were directed against the USSR rather than, say, Africa. The USSR has to paralyze these missiles and he believed that the best place for stationing Soviet missiles would be Albania. The distance between Albania and Italy is only 300 kilometers and thus the Soviet Union would not have to expend its longer-range missiles or endanger neutral territory. When the Vice President interjected, “or without danger to yourselves from fallout,” Khrushchev dismissed this as another question. Italy and Greece could be hit best from Albania and Bulgaria, while Turkey could be hit from the territory of the USSR and Bulgaria. It was this that he had had in mind, although he had not mentioned Turkey in the statement referred to by the Vice President. However, he added, at present the Soviet Union had no bases in these two countries. They would be established in Albania when U.S. bases were established in Italy and in Bulgaria when U.S. bases were established in Greece.

The Vice President then asked whether the Soviets made a distinction between collective security arrangements such as NATO and the individual nations belonging to NATO.

Khrushchev said yes, but the individual members of such arrangements had to make a decision about bases if they wanted to avoid becoming missile targets. If some individual country decided not to accept rockets, the Soviet Union would not hit it with its own missiles.

The Vice President observed that Khrushchev frequently made public statements on the subject of missiles, including the question of their delivery to China. When people in the West read some such statements it was possible that they got an impression which Khrushchev did not intend. He said that today Mr. Khrushchev was apparently simply relating his estimate of the strength the USSR possesses and how this strength would resist any attack or how the USSR would counterattack. However, when such talk is published throughout the world it frequently creates the impression of a deliberate attempt to threaten other countries. Taking into account the attitude toward peace of the people of the U.S. as well as of other nations, these statements could be misunderstood. The Vice President said that he did not know the strength of the U.S. as well as the President, who was highly competent in the military field and could discuss these matters at length. Mr. Khrushchev, of course, also knows the strength of the USSR very well. However, the U.S. has, as Khrushchev knows, considerable power but it does not want to have to use it. No war, regardless of who starts it, can be prevented from causing disaster to the entire world, because even a sudden blow could not eliminate the retaliatory power of the other side. As to the U.S. and the USSR, their respective advantages could not be decisive, i.e., they both must recognize that they are both strong, that they have the necessary will, and that their peoples are strong. Neither of the two countries should look down upon the other; and if there is mutual respect then the two countries can create a basis for the negotiations necessary for reducing existing world problems and for bringing about a reduction in armed forces, which is desired by both sides. The Vice President continued by saying that in his statements to the press as well as in his public statements he would make no reference to the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR, but would rather emphasize that both nations are powerful and that they have to see to it that the future is that of peace rather than of war. The Vice President emphasized that he was not saying that a settlement of differences would be easy, but still both sides must exert every effort toward this end.

Mr. Khrushchev expressed full agreement as to the Vice President’s estimate of the correlation of forces as between the two powers. He denied that Soviet leaders had ever made statements to the effect that the Soviet Union could destroy the United States without suffering losses itself. Yet some American generals had said that the U.S. could wipe out the Soviet Union in no time. (The Vice President indicated dissent, but Khrushchev held the floor.) He then continued to say that he would reveal another secret. The Vice President was undoubtedly familiar with Marshal Vershinin’s famous interview about a year ago on Soviet capabilities of destruction. It was he, Khrushchev, who had dictated that interview. He had been on vacation at that time and had summoned the Marshal and a secretary in order to dictate that interview. The Soviet Government could not let pass in silence certain statements by U.S. generals and the Presidium had carefully considered at what level their reply should be issued. Finally it chose Vershinin, Chief of the Soviet Air Force, to equate with the sources of U.S. threats. A statement by one of the Ministers or by the Chief of Staff would not have been appropriate because it could have been misunderstood by the other side. The Soviet Government as such had never made statements comparable to statements by some U.S. generals. Such statements were irresponsible because the other side might misunderstand them. [The Vershinin statement referred to appears to be a four-column interview with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Forces by a Pravda correspondent published in the Pravda of Sunday, Sept. 8, 1957, summarized as follows by Embassy Moscow at that time:

“Primary emphasis on (1) annihilative nature of another general war; (2) U.S. ‘stupidity’ evidenced by Generals and Admirals who say Soviet Union could be destroyed in several hours (specific reference to General Norstad, Admiral Burke and Field Marshal Montgomery); (3) rocket warfare nature of next war, Soviet superior offensive ability with such weapons, and charge that there is no defense against rockets; (4) ulterior motives, particularly adverse to U.S. military partners, of U.S. plan for world supremacy; (5) ulterior motives of U.S. monopolies and military leaders for continuation of arms race; (6) necessity follow Soviet standard disarmament proposals.”]⁴

Khrushchev then said that it would be very easy for the USSR to destroy Europe and also mentioned that there would be no need for pinpoint missile accuracy, since accuracy with a 100 kilometer tolerance would be entirely adequate. He then cited a joke he understood to be current in England about pessimists and optimists. The pessimists said only 6 atomic bombs would be needed to wipe out the U.K., while the optimists said 9 or 10 would be required. Referring again to Turkey, Khrushchev said that, while being a poor, hungry country of beggars, it was a U.S. base. The USSR held no naval forces in the Black Sea because Turkish territory as well as the entire sea could be covered with missiles and missile carriers. This was why the Soviet Union could not understand why the U.S. held to its bases. Perhaps the purpose was to divert the Soviet Union’s nuclear power to the countries where U.S. bases are maintained. Mikoyan interjected that the purpose of U.S. bases was “political domination.” Khrushchev said, “If you intend to make war on us, I understand; if not, why do you keep them?”

Khrushchev then said that he would reveal another, internal secret of the Soviet Union. He said that the Austrian State Treaty had been concluded at his own initiative. He had summoned Molotov and asked him why no peace treaty with Austria was being concluded. Molotov had replied that this was impossible. Khrushchev had said to Molotov, “If you want war, then all right, we should keep our positions in the West; however, if we want no war, then why not sign a peace treaty with Austria?” The question had been discussed at length within the Soviet Government and finally the decision to sign a peace treaty with Austria had been approved by every member except Molotov. Khrushchev went on to say that the Soviet Union had gained by this; it has the best possible relations with Austria, even better than with Finland, which are also very good, and all this in spite of the fact that both countries have bourgeois regimes. He recalled in this connection that when he had charged Chancellor Raab⁵ with being a capitalist, Raab had replied that he was only a “small capitalist.” Khrushchev went on to say that, without wanting to brag, he wanted to point out that it was again he who had proposed that the Soviet Union liquidate its Porkalla base in Finland.⁶ his reasoning had been that if the Soviet Union did not want to seize Finland then why direct guns against the Finns. Again there were many discussions and finally the decision had been reached to withdraw. Khrushchev said that if the U.S. were to do the same thing with respect to its bases, world tensions would be relaxed. “I put to you the same question that I put to Molotov,” he said, “Do you want to attack us?”

Dr. Milton Eisenhower interjected that under no circumstances would the U.S. do that, and the Vice President also replied in the negative.

Khrushchev then claimed that the U.S. wanted to install new bases in Iran. Ambassador Thompson said this was not true.

Khrushchev rejoined by saying that although the U.S.-Iranian agreement was secret he still had read it and could even give the Vice President a true copy of that agreement.⁷ It was true that it had no provision for bases, yet it did provide for U.S. assistance to Iran in the event of “indirect aggression.” This meant, he said, that the U.S. wanted to act as gendarmes against the Iranian people when they rose against their government.

The Vice President said he hoped Khrushchev did not think the Soviets could hold a meeting of Communists from 51 countries in Moscow⁸ without the U.S. knowing what they were up to and what instructions they were getting with regard to subversive activities. Also Khrushchev had openly declared during his recent visit to Poland that the USSR would support revolution everywhere in the world.⁹

Khrushchev observed that the U.S. should not pay its intelligence agents because they were no good. He claimed that only 12 nations rather than 51 had met and that nothing had come out of that meeting that had not been published in the press. He said that the U.S. did not understand Communist ideas—Communists were against subversion and terror. The U.S. was still talking about conspiratorial parties like the anarchists and Nihilists in the old czarist Russia, but even then Marxists disagreed with such an approach. In response to the Vice President’s remark, “unless necessary,” Khrushchev specified that Marxists had always been against “individual terror.” He said that such terror served no useful purpose and recalled in this connection the assassination of Czar Alexander II, when the Czar was killed but the system still remained. Yet mass uprisings where the bourgeoisie does not surrender its power peacefully are a different thing and are favored by Marxists.

Dr. Milton Eisenhower inquired whether this was not interference in the internal affairs of other countries, while the Vice President wondered whether this meant that the peoples in bourgeois countries were captives whose liberation was justified.

Khrushchev replied that this was too vulgar a term, not a scientific term. He said that if the Soviet Union wanted subversion it would have organized the strongest possible Communist party in the U.S.A. and the whole course of history would be different. He denied that the Soviet Union was supporting violence.

The Vice President inquired how the uprising in Northern Iraq last week¹⁰ fitted into Khrushchev’s theories. (This resulted in considerable exchange among the Soviets with confusion between last week’s uprising and last year’s revolution.)

Khrushchev finally replied that he knew of nothing going on in Iraq and therefore could not comment.

The Vice President then cited the case of Czechoslovakia.

Khrushchev said this was an interesting example worth examining. He said the Communist party in Czechoslovakia had been the only party in the country which had not surrendered to the Germans. For that reason the prestige of the Communist party had been much greater than its influence in the post-war government of Czechoslovakia, and so the Communist party presented demands on behalf of the people and the government capitulated. There was not one Soviet soldier in the country at that time and the Czech revolution was like the U.S. revolution. There was a complete parallel between the two situations. It was not King George III who had given the Americans their independence—American independence had been won as a result of the American revolution and the sympathies of the Russian people had been on the American side at that time.

The Vice President commented that, of course, everyone can give his interpretation of history. He then referred to the question of individual terror and recalled the Soviet incitement through the press and radio calling for terrorism against Mrs. Nixon and himself when they had been visiting Latin America.¹¹ Mobs had tried to kill them and the Soviet press and radio had expressed approval of those actions. The Vice President said he wondered how Mr. Khrushchev could reconcile this with his statement.

Khrushchev replied that he never evaded acute problems and quoted the Russian saying, “You are my guest but truth is my mother.” He admitted that the sympathy of the people of the USSR had been with the people who had been against the Vice President. The Vice President had been the target of the righteous indignation of the people, indignation which had been directed not against him personally but rather against the policy of the U.S. The Soviet Union had regarded the Vice President’s trip as demonstrating failure of the U.S. policy. Khrushchev said he thought that if the Vice President had visited the countries in question as a tourist no one would have paid attention to him, and repeated that all violence had been directed against American policy rather than the personality of the Vice President.

The Vice President said he accepted Khrushchev’s right to his opinion and to his sympathy for such acts. However, he pointed out, what had happened in Venezuela might happen in the world between countries of great power. When military power like that of the Soviet Union was coupled with such revolutionary policies there was a grave danger of matters getting out of control. In comparison, the 2000 kilometers mistake on the ICBM was a relatively small error. Therefore men like President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev who are reasonable, tough, not soft or frightened, must approach these problems on the basis of give and take. Mr. Khrushchev was one of the most effective exponents of his own views, but he adhered to one single theme—the U.S. was always wrong, the Soviets never. It was impossible to find a settlement between two strong nations on that basis. Geneva was an example of that. Secretary Herter, representing the President, had made several concessions to meet the Soviet point of view. But a point can be reached where one side can go no further—therefore, both sides must give.

Khrushchev, referring to the events in Venezuela, said that the Vice President’s remarks in that connection smacked of imperialism and tried to justify interference in internal affairs. This was the Eisenhower-Dulles policy, which wanted to control Venezuela’s decisions because the U.S. believed that that country was of strategic importance. Such policies would result in hatred for the U.S. everywhere; even in Taiwan last year there had been anti-American riots. The U.S. wanted to determine itself where it could intervene, and this was an imperialist approach. The peoples of the countries concerned would not tolerate that.

The Vice President interrupted Khrushchev and asked him what he could say about the events in Hungary, Poland and East Germany.

Khrushchev dismissed this question, saying that this was an entirely different matter.

Khrushchev then referred to the Vice President’s remarks regarding concessions and said that when peace was at stake no surrender, but only advance was possible. Soviet proposals were formulated on a global basis to appeal to the entire world, not just the U.S. Soviet proposals were well thought out and were supported by the entire world, because they were for peace. As for Geneva, this was a tea party and made little or no sense.

[Here follows discussion of the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva and the Berlin question, printed in volume VIII, Document 481.]

At this point the Vice President invited Dr. Eisenhower to speak. Dr. Eisenhower said that he spoke as a private citizen and educator, with only limited experience in foreign affairs, and for whom it was a privilege to attend this historic meeting, a meeting that offered hope. He said that he wanted to emphasize that never in history had the people of the U.S. started a war. The people of the U.S. wished most passionately that peoples of the world could live in peace, choose their own governments, and select methods for progress. He observed that in another year and a half President Eisenhower would have completed 50 years of service to his country. Dr. Eisenhower expressed the hope that by some miracle within that time, before President Eisenhower’s Administration ends, something would be done to ensure that no war should happen.

The Vice President remarked that Dr. Eisenhower had pointed up a possibility which should not be overlooked. The decisions made within the next year or so could determine the course of history for the next 50 years. The architects of those decisions would be the President, the Soviet Prime Minister himself, and other leaders of nations, but the key people would be the President and Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed and said that this was logical because the USSR and the United States are the two most powerful nations. He then invited his Deputies to speak and show that he was not alone in presenting the views of the Soviet Government. Both were First Deputies. He would give priority to Mikoyan because of age but in contest would not exclude possibility Kozlov first.

Mikoyan said that all the words uttered by Khrushchev were so reasonable, logical and persuasive that he had nothing to add. He observed that when he had visited the U.S. he had found there a desire to understand the Soviet Union and that he had reported this to the Government. He concluded his remarks by saying that Mr. Khrushchev in his statements today had reflected the attitude of the Soviet people, which the Vice President had been able to observe earlier at “our Moscow River rallies.” He proposed that policies of dictates and ultimata be replaced by policies of peace and friendship.

Mr. Kozlov joined Mikoyan in supporting Khrushchev’s remarks and said that he also had found a desire for peace in the U.S. He would emphasize that the entire Soviet Government and all the Soviet people support the position set forth by Mr. Khrushchev.

Khrushchev concluded the conversation by saying that what he had said was not his own policy but rather the policy of the Government and of the Party. There was no divergence of views within the Government or the Central Committee of the Party. The people of the Soviet Union also understand the problems in this matter and are brought up in that spirit. They desire only peace.

After an exchange of pleasantries the group rose from the luncheon table at 8:50 p.m.

ADDENDUM

In taking leave of Ambassador Thompson following the luncheon, Khrushchev half-apologized for his attack on the Ambassador during the conversation, saying that he had not meant to give offense.¹² Thompson replied that he had not meant to make a threat.

Following the luncheon, the Vice President walked to the dacha with Khrushchev accompanied only by Soviet interpreter Lepanov and Mr. Kohler. During the private exchange the Vice President mentioned the correspondence which had taken place between the President and Prime Minister with respect to an exchange of visits between the two.¹³ In this connection, he again referred to the necessity that if such meetings were to be profitable, they must take place in an atmosphere from which the element of crisis had been removed. In replying Khrushchev referred to a report which he had just received from Soviet Ambassador Menshikov along similar lines, which he said he considered as reflecting the President’s instructions to Mr. Murphy.¹⁴ He added rather cryptically, that “instructions had been sent to Gromyko” at Geneva. The Vice President then said that the nature of the luncheon conversation had been such that he had not felt the occasion opportune to mention a few bilateral matters, which caused us concern and were a subject of public interest, relating particularly to the status of individual Americans. He said that if the Prime Minister were agreeable he would like to write him letters on these matters. Khrushchev indicated that this course was agreeable to him and promised to do what he could in connection with these questions. (In pursuance of this private exchange the Vice President sent two letters to the Prime Minister, one dealing with the C–130 case and the other with the issuance of Soviet exit visas to a selected list of American citizens and relatives of American citizens residing in the Soviet Union.)¹⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/7–2659. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Akalovsky and approved by Kohler on August 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Government summer house at Ogorevo near Moscow. Attached to the source text is a short summary of passages excised or paraphrased from Khrushchev’s conversations with Nixon. These passages contained Khrushchev’s apologies for his use of “strong peasant language” and Nixon’s use of similar vulgar language in response. For Nixon’s account of this conversation, see Six Crises, pp. 284–293.
1. Regarding Khrushchev’s statement, see Document 75.
2. Brackets in the source text.
3. During an official visit to Albania May 25–June 4, Khrushchev made several speeches assailing the establishment of U.S. missile bases in Italy and warning that if Greece allowed such bases, the Soviet Union might erect bases in Albania. For the condensed text of two of his speeches at Tirana, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, June 24, 1959, pp. 12–13, and July 1, 1959, pp. 3–5. Regarding Khrushchev’s trip to Albania, see Part 2, Documents 35 and 36.
4. Brackets in the source text. The quoted paragraph is from telegram 507 from Moscow, September 9, 1957. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5/9–957)
5. Julius Raab, Chancellor of Austria 1953–1961.
6. Regarding the Soviet Union’s relinquishment of this base, see footnote 6, Document 80.
7. Reference is presumably to the agreement of cooperation between the United States and Iran signed at Ankara on March 5 and entered into force on the same day. (10 UST 314) This treaty was not secret and contained no secret provisions.
8. Reference may be to a meeting held in Moscow November 14–16, 1957, of repres-entatives from 12, not 51, Communist nations.
9. Not further identified.
10. On July 14, fighting erupted between Turcomans and Kurds in Kirkuk, Iraq. Kurdish soldiers, led by Communists, disobeyed orders and began to massacre Turcomans. Army reinforcements, which were sent in from Baghdad, did not restore order until July 18.
11. Nixon made a good will tour of eight South American countries April 27–May 15, 1958.
12. The exchange between Thompson and Khrushchev took place during the discussion of Berlin, printed in vol. VIII, Document 481.
13. See Documents 89 and 91.
14. See Document 87.
15. Regarding Nixon’s August 1 letter to Khrushchev on the C–130 case, see Document 55. Nixon’s August 1 letter on exit visas is printed as Document 104.