273. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 0
2398. Eyes only Secretary. I saw Chancellor yesterday at Cadenabbia.1 He asked me to communicate substance our discussion to you only.
Adenauer had informal agenda four items: (1) new situation Washington; (2) his candidacy for Presidency; (3) prospects at FonMin and Summit Conferences and, in this connection, remarks on the Working Group studies;2 (4) situation in UK.
Re (1) In view Secretary’s departure Washington Monday and inability Chancellor send him letter from Italy before that time, Adenauer wished me communicate to him his strong desire to establish constant and close relations with him. He will later initiate a regular correspondence with Secy. He expects shortly to send letters to President and Mr. Dulles [ Herter ] expressing his views on pending problems.3
(2) He had decided to be candidate for Presidency in order to assure orderly transfer of power in advance of 1961 elections which will be bitterly contested by SPD. He said he expected arrange matters so that his foreign policies would be carried on by his successor. (It was evident he is confident he will continue to dominate political scene here as long as he is in good health.)4
(3) He sees no prospect of any substantive agreements being reached at FonMin Conference or later at Summit Conference if such takes place. He thinks at both conferences the question of general controlled disarmament must be discussed. In regard to Working Group, I explained to him frankly the undesirable position in which his FonMin had found himself, as result repudiation in Washington by FedRep Govt of proposals initiated or agreed to by German Delegation Paris.
He answered he had not been informed of results of Working Group Paris5 findings until too late to act otherwise than he had. He was out of sympathy with positions taken by his delegation and therefore [Page 645] had given to von Brentano for presentation to the other FonMins the orders with which you are familiar.
He has not yet seen papers prepared by Working Group London but his delegation there had been operating within framework of his instructions, and he has been kept generally informed as to what has transpired. He is seeing von Brentano on subject today in Cadenabbia, and he would appreciate if Secy would meet von Brentano Paris some time Tuesday.
(4) His chief preoccupation is over UK foreign policy. On April 20 Macmillan sent him summary of Khrushchev’s personal letter to Macmillan.6 PM wrote Adenauer that this long document had as one objective driving of wedge between Allies, and that Khrushchev had tried to go further than justified in interpreting PM’s conversations with him in Moscow. The main point of K’s letter, according to Macmillan, was to propose a nonaggression pact between UK and USSR, having as its most important element agreement that US bases in UK should be maintained only limited period time.
PM thought maybe there was element of genuineness in K’s letter and therefore wanted to continue their correspondence. PM asked for Adenauer’s views on above.
Chancellor said at first he had been tempted to answer that K seemed to think UK might be induced to be disloyal to its allies, but had refrained from doing so, and would shortly reply to him and observe that if an exchange of letters between the two statesmen continues no good could be expected to come of it.
Chancellor spoke at length of his deep concern over UK foreign policy and especially what its representatives might say in debate at conference table. PM, in his eagerness for Summit meeting, has already thrown away good cards. The three Western powers have thus far missed opportunity to obtain standstill concession from USSR in return for summit, and Adenauer hopes they will nail this down before agreeing to such meeting. In his opinion PM is thinking in antiquated European balance-of-power terms, and does not realize strength in Europe engendered by continental unity thus far achieved. It is evident he has profound distrust of UK firmness or ability in dealing with Soviets. He said he thought in Moscow there must have been serious negotiations between PM and K which had given latter false impression of what might be done with West.
Miscellaneous remarks; I told Chancellor:
[Page 646](1) Paris Working Group papers never contemplated making proposal on confederation.
(2) Special security zone was always linked with reunification but it is not yet apparent what UK will finally decide in this regard.
(3) As to tactics, we are puzzled by German Delegation in London insisting on talking about Berlin first, whereas we would like to use it as last resort.
(4) His repudiation of reunification issue has created a confused atmosphere.
(5) We have certain hesitations about UN association with Berlin matter, since there is some danger of UN, once sharing, going too far.
(6) I sought Chancellor’s views oh how he proposed answer most recent Soviet note.7
Chancellor answered:
(1) He understood we were opposed to confederation and was not worried about our position.
(2) He considered special security zone dangerous and does not like idea at all. It would mean a limitation on FedRep’s full partnership with West, which is the single most important thing to maintain. Chancellor’s military advisers have told him any special security zone must extend from Atlantic to Urals.
(3) and (4) German Delegation had been instructed to regard reunification as secondary question and to put Berlin at top of list because of distrust of UK policy. If our rights in Berlin were surrendered or diminished, there would be even less prospect of reunification. Also, we should continue to base our position there on conquest.
(5) He has no enthusiasm about the UN, but thinks some form of association might be acceptable if Western garrisons and guarantees remain and if UN exercises no command or executive functions.
(6) Adenauer believes we should not be deterred from going ahead with atomic stockpile agreements because of Soviet note or remonstrances. I told him of my conversation with General Norstad on Friday and Norstad’s suggestion that NATO might answer the Soviet notes to US and FedRep.8 Chancellor said he would like to consider this carefully but offhand believed reply from US much more important [Page 647] than one from NATO. However, it might be that both methods should be used.
Since I was with Chancellor for four hours, obviously there was much additional conversation, but none I think worth reporting at this time, although I will speak to Secy in Paris about Chancellor’s confidence he can continue to dominate FedRep foreign policy if he becomes President.
Segni had visited Adenauer Friday. They have been good friends for some years, and he feels assured of Italy’s backing for his present views. His evident liking for Segni has perhaps been strengthened by his having decisively beaten the Italian at his own national game of bowls in which Adenauer has become an expert. He has his own alley Rhoendorf and plays at night under arc lights. He said his relationship with de Gaulle was in every respect satisfactory.
One must not underestimate the depth of his settled suspicion of UK policy. It is affecting all his decisions and tactics. He regards Macmillan’s trip to Moscow as the beginning of a decided veering away on the part of the UK from what should be the true objectives of Western Alliance.
Chancellor seemed in perfect health, except for intermittent cough. He receives many visitors and expects to have a group of his leading party politicians at Cadenabbia this week to discuss his candidacy for the Presidency and his successor as Chancellor.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/4–2659. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Transmitted in two sections.↩
- Adenauer was at Cadenabbia on vacation; his conversation with Bruce was held from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.↩
- See Document 270.↩
- Not found.↩
- According to Bruce’s diary the Chancellor also expressed some reservations about running for the Presidency and stated that he might continue as Chancellor. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)↩
- See Document 242.↩
- For a summary of the letter from Khrushchev, dated April 14, Macmillan’s reply, and the summaries sent to de Gaulle, Adenauer (and his reply), and Eisenhower, see Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 652–656.↩
- For texts of the Soviet note to the Federal Republic, April 21, concerning the nuclear arming of West Germany, and the Federal Republic’s reply, May 9, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 543–548; for texts of a similar note to the United States and the U.S. reply, May 8, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 517–519 and 521–522.↩
- Bruce was in Paris April 23 and 24 en route to his meeting with Adenauer. According to his diary he discussed with Norstad [text not declassified] high altitude flights to Berlin. On the latter Norstad agreed that they should not be continued until the Western Foreign Ministers had met. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)↩