100. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State0
753. Paris for Embassy, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Ref: Dept’s 2014 to Bonn.1
Mayor Brandt called in my British, French colleagues and myself afternoon March 21. He told us he had received letter from Chancellor March 18 re plebiscite proposal. Adenauer stated reason was to strengthen the Western position at summit. Chancellor mentioned that subsequently idea of less formal arrangement with action to be taken by political parties in Berlin was discussed in Washington.
Brandt then summarized his reply to Chancellor’s letter (now en route) which also includes views of Senat and both political parties. Main points as follows: Senat ready to hold a plebiscite in West Berlin if [Page 252] Western Powers should desire it. Berliners themselves would be prepared to sponsor plebiscite on their own if it appeared situation required such action.
Re technical problem of holding plebiscite in West Berlin on such short notice, special law would have to be adopted but this could be rushed through in about 4 weeks. Proposed text of such law, with question to be posed in plebiscite omitted, has already been drafted.
Brandt said in letter to Chancellor he deplored lack consultation before Adenauer made proposal. Furthermore, difficult to understand need for plebiscite without background regarding Chancellor’s conversation with President and SecState. (Brandt told us his impressions were there nothing in Washington talks indicating such a need.)
Brandt’s letter further referred to importance of carefully considering theme, time and form of any plebiscite. Impression must be avoided that Germans mistrusted their allies, nor must plebiscite appear to ask Berliners who their occupiers should be.
As to form, Brandt told Adenauer it should be “formal plebiscite” not “public opinion” poll conducted by political parties. Latter would have two disadvantages: (1) Would be compared to sort of thing that goes on in a “peoples’ democracy” (2) It would be impossible to achieve as good results percentage-wise. Under any circumstance it difficult obtain voting participation of 93 percent as in December 1958 elections. A vote under party sponsorship without formal voting lists might result in significantly weaker participation.
Brandt also wrote Chancellor that irrespective of plebiscite before summit, Berliners were planning to use events of May 1 to register an impact on world opinion. Various schemes under consideration to augment normal activities, including participation of representative groups from public life who might be called upon to show their support for the cause.
Brandt also told Adenauer he assumed Allies at summit would keep their word that no agreements would be made against will of Berliners. This also pointed to conclusion it preferable to have plebiscite, if any, after rather than before summit.
Brandt said he would keep us informed of any further communications with Chancellor and would be glad to hear anything we might have from our governments.
After others left I informed Mayor of substance reftel saying that Dept felt plebiscite idea needed to be carefully studied before any decision made. Brandt himself had mentioned several disadvantages and it was obvious this was particularly delicate problem which seemed put us in position answering question whether we for or against sin. Brandt agreed saying he too was in that predicament and that his letter, while [Page 253] expressing negative views, had carefully avoided taking definitive position. He said he dared not do so as he would not give Chancellor opportunity, “if things don’t go right at summit,” of accusing him (Brandt) of having blocked plebiscite proposal. (Adenauer under these circumstances would claim pre-summit plebiscite would have forced Allies to take stronger position.)
Other leaders both parties queried today expressed many same points, CDU unenthusiastic, SPD more critical. Some expressed unhappiness about Berlin newspapers which reacted too enthusiastically too soon (Berlin’s 649 to Bonn, 746 SecState)2 but said that virtual disappearance of plebiscite subject from press over weekend may indicate editors having second thoughts.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2160. Secret. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.↩
- Dated March 19, telegram 2014 to Bonn summarized Herter’s conversation with Brentano on March 17 (see Document 96) and stated that Adenauer’s proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin (see footnote 2, Document 94) contained certain disadvantages that would have to be weighed carefully before any final decision could be taken. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1960)↩
- Dated March 18, telegram 649 from Berlin to Bonn reported that all the Berlin papers had reported variably on Adenauer’s proposal for a plebiscite while the East Berlin press regarded it as a bluff. (Ibid., 762.00/3–1860)↩