Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

134. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, April 22, 1960, 7 p.m.

817. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Morale of West Berlin’s political leadership has not noticeably fluctuated during past three months. It reached what was probably lowest point since Nov 1958 earlier this year in connection with public disagreement between leading figures of West as to whether Western Geneva offers were to be considered as still valid at summit. International developments since then (especially Apr 13 Foreign Ministers’ meeting¹) have restored attitude approaching cautious optimism, without however alleviating lingering doubts as to what future may hold for city. Polemical leadership continues, as in past, to express greater degree of confidence in their public statements than they evidence in their private remarks.

Sense of uncertainty of West Berlin leaders concerning fate of Berlin is not caused by apprehensions that West has any intention of going back on its fundamental pledge to maintain freedom of West Berlin, but by misgivings about possible slippage in Western position in protracted negotiations with Sovs. West Berlin leaders believe that accommodation to Sov point of view on question of allied rights or FedRep West Berlin relations could impair—in the long run if not immediately—city’s political and economic welfare.

In absence of any foreseeable possibility of restoring its position as German capital, Berlin’s future now seen in terms of an industrial, cultural and intellectual center, with a mission of preventing consolidation of Communist control in East Germany. Possible imposition of curbs on freedom of expression in Berlin is therefore regarded with particular sensitivity as likely to remove an important aspect of city’s raisin d’etre and thus leading to eventual intellectual and political stagnation and decay.

Although outwardly economic behavior of population shows few if any signs of lack of confidence and West Berlin’s prosperity continues at post war record levels, there is continuing pervasive concern, especially among wealthier residents of West Berlin. The “business as usual” attitude of managerial and entrepreneurial groups is based on intangible factors of sentiment and spirit and on tangible advantages of business profit but there is no doubt they still [will?] carefully evaluate results of summit in future planning.

Broad public is adopting generally confident wait-and-see attitude toward summit. Confidence is especially high among labor groups which show no signs of modifying their uncompromising opposition to Soviet zone “socialism”. However, all strata of population appear carefully to scrutinize all Western moves. Actions on part of Allies giving impression that fundamental re-examination of Western commitment to Berlin is in offing, or even failure to react forthrightly to Sov-GDR moves against Berlin, would very likely substantially affect general morale picture.

SovZone morale is subject of immediately following telegram.²

Detailed evaluation of West Berlin and SovZone morale (our despatches 637 and 654)³ being pouched.

Lightner

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/4–2260. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLADUSAREUR.
1. See Document 123.
2. Document 292.
3. Despatch 637, April 16, reported on the GDR in the pre-summit period (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–1660); despatch 654, April 22, reported on West Berlin morale on the eve of the summit (ibid., 396.1–PA/4–2260).