Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany ⁰

Washington, February 11, 1960, 9:05 p.m.

1738. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Our 1729 to Bonn.¹ Following summary based on uncleared memorandum of conversation between Merchant, Caccia and Alphand today on MLM Pass issue:²

Merchant noted we had sent revised draft Eddleman-Zakharov letter to Bonn. Hoped 3 Western Commanders would send identical or parallel letters leaving no room for Soviet misunderstanding our attitude. Letters draw attention to objectionable characteristics new passes and demand withdrawal. No publicity or indication consequences if our demands not met at this stage to permit Soviet backdown if they desire. Letter, however, drafted with view to eventual publication if necessary. If Soviets fail to back down, we would then move toward restriction of Soviet Missions and their expulsion and withdrawal of our own.

Caccia declared British:

• [1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
• 2. Question that Soviets have taken settlement of military problems by commanders out of normal framework and placed them in political field through addition some phrases in German.
• 3. Wonder whether some other language might be substituted to clear up doubts about character of new pass without necessarily reverting to passes identical with old ones.

Kohler stated language fuzzy. Soviets at later stage such as Summit could hold that registration of pass with GDR is what gives Missions right of travel.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Caccia said letter looked all right to him but sought to clarify whether there was not some intermediate stage between possible Soviet refusal to change passes and close out Missions. Suggested negotiations, as means substantially meeting our demands without Soviet retreat.

Merchant replied if our demands “substantially” met through negotiation Soviets would also gain through certain slippage in our position in direction they desired. Lengthy negotiations should not permit Soviet maneuvering to create impression we agree to role for GDR in access control or to obscure clear nature of issue.

British noted new passes being used only for humanitarian purposes at present.

British thought they might want to raise matter to political level before moving to withdrawal.

Merchant agreed that, depending on nature of reply, it might be desirable to consider whether diplomatic démarche indicated prior to ordering withdrawal and expulsion of respective Missions.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Hillenbrand, Vigderman, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
1. See footnote 1, Document 285.
2. A memorandum of this conversation, which also included Lebel, Winckler, Hood, Logan, Kohler, Hillenbrand, Long, and McFarland, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1160.