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  4. Document 288

288. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State0

London, March 2, 1960, 6 p.m.

4292. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Thurston, and Finn. Bonn’s AG to Department G-450 and Deptel 6512.1 While true that UK during past year has shown itself reluctant to take firm position with respect number of provocative GDR and Soviet actions, Embassy does not believe explanation is to be found in British acceptance of inevitability of “GDR recognition”, although it is undoubtedly true that UK attitude toward a divided Germany and concept of “recognition” is different from our own. Point is that British are extremely averse to any Western actions which, in their opinion, could prejudice atmosphere of developing East-West détente. Prime Minister Macmillan is personally deeply committed to idea of consistent and determined Western effort to bring about relaxation of East-West tensions carrying with them danger of nuclear war. He believes that improved East-West atmosphere and agreement on holding of summit conference direct result of his “ice breaking” mission to Moscow in March 1959.2

So far as GDR “recognition” is concerned, Embassy has no info to support thesis that UK Govt is now inclining toward acceptance inevitability [Page 753] of de jure recognition. UK, however, has shown itself more willing than either US or France to accept situations or actions carrying the implication of de facto recognition. This has been evident for example in UK approach to contingency planning with respect to access to Berlin. UK has also followed visa policy with respect to travelers from GDR which has taken insufficient note of regime’s efforts to enhance its international prestige through travel of officials and politically motivated individuals to Western countries. We have repeatedly been told by British officials defending this attitude that Federal Republic has many contacts with East Germany and UK can hardly be expected to be more Catholic than the Pope. Furthermore, relatively poor state of relations between UK and Federal Republic and recurrent controversies and mistrust are not conducive to hard UK line on GDR in defense of what is often viewed by UK as exclusive or predominant Federal Republic interest. Embassy would reiterate, however, that basic explanation of attitude referred to in Bonn’s airgram is not acceptance of inevitability GDR recognition but rather desire to avoid anything which would spoil the present East-West atmosphere, particularly on the eve of the summit conference.

Whitney
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and Paris.↩
  2. Airgram G-450 from Bonn, February 26, reported that since December 1959, the British Embassy in Bonn had acted as if recognition of the German Democratic Republic were only a matter of time. (Ibid.,762.00/2–2660) Telegram 6512 to London stated that the Department of State assumed the Embassy would comment on G-450. (Ibid.)↩
  3. For documentation on Macmillan’s trip to the Soviet Union February 21-March 3, 1959, see vol. VIII, Documents 183 ff.↩