Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

120. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/5

Washington, April 12, 1960, 2:15 p.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

SUBJECT

• Summit Preparations

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany
• Dr. Karl Carstens, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany
• German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
• Dr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter
• The Secretary
• Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant
• Mr. Philip J. Farley—S/AE
• Mr. Richard H. Davis—EUR
• Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

After an initial exchange of pleasantries, Von Brentano said that he had read the various papers prepared by the Working Group on Germany including Berlin¹ and had the impression that in general they were good and convincing. However, a few questions still had to be discussed. He did not wish to mention them all on this occasion, but pointed out, for example, that the all-Berlin proposal discussed by the Working Group had created certain difficulties with Berlin officials with whom it had been discussed. Von Brentano noted that he personally was sympathetic to the idea of advancing such a proposal at the Summit. He also expressed the hope that some better term could be found to describe the Western objective relative to Berlin than a modus vivendi, which seemed to imply more a state of affairs or a condition rather than a legal status, but he himself could not think of any better term at the moment. These were all minor matters, Von Brentano continued. The most important thing was that the Western Powers should find a basis for a common language in Paris so that they would speak to the Soviets in one voice. He asked the Secretary whether he believed, as did Von Brentano, that the Western Powers would be successful in arriving at such a common language. The Secretary said he was more and more encouraged to think that this objective could be achieved, and it was certainly our hope that it would be. Von Brentano commented jocularly that, since the subject of the Sixes and Sevens was not going to be discussed at the Summit, this would make it easier for the West to reach agreement. The Secretary said that he had talked to Lloyd earlier in the day² and the subject had not been raised. Von Brentano noted that he was prepared to talk with Lloyd on this subject and referred to two very good conversations with the Danish and Austrian Foreign Ministers which he had recently had. However, he noted that they had not employed the same arguments which the British apparently had used in the US.

Returning to the Working Group preparatory meetings, the Secretary said that he had the impression that the Working Group on Germany and Berlin had come to a good understanding and that, within very small limits, the Western positions were identical. Ambassador Grewe observed that if the Foreign Ministers only stuck to the results of the Working Group the situation would be fine.

Von Brentano said that one question which required very careful study was that of keeping NATO informed. The Western Powers undoubtedly had an obligation to do this, but if too many details were provided, assurance would be lacking that these details would not become known outside of NATO. It was especially important, therefore, not to say much about tactics, although the Council could be informed of the general purposes, goals, and difficulties of the Western Powers. The Secretary said he agreed completely on this; it was never contemplated that NATO would get the Western tactics paper.³Von Brentano added that perhaps Spaak could be informed on a personal and confidential basis.

In response to Von Brentano’s question as to the Secretary’s thoughts on the subject of East-West contacts, particularly whether he thought agreement could be reached on a common formula, the Secretary said that this had to be discussed thoroughly. Of all the subjects suggested as possible topics for the Summit, we could not see much use in raising any of them. However, since the French had taken the lead in this field we did not wish to prejudge the matter until Couve had had a chance to state his position. Nevertheless, we frankly did not see much prospect for useful discussions with the Soviets in this area. We had examined the various topics which the Working Group had been studying. It might be desirable to explore some with the Soviets if we could be sure they would work out a way we wanted, but all contained dangers as we saw it. On the subject of Berlin, we cannot be certain of the Soviet attitude, but there was an intimation in the de Gaulle–Khrushchev talks⁴ that, if we make a little headway on disarmament, the Soviets might be willing to put off action on Germany and Berlin for a period of some two years under some sort of modus vivendi. This was somewhat different from what Khrushchev had said to Gronchi⁵ and in Indonesia.⁶ He seems to blow hot and cold, and we could never be quite sure what he would say next. Von Brentano noted that Khrushchev had to a large extent limited his freedom of action by the speeches he had made. There was a question whether he had done this intentionally. The Secretary observed that we did not know whether Khrushchev was actually strong enough internally so that he could commit himself on a separate peace treaty to the extent that he had and still not move ahead on it. Von Brentano commented that he continued to be anything but polite to the Federal Republic. The Secretary said that the Soviets were undoubtedly engaged in a deliberate campaign against the Federal Republic. It was hard to tell whether this was essentially for domestic reasons or to split the alliance. The latter objective was the probable one, but it seemed to have had the reverse effect. Von Brentano agreed with this and said that particularly with reference to the French-German relationship Khrushchev seemed to overestimate the possibilities of sowing dissension. The Secretary confirmed that our impression also was that the Soviets had had little effect on France’s attitude to the Federal Republic. De Gaulle’s attitude had been sober and firm, as well as that of the French people and press. The Secretary said he also believed that De Gaulle’s visit to the United Kingdom had been important and apparently a great success. Von Brentano commented that it was especially important coming prior to the Summit Conference.

The Foreign Minister said he was convinced that, during the Summit Conference, Khrushchev would provoke at least one serious crisis. He wondered how long the Secretary believed the Summit would last. The Secretary observed that that was Khrushchev’s technique. He opened in a good spirit, then provoked a crisis, and then eased off again at the end. The duration of the Summit was of interest to us since the President had promised to visit Portugal after the meeting. It was necessary to give the Portuguese a definite date. It was hoped that we could tell Khrushchev that the Summit should last only one week. The President would like to be in Lisbon on Monday of the following week. Von Brentano noted that a NATO meeting was scheduled for the 22nd and 23rd. The Secretary said he assumed that this would be on Monday if the Conference ended over the weekend. We did not know, of course, if Khrushchev would agree to fix a limit on the Conference. This still had to be worked out. Another difficulty was that the President would only be arriving in Paris on Sunday, May 15. We were not sure of the exact time. We may, therefore, wish to suggest that the East-West Summit not begin until Monday afternoon so that part of Sunday and Monday morning might be reserved for the Western Summit. Von Brentano commented that one day should suffice for the Western Summit if proper preparations were made. The Secretary said that he would be getting to Paris two days earlier and that if Von Brentano were there preliminary talks between the Foreign Ministers could be held. Von Brentano said he would be arriving in Paris on either the 13th or 14th.

Von Brentano asked the Secretary whether he thought, as the Working Group had suggested in one place, that the Foreign Ministers might carry on after the Summit on the basis of directives issued by the Heads of Government. The Secretary said that would depend, of course, on what actually happened at the Summit. This was a possibility but he hoped they would not be in for another Geneva-type of conference.

The Foreign Minister asked about the composition problem, noting that the Soviets might raise the possibility of introducing other participants into the conference, especially the GDR. The Secretary observed that this was going to be a difficult problem. The Summit Conference could not be turned into something like the UN where Foreign Ministers sometimes had to wait two weeks to speak. We would aim at keeping the Summit participation to the original four members. Von Brentano said that he hoped the “macabre spectacle of Geneva” would not have to be repeated unless it were urgently necessary. The Secretary stated that, if there were to be a series of Summit meetings, one danger was that other countries would object that the Four Powers were trying to run the rest of the world. It was necessary to avoid giving this impression. As far as Berlin was concerned, there was no question as to the primary responsibility of the Four Powers. In the disarmament field, it was clear that the Soviets and the U.S. were the primary possessors of the important weapons. When it got beyond this to more general questions affecting the interests of others, we could not give the impression that we were disposing of those interests without their having had any say.

The discussion at this point moved on to the subject of the Nuclear Testing Conference.⁷ In response to Von Brentano’s query the Secretary said the Soviets seemed to be prepared to make meaningful concessions involving successful controls over their own territory. We could not tell, of course, whether they would actually sign on the dotted line. The Secretary and Mr. Farley provided certain detailed information bearing on the Nuclear Testing Conference. The Secretary observed that there were still many problems to be solved. He doubted if the treaty would be signed at the Summit. When Von Brentano raised the question of whether there was not a danger that the Soviets would simply shift their testing to Red China, the Secretary and Mr. Farley pointed out the provisions in the draft treaty intended to take care of this point.⁸

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–1260. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, initialed by Merchant and Davis, and approved in M on April 15 and S on April 19. The meeting took place in Secretary Herter’s office.
1. See Document 115.
2. See Document 119.
3. See Document 115.
4. See Documents 106 and 108.
5. See Document 77.
6. For text of Khrushchev’s remarks at a press conference in Indonesia on February 29, see Pravda, March 1, 1960; an extract pertaining to Germany is also in Embree, Soviet Union and the German Question, pp. 229–231.
7. Reference is to the Nuclear Testing Conference then going on at Geneva.
8. At 3 p.m., Brentano discussed the German position on the Common Market external tariff acceleration with Under Secretary Dillon. A memorandum of this conversation (US/MC/24) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624.