Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

209. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Berlin, March 9, 1959, 9 p.m.

694. Paris for Hillenbrand. During recent weeks some corrosion West Berlin in morale imperceptible in detail is beginning be discernible in cumulative effect (Berlin’s despatches 620 and 621).¹ Apprehension re outcome Berlin crisis has increasingly pervaded thinking of politically articulate segments of population.

This concern engendered by: 1) Sov’s show of self-assurance and aggressiveness compounded by unwillingness yield on any aspect their substantive demands while making only apparent concessions re procedural matters; 2) inclination some elements in West detect favorable omens in these “concessions”; 3) apparent lack Allied unity in dealing with Sov moves and inability (as reported in press) after three months’ consultation arrive at plan of action; 4) worry that even some key Western policy and opinion makers may fail recognize deadly seriousness Sov challenge and may fail prepare materially and psychologically for real showdown with Sovs over what might seem to Western publics to be minor “GDR control” issue; 5) fear if Sovs go to brink West might unwittingly make what appear be minor concessions with major implications placing city’s freedom in serious jeopardy; 6) press reports re 2, 3, 4, especially speculative articles by columnists, which have greatly contributed to feeling uneasiness and have diminished beneficial effects recent reaffirmations Berlin guaranty; 7) Secretary’s illness at crucial time in East-West relations.

Berlin leaders feel present impasse unlikely be solved by further statements. They convinced more physical evidence Western determination, such as build-up general military strength, may be required dissuade Sovs from carrying out their threats to take unilateral action. There no question in their minds such moves would meet with full approval Berlin population as sign of Western resolve (see Berlin’s airgram G–324 to SecState, G–145 Bonn).²

Basically Berlin’s leading elements remain admirably calm and brave despite inner concern and continue put faith in belief that, if their protectors stand firm, Soviets will ultimately not drive matter to armed conflict. Berliners naturally also hope that if there must be concessions they will be ones for which full price is paid by Soviets; that is, real compromises not Western surrenders.

Although responsible Berliners are usually careful not to criticize unfavorably British and French we have general impression that they consider France willing but weak because of Algerian situation, Britain momentarily irresolute though basically probably dependable, and look to USA to provide both initial strength and leadership necessary to put full resources free world in line against Soviet menace to its most exposed citizens.

Insofar as we can detect mass Berlin population not as apprehensive as politically informed elements. There are only scattered outward signs of disquiet. Berliners generally have adopted attitude watchful concern, closely scrutinizing all developments relating Berlin situation. Party leaders report questions asked at Party meetings indicate extraordinary awareness international situation. Outward calmness of population evidenced by absence increased buying or hoarding of nonperishables. Berlin leaders wish housewives would fill their larders in order make room in city’s warehouses for further public stockpiling but don’t quite know how to suggest such private stockpiling without causing panic.

Gufler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–959. Confidential. Repeated to Paris and the Department as telegram 778, which is the source text.
1. Both dated March 2. The former transmitted a report on the attitudes and morale of Berlin workers, and the latter transmitted a report on the attitudes and opinions of Berlin’s political leaders on the situation in Berlin. (Ibid., 762.00/3–259)
2. Airgram G–324, March 4, transmitted a report on a meeting at the Berlin Press Club on March 2 at which the Commandants exchanged views with leading Berlin press editors. (Ibid., 762.0221/3–459)