272. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State0

5639. Paris for Embassy, USRO and Thurston. On eve of Western Foreign Ministers Meeting Embassy believes it may be helpful offer general appreciation present UK Governmental and public attitudes toward Berlin and East-West negotiations. Embassy is mindful in this connection that recent diplomatic activity and public and private statements of Prime Minister Macmillan have enhanced speculation that British becoming “soft” in face Soviet threats and that “Munich mood” is at large in country. This is not, however, our assessment British attitudes either on part of government or general public. Certainly there is no parallel between emphasis given by Macmillan to negotiations with Soviet and Chamberlain’s efforts at appeasement. Macmillan and British Government under no illusions about menace of Soviet imperialism or character of Soviet leaders, nor do they expect negotiations to yield immediate and far reaching results.

Point of departure in Macmillan’s thinking appears to be his assessment of catastrophic consequences for humanity of nuclear war and his conviction that in present circumstances neither East nor West can or does contemplate deliberate resort to it. At same time actions of Khrushchev most notably over Berlin carry great danger of setting off chain reaction carrying world to brink. For UK with its small area, heavy population and proximity to Soviet military power possible consequences of nuclear exchange appear in sharp focus and explain in large part emotional content some of Prime Minister’s recent statements about effect very small number hydrogen bombs dropped on British [Page 642] Isles. British feel US with large land mass and greater distance from Soviet Union for moment not as vulnerable and consequently perhaps not as mindful of danger in present situation nor of imperative necessity attempting find some basis, even temporary, for coexistence Communist empire and free world.

Prime Minister’s reasoning appears to be that if war is excluded because it is unthinkable in light character of weapons available to both sides, then it is incumbent upon both Soviet Union and West to seek modus vivendi through process of negotiation. Obvious that Macmillan considers principal achievement his Moscow visit was to persuade Khrushchev to agree to negotiate. He does not believe that either Adenauer or de Gaulle can be expected in present circumstances to make much of a contribution toward advancing objective of negotiations. US doubts regarding possibility reaching agreement with Soviets at Foreign Ministers or Summit meeting probably lead Macmillan to conclude we may be more interested in disabusing our Allies of their illusions about prospects negotiations than in pursuing patiently and assiduously any possible point of agreement. In these circumstances Macmillan obviously is convinced that he owes it to his own people, to Western Alliance and to history to bring his own talents to bear in finding road to peace. Equally obviously as politician as well as statesman, he is not unmindful of fact that his recent efforts have been applauded by all sections of British public opinion even though they have been viewed with varying degrees of suspicion and reserve in other Western capitals. This places him in a dilemma from which perhaps he can hope to emerge only in course of negotiations themselves.

Macmillan is on record as stating negotiations with Khrushchev offer sole prospect of useful results in dealing with the Russians. Therefore Foreign Ministers’ meeting from his point of view has significance only because its complete failure, in view US attitude, would prejudice holding of Summit talks. Macmillan recently has expressed opinion that what is required is continuous negotiating procedure punctuated from time to time with Summit meetings. This is consistent with his belief that while basic East-West differences are not negotiable at present time, it may nevertheless be possible to arrive at limited agreements reducing danger of conflict and purchasing time. This brings us to additional point which apparently impressed Macmillan greatly during his visit Soviet Union, namely great advance in standard of living of Russian people since his last visit some thirty years ago. Macmillan sees in this improvement best long range hope for the West that aggressive, imperialistic character of Soviet Government will undergo internal changes causing it to become less of menace to rest of world.

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Fundamental problem arising from Macmillan (also Lloyd) thinking as analysed above is, it seems to Embassy, that British pursuing traditional policies and tactics and fail to see desirability genuine confidence in nuclear deterrence to prevent war, although they profess concur in deterrent concept. Thus, as we see it, they are following traditional procedure of maximum negotiating effort with potential enemy and, also traditionally, are quite determined to be staunch in face of hostilities which may arise if negotiations fail or if enemy attacks. However the psychological imperatives of a massive retaliatory posture coupled with disposition to face up publicly to Soviets firmly in peacetime seem in fact to be beyond British grasp.

In Embassy’s opinion we have many problems before us inherent in the present strong desire of Macmillan government to seek basis for agreement with Soviet Union and in sense of urgency which it brings to these endeavors. Undoubtedly we can anticipate differences to arise with UK during negotiations with Soviets. We do not believe, however, that these differences have their origin in weakened resolution or “Munich spirit” of UK. Furthermore there is no reason to believe that British Government has any doubts that fundamental basis of British security continues to lie in Anglo-American alliance nor that in final analysis UK, despite differences with U.S. on strategy and tactics, would permit such differences to override requirements Anglo-American partnership.

Whitney
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–2559, Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin.