Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

104. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, March 26, 1960, 9 p.m.

767. After official luncheon for Secretary Gates¹ March 25 Mayor Brandt asked me to his office. He told me his letter to Adenauer on plebiscite matter (ourtel 753 SecState, 656 Bonn)² had crossed one from Chancellor in which latter had urged Brandt accept plebiscite idea and to eschew advice from certain influential critics who Brandt said Chancellor had identified. (As reported ourtel 762³ identified critics as “The Americans”.) Brandt said he had made no substantive reply to this letter. However, he had now received another letter from Chancellor mailed in Honolulu and written after receipt Brandt’s letter (ourtel 753). Chancellor referred to apparent disagreement “over details” and urged Brandt do nothing to hinder plan pending opportunity sit down together and go over whole thing after Adenauer’s return.

Brandt, who is obviously on spot, told me he knows of no one who favors the plan besides Adenauer himself. In addition to entire Berlin Senat, he mentioned President Luebke (now visiting Berlin), Chancellor’s Berlin representative Vockel, and even Chancellor’s “great eminence” Globke as being opposed to plan. Even Fonoff apparently opposed although they have to be very careful what they say. This evident from attitude of Professor Carstens, Foreign Office representative who had accompanied Adenauer to Washington, with whom Brandt had just discussed subject at length.

Brandt then referred to same point he made to me March 21: difficult position he would be in if there is no plebiscite because of his opposition and if summit decisions leave many Germans unhappy. Adenauer would crucify him. Therefore, Brandt said, after discussing problem at length with his friends he decided go ahead with preparation technical matters that would be necessary for a formal plebiscite so that Adenauer could not later accuse him of having sabotaged idea from beginning. Necessary law to authorize plebiscite already drafted and can be acted on in one day. Preparation election lists and other details which will take about three weeks to complete will be handled by Senator Lipschitz.

Upon Chancellor’s return to Germany, Brandt will meet with him and do his best to talk him out of holding Berlin plebiscite. If not successful, he will suggest some alternatives to plebiscite. Brandt has already given some thought to alternatives and will continue to. Right now he is thinking seriously but as last resort of suggesting to Chancellor that Berlin Parliament be dissolved and new elections held. This would avoid many pitfalls involved in plebiscite and would be comparable in every respect to December 1958 election. Brandt cited Carstens as having reminded him world outside of Germany only dimly aware ’58 election and its significance; hence new election at this time would demonstrate in timely way allegiance of Berliners to Western cause. According to Brandt, one objection to this idea voiced by Lipschitz who doubts wisdom playing around with basic system of representative government itself, even though in a good cause.

If he does not succeed changing Chancellor’s mind, Brandt says he will have to go along but will then remind Chancellor that matter should be taken up with three ambassadors in Bonn as Brandt would not be willing carry out plebiscite if Allies object. Brandt does not see how Adenauer could take exception to this in view many occasions Adenauer himself has referred to Allied-German partnership in Berlin.

I asked Brandt if it did not seem evident that Chancellor’s position frankly based on using this method to guarantee fulfillment recent pledges received from President Eisenhower. Brandt referred to letter from Chancellor in which Adenauer stated reason for his proposal was “to strengthen Western position at the summit.” I recalled Brandt’s own views that plebiscite might well be taken as sign Germans did not trust their allies and said I believed there was indeed risk plebiscite idea might boomerang in big way when full significance brought home to British, French and American peoples. Brandt said this was just the point that troubled him.

Brandt, of course, has his own political position and future to consider but I have impression he will make sincere effort convince Chancellor to give up plebiscite idea. In meantime I doubt there is much U.S. or Allied representatives can do to assist. In fact as indicated ourtel 762 I believe we should avoid becoming involved between Chancellor and Brandt. Such intrusion could easily boomerang on us.

Lightner

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2660. Secret. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
1. Secretary of Defense Gates was in Berlin as part of a tour of U.S. military installations in Europe prior to the NAC Defense Ministers meeting in Paris at the end of March.
2. Document 100.
3. Dated March 25, telegram 762 from Berlin reported that Brandt did not seem to want a formal reply to his request for Allied views on the plebiscite and that Adenauer had written to Brandt imploring his support for the proposal and that he not be misled by American opposition to it. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3–2560)