271. Report of the Four-Power Working Group0
In fulfillment of the directions given to them by the four Ministers in Washington on April l,1 the Working Group has prepared:
a. A revision of the “Phased Plan for German Reunification and European Security and a German Peace Settlement”,
b. Preliminary Draft Principles of a Peace Treaty,
- Proposals on Berlin,
- A paper on Tactics at a Foreign Ministers’ Conference,
- A statement to the North Atlantic Council.
While the Working Group has reached a large identity of view, there are nevertheless certain questions in the attached papers on which an agreed direction must now be sought from Ministers.
1. Security and Disarmament
(a) In what terms should the connection be expressed between general disarmament on the one hand and European security and German reunification on the other hand? In particular, can a measure of general disarmament (overall force levels and arms reduction for the Four Powers) be introduced into the plan? Alternatively, should the plan provide for a parallel negotiation about general disarmament?
(b) Should provisions which are stated in general terms for measures against surprise attack allow for an alternative proposal limited to Europe and also for a specific proposal for ground inspection limited to a small area in Europe?[Page 640]
(c) Should a specific formula, for instance by reference to the Paris Agreements,2 or general language be used for limiting the strength of indigenous military forces in a defined area in Europe?
(d) Should a prohibition against the stationing of I.R.B.M.s in a defined area in Europe be included?
(e) Should Hungary be included in the area in Europe in which special security measures would be applied?
(f) Can and should the area in Europe in which special security measures would be applied be identified in other than political terms?
(a) What Berlin proposals should be made within the “phased plan”?
(b) In considering secondary solutions, i.e. solutions apart from the “phased plan”, could the Western Powers accept anything beyond the “agency theory”? Specifically, could they proceed from Solution C in the Berlin paper to Solution D.3 (Soviet-G.D.R. declarations?)
(c) Can a G.D.R. declaration of the type included in the final fallback proposal on Berlin be envisaged without moving too far in the direction of the recognition of the G.D.R.? If so, can the Western Powers take the initiative with the Soviets in obtaining this, or should this initiative suggesting such a G.D.R. declaration be left to the Soviet Union?
(d) What measures of United Nations participation, if any, can the Western Powers contemplate? Should the United Nations role include United Nations personnel to determine whether the declaration concerning free access and non-use of force are being fulfilled?
(a) Should the Western Powers give any publicity to the “phased plan” prior to the May 11 meeting?
(b) Should the Western Powers introduce the “phased plan” (or an indication of it) at the outset or should they hold it in reserve until they have been able, to some extent, to probe the Soviet position?
(c) If (a) has not been done, should the “phased plan” be publicised, either textually or in summary, when it is introduced?
(d) Should the Western Powers fully explore the “phased plan” with the Soviets and decide on its final disposition before any separate [Page 641] discussion of Berlin? Or should they seek to have the Berlin question discussed before entering into a discussion of the phased plan?
(e) Should the Western Powers oppose any discussion of the Peace Treaty principles, permit only extremely limited discussion, or be prepared for a detailed discussion?
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–2359. Secret. The complete text including the papers cited below comprise 43 pages. Only the summary is printed here. Regarding the deliberations of the Working Group, see Document 270.↩
- See Document 251.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 263.↩
- Solution C outlined various declarations that the four occupying powers and the East Germans might make to ensure access to Berlin. Solution D stated that the Western powers would say that they intended to maintain their rights in Berlin under existing agreements and trusted that the Soviet Union would not interfere with them.↩