105. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Summit Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
- British Side
- Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
- Sir Norman Brooks
- Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia
- Mr. C.D.W. O’Neill
- Mr. Philip F. de Zulueta
- U.S. Side
- The President
- Under Secretary Dillon
- Assistant Secretary Kohler
- General Goodpaster
During the discussion of nuclear test questions between the President and the Prime Minister, the President had commented, in speculating on Soviet motives with respect to that conference, on the importance which he felt the Russians attached to a confirmation of the post-war German borders, and of the real fear they have of a reunited, armed [Page 259] Germany. In this connection, he had cited the many placards he had seen during his recent visit to Germany1 demanding the return of the lost East German provinces. The Prime Minister had cited the statements on the German borders already made by General De Gaulle,2 and had suggested the possibility that this subject might be explored in connection with the forthcoming May Summit meeting. After the conclusion of the nuclear test talks, the President reverted to the subject, referring to the strong statements made to him by Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev during his visit here, and to the fervent remarks on the border question made to him just a few days ago by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jaroszewicz.3 The President said he felt we could not really afford to stand on a dime for the next fifty years. He believed the time would come when we should make a statement on the border. He knew the Germans would not like this. He acknowledged that we must not destroy West German morale. However, the fact of the matter was that the borders could be changed only by war. The Prime Minister commented that this might be an important consideration to the Soviets. If anything could be gotten in return for such a statement, he thought it might be worthwhile.
The President agreed that this was not a thing which we should let the Russians have cheaply. However, he thought it would be good to be prepared as to what we would propose to say. We could then keep such a statement ready in our trading bag, and pull it out at a certain time in the negotiations. He recognized that it might prove to be premature to bring it out at the Summit.
The Prime Minister said that in view of the Western democratic processes, press pressures and leaks, he felt that it would be necessary for the Heads of Government to a great extent “to play it by ear”. The process of preparations, the drafting of position papers, were dangerous operations and it was very difficult to try to reach fall-back positions in advance.
The President agreed, saying it seemed there was always someone with a good friend who was a journalist, and then headlines were inevitable. Moreover, despite repeated efforts, it had been proved to be almost impossible to track down responsibility for such leaks.
Mr. Dillon remarked that some of our officers in the Department had in fact felt that concessions in other areas, specifically with respect to the nuclear agreement, might be valuable in exchange for some [Page 260] reasonable Soviet position on Berlin. He indicated that the Department was considering such possibilities.
The President pursued this thought, commenting that if we were willing to take a moratorium of perhaps two years on nuclear testing, the Soviets might be expected to do some kind of a similar moratorium with respect to Berlin.
The Prime Minister then turned to the subject of the adamant German position, recalling the efforts the President had made during the Western Heads of Government meeting at Rambouillet4 to persuade the Germans and French to face up to what would happen if an impasse were reached at the Summit, and the Soviets carried out their threat to conclude a separate treaty and put the East Germans in charge. He recalled Adenauer’s reference to the sending of armed columns through to Berlin in such circumstances. He said the British do not intend to engage in such a movement of armed forces, and indicated his assumption that the US felt likewise.
The President replied that if Khrushchev maintains that his treaty brings an end to our rights, then we do intend to go through to Berlin with armed forces. However, he said, the real weakness of the position in Berlin relates to the question of civilian supplies. Berlin is now a big industrial city. The Soviets have no obligations with respect to Berlin’s trade, sources of supply of raw materials, and the like. He said he had told De Gaulle and Adenauer it was all right to stand on the “juridical position”, but had tried unsuccessfully to get them to answer the question as to what we do when the Soviets move.
Mr. Macmillan said he thought that De Gaulle’s strong stand was a rather formalistic position intended to keep the Germans from accusing him of weakness. However, he thought that in the last analysis De Gaulle might not be as tough on this question as he now seemed.
The President said we must keep in mind the danger that if we let the Germans down they might shift their own position and even go neutralistic. He was very worried about who would then hold the central bastion in Europe.
The Prime Minister indicated that he did not share the President’s views. He pointed out that the Germans had now had an effective military build-up and were accustomed to it. He expressed the opinion that in fact the Germans now liked playing soldier again and would not likely change their role.
The President said flatly that he would take a strong Germany. He pointed out that the West was afraid of a strong Germany only when there was a weak Soviet Union. Now the central problem was the [Page 261] strength of the Soviet Union. He commented that this would probably not be the case if Hitler had not committed so many blunders.
Prime Minister Macmillan then said that he personally thought the West and Berlin would be better off under a “free city” arrangement or other variant plans which had been considered by the Western powers. However, he recognized that such an arrangement was not obtainable, and said if you can’t get that then there is no choice but an interim arrangement.
The President said that frankly he did not see how a city like West Berlin, surrounded by hostile elements who could hamper and harass at will, could long survive.
The Prime Minister said that in any case it was important not to get ourselves into a ridiculous position which we cannot maintain.
The President commented that on the other hand it would be a serious blow to the entire Western position if we showed ourselves to be weak in Germany.
Mr. Dillon said that we had some hope that the Germans might be more forthcoming in considering the Berlin problem following the Adenauer visit and the President’s conversations with him. We would perhaps have a test of this in the sessions of the Working Group on Germany beginning next week.
The President then reported on his conversation with Chancellor Adenauer with respect to inspection zones. He said he had referred to zones not only in central Europe but also outside, specifically suggesting the possibility of Alaska and parts of Siberia, but emphasizing that no change in force levels would be involved. He said the Chancellor had seemed to be in hearty agreement, but the following night at Secretary Herter’s he had blown up and even asserted that there had been no mention of a zone in central Europe. Mr. Dillon supplemented the President’s statement by saying that subsequently, however, German Foreign Minister Von Brentano had agreed that the question could be discussed in the quadripartite working group, and that General Norstad’s military opinion could be sought.
The President said that some kind of arrangement like this, versions of which have been under discussion at various times for some years, might be a very useful product of the Summit.
The Prime Minister strongly agreed, saying that this was why he was so anxious to achieve a nuclear agreement to show that something concrete in the way of cooperation in settlements could be achieved. The President assented, saying that he had thought it might be possible to get something specific in the disarmament field and that the zonal inspection plan seemed like a possibility.
[Page 262]Mr. Dillon commented that the Soviets appear to be seeking not something specific in this field at the Summit but rather some kind of subscription to general ideas or principles of agreement which would clearly be undesirable.
The Prime Minister then turned to the subject of tactics and procedures, saying he felt the preparatory groups had given no thought to this aspect of the Summit preparations. He thought that you would get nowhere in the kind of vast plenary sessions which had been held in Geneva in 1955. Even the so-called “private sessions,” he said, had about a thousand people. The whole procedure was then reduced to formal speeches made around what looked like a boxing ring. He felt that this was a subject we must think about. Mr. Dillon agreed and pointed out that tactics and procedures would be the main subject for discussion among the three Foreign Ministers on April 12.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1618. Secret. Drafted by Kohler, approved in U on April 5, and in the White House on April 20. Further documentation on Macmillan’s visit to the United States March 26–30 is in volume VII, Part 2.↩
- See Documents 5 and 8.↩
- For text of De Gaulle’s statement on German borders, given at a press conference on March 25, 1959, see Statements, pp. 41–51.↩
- Jaroszewicz visited the United States beginning March 23.↩
- See Document 58.↩