295. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 0
1322. 1. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Prime Minister convoked me last night for one of those midnight meetings in Parliament building (where heavy attack was proceeding against GOG for its anti-Communist measures).1 By time I could arrive Karamanlis had been compelled to retire to bed with another kidney attack and Tsatsos spoke to me in his name assisted by some telephonic conversation between Prime Minister and me.
2. General tenor of their remarks was to effect that GOG had last night received reports we would oppose redrafted Indian resolution2 which presumably was submitted yesterday and they wished to urge our benevolent neutrality as a minimum. Tsatsos said Indian resolution as redrafted refers to abandonment of enosis by GOG, states effective provisions for protection of minority rights are essential, requests continued negotiations for self-government in accordance with Charter of UN, mentions cessation of violence and calls upon all to respect the integrity of Cyprus. Tsatsos said GOG feared US would vote against Indian resolution [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. I replied indeed it might and as he had probably observed from Barco statement3 we had maintained position of neutrality but doubted if frame of final solution would emerge from UN debate. I maintained that to date we had shown neutrality in this context.
3. Tsatsos replied he had impression we had not advocated partition as solution and therefore could consistently support Indian resolution. I said that speaking without benefit of texts it might depend upon interpretation given to this phrase, recalling we had earlier agreed in Paris to discussion of final solution but had not taken a position on any particular solution. Tsatsos said he hoped Indian resolution was sufficiently consistent with our position to enable us not to oppose it if we could not give it active support.
4. I enquired if Makarios would agree to Indian resolution and he replied affirmatively. He added Prime Minister had asked him to state [Page 752] specifically that if Indian resolution were adopted it would be sufficient for GOG to resume negotiations in NATO.
5. Not having seen complete text of Indian resolution I hesitate to comment as there may be other sections which are objectionable to us. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Without wishing to belabor point made earlier, perhaps it would help if I could give GOG our opinion whether modified Macmillan plan invalidates Lennox-Boyd declaration. If it does, we could possibly eliminate Greek belief UK goes into conference committed to partition if Turks insist.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–358. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.↩
- EDA, in a parliamentary interpellation, had charged that the Karamanlis government was persecuting its members, following reports that the Greek police were investigating alleged ties between EDA members and the outlawed Greek Communist Party. On December 7, 13 members of EDA were arrested and charged with espionage.↩
- For text of this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.228.↩
- See Document 293.↩
- The United States decided to support the Iranian
instead of the Indian resolution. At 11:20 a.m. on December 3,
Wilcox on the status of
the Cyprus issue. According to a memorandum of their conversation,
“Wilcox said he, Merchant
and Rountree had met after
staff and had agreed to tell NY the Iranian proposal is consistent
with our statement and has merit of not raising substance in the
Assembly. British wanted us to make a speech but Merchant agreed we
should not but wants to tell British we are supporting proposal.”
Herter then telephoned Ambassador Lodge at 11:40 a.m.: “Lodge said the policy, as he understood it, is to support the Iranian resolution and abstain on the Indian. Does not think the Turkish, British and Greek resolutions will come up for a vote. CAH agreed.” Memoranda of those conversations are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.↩