Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

287. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, February 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Transmitting Suggested Memorandum for the President Reporting Latest Developments Affecting the Western Military Liaison Missions in the Soviet Zone of Germany

Subsequent to your briefing of the President on this subject on February 8,¹ there have been certain additional developments which it seems desirable to bring to his attention. The British have been persuaded, after the exertion of very considerable pressure, to join us and the French in protesting the Soviet action, and calling on the Soviets to correct the situation they have created.

The next move, following the despatch of letters to the Soviet Commander today,² will be up to the Soviets. We have no way of predicting the nature of the Soviet response, but we do not doubt that British reluctance to “rock the boat” will again manifest itself when it comes to the formulation of a common position to be taken to the Soviet response. The British have indicated that the whole question is likely to be brought to the attention of the British Prime Minister, who, in turn, may raise the subject with the President.

The developments of the last week are noted in the attached memorandum which you may wish to sign or use for the purpose of an oral briefing on the subject.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you sign the attached memorandum.

[Attachment]

³

Memorandum for the President

Washington, February 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Unacceptable Documentation for Western Military Liaison Missions in the Soviet Zone of Germany

Since our conversation on this subject February 8, tripartite consultations were pursued here and in Bonn. The United States and France continue to take a very serious view of this obvious Soviet attempt to divest itself of its responsibilities and to create an independent role for the “GDR” in control of Allied movements into and out of Berlin. The British take a different view, arguing that we cannot afford to make an issue of this matter to the point of threatening the continued functioning of the Liaison Missions. After very considerable diplomatic pressure, they have agreed with us that at least letters should be sent protesting the Soviet action and calling on the Soviets to correct the situation they have created. The tone of the British letter, as finally agreed, is only slightly less firm than that of the letters which the United States and French Commanders have sent to Marshal Zakharov.

In an attempt to arrive at a common Western position, we agreed to certain amendments in the draft letters to be sent to make them somewhat less ultimative in character than originally proposed. We have also agreed to give consideration to making a diplomatic démarche to the Soviets, depending upon the nature of the reply from Marshal Zakharov.

The US and French are agreed that eventually we must be prepared to order withdrawal of the Soviet Missions from our respective military headquarters in the Federal Republic and to withdraw ours from the Soviet zone if the Soviet authorities refuse to accede to our demand to withdraw the objectionable passes and substitute others in the form and language of those recently cancelled by the Soviets. We do not feel there is room for further slippage in the Western position which would result from the type of protracted, inconclusive discussion the British appear prepared to enter into with the Soviets on this issue. As has been noted, the British have so far refused to be committed to eventual closeout of the Missions.

We will continue to attempt to persuade the British to join with us and the French in taking a firm position in this matter when we have a Soviet response to our letters. It is vital that we not give the Soviets the impression that we might acquiesce in an analogous attempt by them to abrogate, by the substitution of “GDR” for Soviet authorities, their responsibilities with respect to Allied access.

Christian A. Herter⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1960. Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and initialed by Kohler.
1. A memorandum of Herter’s conversation with the President on February 8, during which he brought Eisenhower up to date on the question of passes, is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
2. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 1579 from Bonn, February 18. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.0221/2–1860) The differences between the U.S. and British text were explained in telegram 1578 from Bonn on the same day. (Ibid.)
3. Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and McFarland. A marginal note by Goodpaster on the copy of this memorandum at the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, reads: “22 Feb rptd to President. G.”
4. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.