Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

37. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, November 2, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter, Mr. Hagerty (for initial discussion), General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Secretary Herter next referred to the problem he foresees in preparation for the Western Powers meeting and the summit. He will shortly meet with the three Ambassadors in Washington to begin the preliminary work. He proposes to express to them our impatience over their intransigence in telling the President where he is to go and what kind of meetings he is to attend. He will stress that we are carrying the tremendous burden of Western defense and that we do not appreciate the rather cavalier attitudes being displayed. Secretary Herter sees the purpose of the Foreign Ministers meetings as determining what topics are to be recommended for discussion in Paris and at the summit, and also for considering what the purpose of a summit meeting should be. The French seem to want a grand confrontation on all major issues involving the East and West, the British a series of meetings, almost for their own sake.

The President said that the prospect of a series of meetings requires something new in our governmental organization. He feels it is wrong for the President to engage personally in debate and conference with representatives of other countries. Mr. Herter recalled the President’s statement, which he thought very logical and effective, that he would go anywhere at any time to advance the cause of peace.¹ The President confirmed this, but commented that summit meetings were not in his opinion necessarily the best way of advancing the cause of peace.

Mr. Herter said that the French had wanted to conduct the Foreign Ministers session on a tripartite basis. Adenauer has sharply disagreed, and has likewise disagreed with any intent to hold German participation to questions limited to Germany.² He stresses that his chief interest is in disarmament. The President said he saw the logic of this but felt that there may be specific questions elsewhere in the world which involve only the three powers.

Mr. Herter then said that, regarding Berlin, the President, in his talks with Khrushchev, had said that we would seriously negotiate. It looks as though the British favor some kind of short-term interim solution to carry us over the period of the German elections. Our thinking runs toward a longer-range solution, effective until German reunification, possibly involving something like a “guaranteed city.” The Germans and the French may simply take the position that they will say nothing about these matters. The President commented that, if they do, they may be taking on the responsibility for the future of Berlin and West Germany.

Secretary Herter next raised the question of disarmament. The possibility of thinning out forces in Europe requires consideration. He said he had discussed this with General Schuyler a few days ago³ and that General Schuyler expressed strong opposition. In fact, Secretary Herter thought we may have to make a virtue of necessity, since he understands Defense feels they may have to remove some major units from Europe. He recalled a plan prepared by General Norstad for inspection against surprise attack that involved zones to the east and west of the Iron Curtain through Germany, and inspection of military forces in these zones by ground and air means.⁴ If this inspection proves successful, there would then be a thinning out on each side of the line. The French opposed this scheme. Mr. Herter said he has had discussions with General Schuyler as to the true role and function of the NATO “shield” of thirty divisions, arguing that any attack in Europe which involves the commitment of these shield forces would in fact inevitably lead to all-out conflict. The President said the basic trouble here is the German contention that we are really only talking about Germany. Mr. Herter felt that we should begin talking with our allies on this general topic. He recognized that bitter resistance to change may be evoked, and that leaks by the French and Germans, having very unsettling effects in Europe, must be anticipated. The President said he did not think he would take the proposal for thinning out at the present time. He felt that we should have this in the back of our mind as something to be achieved through disarmament agreements. If we can reach agreement on total strengths, for example, we could then let the “thinning” be the indirect result. Secretary Herter commented that on the broad question of disarmament it may be possible for us to delay action until January or February at which time technical studies might be started. But in the meantime we must start with something concrete, something that can be put down. He understood this to be the President’s line of thought.

The President said this is true. He then went on to comment that there is general agreement that we cannot inspect with full effectiveness against atomic weapons. We must therefore start on other things, and this is why he has previously given attention to the means of delivery of such weapons. He recognizes we perhaps cannot inspect completely against missiles, but naval units and aircraft can be subjected to inspection. This was in fact the purport of his Open Skies proposal.⁵

He said he hoped the Secretary could get some real agreement in principle with our allies on this matter. He suggested that we concentrate very hard on what is good for the United States. He thinks there has been too much sensitivity over what our allies want in this field.

Secretary Herter said that General De Gaulle had also suggested two further items—the first on interference in each other’s affairs, and the second on aid to underdeveloped countries. He thought it essential to clarify just what the French mean by this prior to the Western summit meeting. He asked if the President will want to talk about our balance of payments problems. The President said he thought he would leave that to Secretary Anderson at the NATO meeting. Secretary Herter said that this is a very technical question and a very complex one. He added that the only people who seem to understand it are the British.

The President commented that the best way to pave the ground for reducing our forces in Europe seems to him to be to ask the Europeans in very strong terms why they are not producing the forces required for the defense of the area. We should be able to pull ours out. Secretary Herter suggested that we should keep a small number of our forces in Europe as a symbol of our good faith. The President said we should put squarely to the Europeans the question of what they are willing to do toward paying the costs of our forces in Europe. He recalled that we came over to Europe to give them a chance to form their own forces for their own defense. Mr. Herter commented that we are carrying the bulk of the infrastructure, new weapons costs, etc.

Secretary Herter said that he thought the Germans should take some action on their own to halt the talk that they are a nation committed to a “revanchist” policy. Polish and Soviet propaganda continues to stir up this point, asserting that the West Germans want to regain by force the territory they lost in the East. When the President was in Europe Adenauer said he was giving consideration to actions that would allay this but has since done nothing about it. A friendly gesture by Adenauer to the Poles would help a great deal.

Considering his schedule generally, the President said that December is a bad time for him to go to conferences. He has the State of the Union message and the Budget Message very much on his mind at that time. The President said that de facto he is cancelling the social schedule, simply because it is not possible to schedule events such as the diplomatic dinners, the Supreme Court dinner, etc. He asked that the State Department develop a good diplomatic position, and get it prepared and coordinated before the Western summit meeting. The meeting should be held largely to show solidarity. While he can attend that, he will not have the time to thresh out matters in full detail.

The President said he would make Mr. Murphy his Special Assistant for the trip. He said he would also perhaps wish to take the Assistant Secretary of State for the Mid-Eastern area. He said he plans to keep his party as small as he can. He mentioned that he will send his military aides out on advance trips for the visit. He wishes to have Major Eisenhower as his personal aide to look after personal demands.

On each major topic, the President hoped the Secretary would thrash out with the Foreign Ministers just what the West is prepared to do—on disarmament and Berlin/Germany, for example. Mr. Herter said the problem will come if some of the Ministers say they will not discuss it. The President said they would be taking a great responsibility.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.
1. For text of the President’s remarks along these lines at his press conference on October 28, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 747–757.
2. According to telegram 855 from Bonn, October 31, Adenauer had, on October 30, sent De Gaulle a “fairly acid” letter rejecting the idea of limiting German participation in the Western summit meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10–3159)
3. No record of Herter’s discussion with General Cortlan van Rensselaer Schuyler, SHAPE Chief of Staff, has been found.
4. Not further identified.
5. For text of Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal, made at the summit conference on July 21, 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 450–453.