258. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State0

860. Reference: Berlin tel to Bonn 694 rptd Dept 778 Paris 185.1 Beginning with and largely resulting from President Eisenhower’s March 16 statement on Berlin2 there has been noticeable abatement tension throughout population. American firmness credited with success in achieving abandonment by Soviets of Khrushchev’s November ultimatum. Abatement tension partly mere temporary relief that May 27 now no longer represents in Berlin deadline date beyond which no one could make plans or have hopes with any sense of reality. Berliners by no means feel that their city has been saved, but their hope that it will be is now grounded on a feeling that they have strong friends and real support, not merely on their own courage. They will continue to follow most closely all developments connected with the formulation of Western policy, especially with the crucial question whether US prepared resort to force if necessary.

Congressional interest manifested by visits 18 Representatives and 3 Senators during recent weeks and firm bipartisan assurances of backing for President’s stand re Berlin as well as numerous statements by SecDefense and US military leaders (Norstad, Twining, White, Taylor) have had uplifting effect.

Firmness re Berlin NATO FonMins, certainty of East-West FonMin meeting, and strong probability subsequent summit conference have [Page 600] materially contributed to improved atmosphere, as have unexpectedly favorable economic trends (Berlin’s G–367 SecState, G–485 Bonn).3

On other hand there is in Berlin considerable apprehension re confusion surrounding international debate on Berlin and all German problems. Berliners’ gratification over apparent unanimous determination that they shall be saved is tempered by concern generated from dispute as to methods by which they may be saved and worry as to whether hopes of German unity might be sacrificed for Berlin. There is also continuing and grave concern about British position and fear that British Govt may for domestic reasons drag US into some sort arrangement in which valuable ground may be bartered away for the sake of agreement to ease international tensions which may prove illusory in long run.

Mayor Brandt is emphatic in his belief that Sovs hope obtain some kind agreement introducing new element into status Berlin or altering that status, even if only implicitly, in manner which might permit it in some unforeseeable way to be eroded by Sovs. He strongly feels that maintenance status quo is preferable to any compromise. Despite weakness, present legal basis constitutes clearer claim right maintain occupation forces Berlin, Brandt believes, than any compromised situation which would give “batteries of Communist lawyers” opportunity over period years nibble away at legal position occupying powers. Mayor Amrehn, even more than Brandt, is fearful of results if East-West conference separates German problem from Berlin problem and deals with latter in isolation. Both mayors, most political leaders, and newspapers such as influential Tagesspiegel believe that failure reach East-West understanding re Berlin and subsequent showdown would be preferable to any change which could possibly weaken legal basis Western presence. Berlin leaders all view with apprehension any solution involving transfer occupying powers’ responsibilities to UN. Interior Senator Lipschitz said “Commies would need only 24 hours seize West Berlin by force, and UN obviously incapable making immediate decision and acting swiftly enough to resist such a seizure.” He added, “interminable deliberations after fact would not restore city’s freedom.”

Gufler
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–1059. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, Paris, and London.
  2. Document 209.
  3. See Document 225.
  4. Dated April 3, it transmitted Berlin Weekly Stability Report No. 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 862A.00/4–359)