Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

123. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/8

Washington, April 13, 1960, 10 a.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

SUBJECT

• Germany and Berlin—Western Position at Summit

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Foreign Secretary Lloyd, United Kingdom
• Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, France
• Foreign Minister Von Brentano, Federal Republic of Germany
• (Full list of delegations on last page)¹

The Foreign Ministers, under the Secretary’s chairmanship, discussed the Report of the Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, dated April 9, 1960 (FMW REF–2/110)² using as an outline the Working Group’s list of points which might be considered by the Foreign Ministers (FMW REF–2/111a).³

Report to NATO

The Foreign Ministers agreed that NATO should be given the Working Group Report as amended in the light of the Foreign Ministers’ comments but without the section on tactics, that this report might be discussed in the NATO Council and at the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Istanbul, and that no further report in NATO by any of the Four Powers should be necessary.

Summit Tactics

The Foreign Ministers approved the basic approach of the Working Group in its discussion of tactics on Germany including Berlin at the Summit. Foreign Minister Von Brentano noted, however, that his agreement was subject to his comments on some of the substantive parts of the Report.

Plebiscite in Germany

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Western Powers should be prepared, at an appropriate time during the Summit meeting, to advance a proposal for a plebiscite in all of Germany on the relative merits of Western and Soviet ideas about a peace treaty. Foreign Minister Von Brentano said that the Germans welcomed the Working Group’s proposal, liked its form and the wording of the questions, and believed that emphasizing the principle of self-determination in such a manner would have a good effect on public opinion.

Reunification of Berlin

Foreign Minister Von Brentano said that the Federal Government and the Berlin Senat welcomed the idea of a proposal for the reunification of Berlin in principle but that he had some comments to make on the text drafted by the Working Group. First, he believed that the preamble should not speak of developing Berlin as a link between the separated parts of Germany but rather should mention the reunification of Berlin as a first step towards the reunification of Germany. Otherwise, the Soviets might reply that the Western Powers had accepted the Soviet contention that a solution of the Berlin problem is possible outside the context of German reunification. Second, he believed that the proposal would have to be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the Four Powers to take up negotiations on the question of Germany on the basis of the Western Peace Plan when the proposal came into effect. Third, he believed that paragraph 8 of the proposal should be redrafted to eliminate the possibility of its being construed to mean that the NATO guarantee for Berlin would no longer be in effect. Fourth, he believed that there should be a provision to the effect that the Four Powers would act only on the basis of the Vienna arrangement, i.e. that decisions would be taken by a majority and that the Soviets would not have veto power.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he was then reading the Working Group’s proposal for the first time, but that it suggested certain problems to him. It seemed to suggest the creation of a “third German state” which would be a link between the other parts of Germany, a system which would be quite different from our objective for Germany. It had nothing to do with reunification and would only end the occupation status. In fact, the occupation status was mentioned only in paragraph 8, and then in terms which implied it would disappear. While he understood the tactical intent of the proposal, he felt that its effect on public opinion would be minimal and that the suggestion for a change in Berlin’s status promised no gains but entailed real risks. He had expected only that we would maintain our usual position of insisting on the unity of Berlin; the detailed draft proposal went much too far. He concluded that he was perhaps giving this matter too much attention, for such a proposal would not be put forward at the Summit, but that he considered it dangerous to let such a document be circulated in NATO.

Secretary Herter said that the proposal should be considered a purely tactical one designed to point up the division of Berlin. It would be put forward only after the question of German reunification had been discussed at the Summit. The immediate questions were whether the Four Powers wished to use the all-Berlin theme and, if so, what changes should be made in the Working Group’s draft. He agreed with Foreign Minister Von Brentano’s comments regarding the preamble and paragraph 8 and added that paragraph 8 should make it clear the Western Powers would retain their rights.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said he agreed with the French Foreign Minister that this was not the type of paper likely to be studied at the Summit but that he believed it would be useful nonetheless to have such a paper on hand. He was not happy about paragraph 8 and agreed with the German Foreign Minister’s suggestions.

Foreign Minister Von Brentano reverted to the French Foreign Minister’s comments and said that the proposal could be interpreted as a proposal for a three-part division of Germany and consequently an abandonment of Germany’s present status. He therefore wished to reiterate his suggestions that the preamble should be redrafted and that the proposal should be accompanied by a Four-Power declaration of readiness to resume negotiations on Germany on the basis of the Western Peace Plan.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should revise its draft proposal in the light of the foregoing comments and that the proposal, thus amended, might be included in the report to NATO on the understanding that it was not meant to advance this proposal at the Summit but merely to prepare a stand-by all-Berlin paper.

Additional Working Group Tasks

Secretary Herter noted that the Working Group had inquired whether it should draft:

a) a directive for possible use at the Summit to remand the task of further negotiations to a subordinate body;

b) possible reciprocal declarations which might accompany agreement on such a directive; and

c) a version of its paper on the essential conditions of a modus vivendi for West Berlin suitable for presentation to the Soviets.

These would only be stand-by papers for possible use and would be discussed at Istanbul.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he found the Working Group’s question an enigma. He agreed with respect to part a). Part

b) was very mysterious—declarations on what and by whom? Part c) looked alright but was also a little mysterious.

Assistant Secretary Kohler explained that the Working Group had had two alternative tactical approaches in mind. One was a modus vivendi; the other some continuing machinery for discussions, as in the case of the Austrian peace treaty. The list of essential conditions for a modus vivendi was for internal use by the Western Powers only. The question was whether it should be rewritten for tabling with the Soviets or possible other use. If the alternative of continuing discussions is chosen, there will have to be some sort of Summit directive plus statements to the effect that neither side will disturb the existing situation while further discussions are in progress.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd noted that he was pleased to see that the deputies of the Foreign Ministers might carry on these discussions.

Foreign Minister Von Brentano said that he agreed that the Working Group should complete all the tasks mentioned, although he did not like the term “modus vivendi”. He believed that the Working Group, as a fourth task, should also attempt to improve the Western proposal of July 28, 1959, which has never officially been made to the Soviets. The July 28 proposal did not specify what its duration would be or make it clear that original Allied rights would remain unaffected after its expiration. Moreover, such a proposal should deal more clearly with the question of traffic to and from Berlin.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he wished to pose the question of what would come after the Summit, which could result in failure, agreement on a new Summit, or something else. He saw two possibilities. The first was a discussion of Berlin, as at Geneva, with the objective of reaching a temporary arrangement. In this case, the task is to decide the principles to be safeguarded, i.e. how to maintain our position in Berlin. The second was a discussion of Germany, in which the principles of a peace treaty could provide a conceivable basis for discussion. However, he considered that it was not good to go on discussing with the Soviets the question of Germany as a whole. Such discussion would be completely useless and hopeless. It would also be bad because it could only generate ill-feeling and would do nothing to prepare the political and psychological conditions for an eventual agreement on Germany. He was therefore reluctant to agree to task a) if the idea was discussions of the German question by the Foreign Ministers between Summit meetings. The Geneva discussions had done no good and had only made the situation more difficult. If a rapprochement was to come on Germany, it would come only in an atmosphere of détente. However, he had no objection to the Working Group completing the suggested tasks as a hypothetical study.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that he thought such a hypothetical study could do no harm.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should complete the tasks suggested on the understanding that there would be no commitment regarding any specific course of action.

At the end of the meeting, Foreign Minister Von Brentano reverted to his dislike of the term “modus vivendi” which, he said, implied a factual situation without a legal basis. Since there is a legal basis, he would prefer a designation which confirms Western rights, e.g. “Essential Conditions for the Exercise of Western Rights”. Secretary Herter and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville suggested “temporary arrangement”. Foreign Minister Von Brentano replied that he also objected to the term “modus vivendi” because it implied an “interim” or time-limited arrangement. Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that “interim” had been interpreted at Geneva to mean “until reunification”. It was agreed that the Working Group should try to find a more suitable term.

Unilateral Declarations to Permit East Germans to Exercise Soviet Access Functions

Secretary Herter said that paragraph 4 of the tactics section of the Working Group Report dealt with a highly complicated proposal (i.e. Solution “C” of the April 1959 London Working Group Report)⁴ which had not been put forward at Geneva. He doubted whether it would be profitable to ask the Working Group to do more on this subject.

Assistant Secretary Kohler explained that “Solution C” was designed to maintain the status quo while at the same time permitting the East Germans to take over Soviet access functions. The proposal was a fall-back position which had never been fully agreed. It envisaged unilateral Soviet and East German declarations regarding access and unilateral Western declarations regarding continuing rights and responsibilities. There had never been much enthusiasm for this proposal, and one of the unresolved questions was whether maintenance of free access would be assured by United Nations observers or by a Four-Power conciliation commission, as preferred by the French.

Foreign Minister Von Brentano said that, despite his efforts to understand it, he had been unable to find his way through “Solution C”. The numerous brackets were particularly confusing. If the Working Group wished to study the question further, he would not stand in the way of a further refinement of the proposal. However, if they did so, they should do so very discreetly and there should be no public discussion, for a unilateral GDR declaration would make the GDR in effect a partner to an agreement. Furthermore, unilateral declarations amount to less than a firm agreement. The idea of a United Nations arbitrator might also be objectionable.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd stated that he considered this a low priority task.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should refine the proposal, but that the proposal should not be included in the report to NATO.

Principles of a Peace Treaty

Foreign Minister Von Brentano stated that the preliminary draft principles of a German peace treaty approved by the Foreign Ministers April 30, 1959⁵ could provide a starting point for peace treaty discussions at an appropriate time. However, he would object to discussing them at present because there is no representative of a freely-elected German government who can participate in the discussions. Furthermore, the Soviets might raise certain questions, the discussion of which would be disadvantageous to the Western Powers. For example, the discussion, outside the context of the Western Peace Plan, of the future military status of Germany would be not only undesirable but also dangerous. As a tactical maneuver, the Western Powers might respond to a Soviet peace treaty proposal that they do desire a peace treaty but on the basis of their own principles, the first of which is that the peace settlement should be freely negotiated with and signed by an all-German government. Only if the Soviets accepted this first principle could other aspects of a treaty be discussed.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he was opposed to such public polemics. He also saw a contradiction between an offer to discuss the principles of a peace treaty and the rejection of the Soviet thesis that the conclusion of a peace treaty is the proper approach to the question of Germany. The inopportune questions which might arise included not only the future military status of Germany but also the question of the German Eastern border. The Western Powers might discuss peace treaty principles among themselves, but they should not report such discussion to NATO and they should not envisage the possibility of discussion of the subject at the Summit.

Secretary Herter said that the Western Powers had intended to discuss the principles of a peace treaty at Geneva only in connection with progress on the Western Peace Plan. He doubted that an occasion for the discussion of the subject would arise at the Summit.

All-German Discussions

Foreign Minister Von Brentano said that the Federal German Government rejected so-called “all-German” discussions, which it considered very dangerous. He said that the SPD had withdrawn its “Germany Plan”,⁶ which had envisaged such discussions, because it was now convinced of the danger of them. He felt that the Western Powers should not go beyond the Geneva formulation, namely that there should be Four-Power negotiations to which German representatives could be invited.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to remove the brackets on page 5 of Annex II of the Working Group report.

Future Meetings of Working Group

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should continue its work in Washington, completing any tasks required for the Istanbul meeting, and might also meet in Paris on May 9–10 to do any other work required before the Western Summit if this should be required in the light of the Istanbul meetings.

At the end of the meeting the Foreign Ministers agreed on a brief press release.⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–1360. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan, initialed by Merchant, and approved in M on April 18 and S on April 20. The conversation took place in the Conference Suite at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2214, April 13 at 9:46 p.m. (Ibid., 762.00/4–360)
1. Not printed.
2. Document 115.
3. Not found. A copy of a draft of this paper (FMW REF–2/111) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1629.
4. See footnote 8, Document 72.
5. For the preliminary draft principles of a German peace treaty, see The New York Times, May 20, 1959, p. 15.
6. For the SPD plan on Germany, March 18, 1959, see Dokumente, Band 1, 1958–1959, Zweiter Halbband, pp. 1207–1222. The Embassy in Bonn transmitted the text of the plan as an enclosure to despatch 1440, March 23, 1959. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2359)
7. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 399.