257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 0

2034. As Four Power Working Group prepares resume preparation of Western negotiating position for Foreign Ministers’ Conference, believe it should be useful sum up various aspects of Soviet position as they are likely to unfold at Geneva. Developments for possible later Summit meeting are largely excluded since too much will depend on interim events.

Kremlin objectives now seem clear. Primary one is to achieve result which will in fact amount to Western acceptance of East European status quo epitomized by some sort of recognition of GDR. This is, of course, to be accomplished with as much loss as possible of Western prestige and political stature so as to produce maximum disorganization of NATO, West European unity efforts, defense measures, and West German domestic stability. However, latter gains would at present time serve essentially as icing for Soviet cake, main ingredient of which is to be legitimization of “irrevocable” incorporation of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany into “socialist camp”. This does not mean that achievement of latter aim by Moscow would herald end of Communistled political warfare against West in Europe (or elsewhere), but it would create new phase and changed conditions of struggle, perhaps related to Khrushchev’s concept of economic competition of two worlds which has prerequisite in his eyes of full consolidation of Eastern empire (Soviet hegemony).

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Berlin has been lever by which Kremlin has pried loose Western resistance to top-level conferences, and Soviets will undoubtedly contrive to continue to keep it in forefront of attention in coming weeks and months as means of persistent pressure on most vulnerable Allied point. This is not to say that status of and arrangements for Berlin are not themselves important element in overall Kremlin force play to obtain acknowledgment of status quo, but this probably secondary. Indeed, if Moscow should approximately succeed in its major ambition, British may well be correct in assuming that West can get “improved title” providing better-defined access rights and other matters, though probably no longer on basis of occupation rights, and certainly involving agreement to some sort of GDR role and to some diminution of those “subversive activities” which most directly impinge on GDR internally and which are thus incompatible with new agreement on status quo. On other hand, Embassy would emphasize that if Western position on what adds up to status quo proves unyielding during negotiations (including Summit), Berlin issue is likely to prove insoluble and to develop to point where military considerations and contingency plans for serious trouble will forcefully enter picture.

We are not predicting unavoidable outbreak of war at that point, but serious danger of it and, at minimum, start of active Soviet probing and pressures on Allied and (eventually) West German access to Berlin. This is not because, having started crisis and committed his prestige, Khrushchev must, for sake of his domestic power position and worldwide “face”, produce victory, although that is factor always deserving consideration. Main reason, rather, is that Khrushchev is in deadly earnest, on basis of Soviet national interest, as he sees it, in aiming for fatal blow at Western pretensions to challenging existing boundaries of Soviet empire. Since he undoubtedly conceives of himself as being in strategic situation vis-à-vis West which is much improved over that of recent years, and in tactical position at Berlin which is almost ideal, he will not surrender his advantages and return to situation which existed prior to November 10 last year without major effort (if even then or at all) in which all Soviet power and advantages of position will have been brought into play. However, it would be at some point during this major effort that Soviets would presumably have to decide about peace or war, and we continue to believe that there will be great Soviet desire to avoid letting matters get out of hand.

Under this analysis, therefore, crisis over Berlin status involving unilateral Soviet actions would be most unlikely prior to and during Foreign Ministers Conference. If latter were complete failure, tension arising directly from Berlin might begin to increase and troubles develop even before Summit Meeting, although definite agreement to latter would almost surely cause Soviets to hold back until it too had taken [Page 597] place. This does not mean, of course, that Communist side will not talk great deal about plans for changed Berlin status throughout next months as pressure tactic.

As for Soviet tactics at Foreign Minister Meeting itself, initial positions are, of course, on record and will be brought forth at early stage regarding peace treaty, reunification (confederation), and question of Czech and Polish participation, as well as on “solution” for West Berlin. We would not be surprised if Western negotiators, after hard bargaining, gradually encounter series of Soviet “fall-back” positions on individual articles of peace treaty, on specifics of Berlin solution, and on temporary or provisional exclusion of Czechs and Poles from meeting. Essential sticking point, however, would always be over agreement with any Western proposals which would obviate necessity for West to give substantial de facto recognition to GDR. While we would not anticipate much Soviet initiative on European security aspects of problem, Moscow will probably be ready discuss some items, including versions of Rapacki Plan arms freezes and other limitations, providing that these proposals operate explicitly towards confirming general status quo and would not be disadvantageous to Soviet military position.

In terms of attaining basic Soviet objectives, directly suitable vehicle for Moscow is Soviet form of East-West German confederation which would, in effect, sanctify existing split of Germany and perpetuate two states into indefinite future. Soviets will probably play this game by ear depending on their assessments of West German political scene. Their immediate reaction to Adenauer decision to seek presidency1 is that incalculable new elements of fluidity have entered picture which cannot but encourage their hopes for greater ascendancy of those West German forces willing to dicker with Moscow and Pankow. (Recent Soviet publication of SPD reunification scheme2 was undoubtedly meant to bolster those same forces.) Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers have no doubt gotten hold of information indicating major cleavages within Bonn Foreign Office and CDU on proper policy response to Soviet challenge, and may even have heard of recent Adenauer vacillation.

Soviet negotiators can thus be expected to make major probe of exploitability of political currents in West Germany who may be willing to abandon long-standing Western policy on reunification. They likely to assume that if official West German position becomes soft, France and especially UK will not overly object, and US will be unable to do more than slow down trend. Presence at Geneva of representatives of two German states will provide opportunity for Soviets and East Germans to [Page 598] indulge in numerous maneuvers to wage varied political and psychological warfare to get delegates of both Germanies together by themselves as big first step towards political dealing.

Peace treaty discussion is not quite as salable a topic as confederation for Soviet moves towards consolidating status quo, but it has obvious possibilities nevertheless. Attractiveness to some Germans of simple treaty with two German states might increase if Soviets dropped what amount to punitive provisions and to clauses loaded to favor Communist cause, especially if Soviets seem to introduce new articles with implied concessions. Such Moscow shifts are therefore conceivable. Threat of separate Soviet treaty with GDR will be kept in readiness for appropriate use, if possible, to promote primary objective.

There is some chance that Soviets will attempt to sweeten general atmosphere immediately prior to Foreign Ministers Conference by making enough concessions at Geneva Atom Test Talks to produce agreement there. This would strengthen hand of Westerners arguing for flexibility and asserting that USSR genuinely desires negotiation and compromise. More specifically, it might well give impetus to advocates of European security arrangements who desire various arms limitation and inspection schemes even when separated from progress on European political settlements. Although we are inclined to think that any major new Soviet proposals in this field (and global disarmament) are likely to be held back for Khrushchev himself to introduce at summit, Moscow probably has greater area for relatively safe concessions in this field than in any other, and signs of this may show up with Foreign Ministers. Difficulty for Kremlin is that it is possible for Western statesmen to design security plans which might attract many Westerners and even meet some of Soviet considerations without necessarily involving de facto recognition of GDR and status quo. This would not fulfill primary Kremlin aim which is, after all, not enhanced military security for USSR but protection of their basic political situation. Considerations of this nature may explain signs of relative Moscow disinterest in, security questions, which, indeed, are not even on Soviet agenda for Foreign Ministers.

As suggested above, Berlin itself may not initially be major focus of negotiations (once Soviets have tabled their plan) until USSR determines trend of conference on other topics. However, if it becomes apparent that fundamental Western position on German problem is not changing from that of recent years, Moscow is likely to step up conference emphasis on Berlin itself in effort to use settlement of its status as last resort means for breaking Allied position and attaining own goals.

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It is clear that Soviet aims require Moscow to be appealing incessantly to Western (especially West German and British) opinion during negotiations probably coupled with threats in attempt to force changes in Western stand. As in other recent talks with USSR, therefore, it is illusory to expect any maintenance of secrecy except on certain informal occasions.

Thompson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–959. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.
  2. On April 7 Adenauer had announced his decision to seek the Presidency of the Federal Republic.
  3. See footnote 3, Document 254.