Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

317. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State⁰

Madrid, December 5, 1959, 11 p.m.

793. Chief JUSMG-MAAG General Donovan showed me telegram December 4 which he had just received from DOD (Defense telegram 969145)¹ reporting November 27 conversation between General Miranda (Chief Spanish Military Mission Washington) and Deputy Assistant Secretary Knight (ISA) in which Miranda, acting he said on instructions from Areilza, discussed what he termed his government’s interest in admission Spain to NATO and obstacles thereto, and said he wondered whether DOD from military point of view would support official approach through State Department requesting UK good offices to put pressure on Norway to let Spain become NATO member. Miranda, according Defense telegram, also raised theme that Spain, by authorizing construction US bases, subjected itself to same dangers as NATO powers and should therefore be member of alliance. Furthermore, and this is what interested me most, Miranda suggested to Secretary Knight [garble—Franco might raise?] question with President during his visit. (Knight, according Defense telegram, explained to Miranda US political position on matter of Spain’s entry into NATO and said President fully conversant with problem and would be supplied with briefing paper concerning it.) Miranda then raised other factors which he said favored Spain’s admission into NATO (1. “Forthcoming withdrawal of US from Moroccan bases” and consequent transference units and equipment to Spain, thus increasing importance Spanish bases; and 2. Importance Rota as possible NATO naval headquarters), and then reportedly also referred to political interest of Franco invulnerability of Madrid to atomic attack and need for adequate missile defense, and indicated Franco might also discuss these matters with President.

I felt it imperative in light of this information to inquire of Foreign Minister if it were true that Franco intended raise these subjects, for if so it would be essential for me to help prepare President for such discussions. Moreover, as Foreign Minister had previously told me that Franco would raise no matters of substance with President (decision which I welcomed in view of nature of President’s trip and his desire to avoid country problems), I had to see if this represented change in that decision and if so to try through Foreign Minister to dissuade Franco from raising them.

When I mentioned gist of Miranda’s conversation with Secretary Knight to Foreign Minister this morning and asked if this indicated change of decision by Franco on raising such subjects with President, Foreign Minister hit the roof. He was indignant that question of Spain’s admission to NATO had been raised in this way, said it was done without his authority or knowledge, and emphatically stated that Franco had not slightest intention of raising this subject with President. Castiella [3 lines of source text not declassified] recalled how calmly he, Castiella, had taken first news I gave him on Department’s instructions that President would not come to Spain on this trip, having replied merely that he thought then it was important that President come to Madrid next spring during his trip to Moscow (Embtel 637).²

I said it had seemed to me unlikely Franco would take up with President now matters which Castiella had avoided raising with President in London, and Castiella said “of course”. He agreed with me that Franco and President would both prefer to keep away from substantive matters and he expected their conversation to take very much course outlined in Department’s scope paper prepared for President.

Upon returning to my office from interview with Foreign Minister I received Deptel 839³ re Areilza’s conversation with Murphy in which Areilza said no problems exist between US and Spain and he did not believe Franco would bring up military assistance program with President. I immediately passed sense of this information to Castiella, but he said action being taken to dissuade Areilza and Miranda from taking further unauthorized initiative.

Lodge

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–559. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. A typed notation on the source text reads: “Note: This telegram has been repeated to Mr. Murphy.”
1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. Telegram 637 from Madrid, November 6, reported that Spanish reaction to the initial decision of President Eisenhower not to visit Spain in the course of his good will trip in December had been slight, but that the Spanish Foreign Minister thought he should visit Madrid on the way to the summit conference in 1960. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/11–659)
3. Telegram 839 to Madrid, December 4, concerns an unrelated subject. Reference is probably to telegram 844 to Madrid, December 4, which reported a conversation between Murphy and Areilza on December 3 concerning the topics that might be raised during President Eisenhower’s stop in Madrid. (Ibid., 752.5–MSP/12–459) A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., 752.00/12–359.