Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

316. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/14

London, August 31, 1959, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Spain
  • Foreign Minister Castiella
  • Ambassador Areilza
  • Mr. Sedo
  • Mr. Pinies
• US
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Lodge
  • Col. Walters (interpreter)
  • Mr. McBride

SUBJECTS

• North African Problems; Military Reorganization and Spanish Membership in NATO; Spanish Gold Claim

After referring to the outstanding impression of confidence and security he had derived from his talk with the President,¹ Foreign Minister Castiella continued his discussion of the Moroccan situation in more detail with the Secretary. He said the Department of State had informed his Embassy in Washington in confidence of our intention, after the talks with President de Gaulle, to issue a public statement recognizing the principle of evacuation of the Moroccan bases. He realized that this did not mean our immediate departure but that this would be phased over a period of time. He said there had recently been Spanish-Moroccan talks and, during these discussions, Spain had refused to issue a declaration of principle regarding the departure of all Spanish forces from Morocco, primarily at the urgent insistence of the French who did not wish to recognize the principle of total evacuation. He said he realized actual departure could be delayed if the declaration was made, but said the French felt the principle was the important factor. Castiella added that sometimes it is easier to do things than to say them. In this context Spain in effect had reduced her forces from 60,000 to 10,000 and these figures would be further reduced in two weeks to 5,000 (this did not include about 10,000 in the presidios of Ceuta and Melilla).

The Secretary said we had had a long and difficult time with the Moroccans. If no statement were made regarding our willingness to leave in principle, we might not in fact remain even for one year. It was important that we remain longer than that; therefore, we thought the declaration in principle the best means of achieving at least partially our objectives. The Secretary said we thought at times we had been in agreement with the French on this but then at other times there had been a lack of understanding. Castiella said that the US of course was in a different position from the French because anything the French did in Morocco had repercussions in Algeria and Tunisia. He added that the Algerian problem greatly worries Spain, and the continuation of fighting there seriously hampers the freedom of movement of all of us. Castiella said that, when Secretary Dulles came to Madrid in December, 1957 to brief General Franco on the NATO Heads of Government meeting, Franco had spoken not of the importance of the Spanish contribution to western defense, but of the importance of Algeria and keeping the Communists from obtaining bases there with which they would outflank the Mediterranean.

Mr. Castiella referred to the fact that certain Spanish exile elements here and other leftists have attempted to portray his trip here as an effort to get Spain in NATO. He said no Spanish Foreign Minister or Ambassador had ever requested Spain be admitted to NATO. The Secretary said we must obviously proceed little by little on the Spanish NATO membership issue. Castiella said he thought the reason for attacks now was that opponents of Spain resented the President’s willingness to meet with the Spanish Foreign Minister. Accordingly by saying Spain came seeking NATO membership they could present the trip as a failure since it was obvious that Spanish membership would not result therefrom. The Secretary said he thought Castiella’s airport statement on this subject had been wise.²

Castiella said that many NATO countries favored Spain and that he was grateful for US assistance in connection with this question. He said he was asking of the US only understanding in Spanish efforts to modernize her army which she wished to do in order that the US might never have to move her bases from Spain because of the internal weakness of Spain. In this connection he handed the Secretary a note covering the modernization of the Spanish army which he had received from General Barroso.³ Castiella said that the Council of Ministers had recently approved the US request for permission to establish a missile tracking station in the Canary Islands.⁴ He said there would be a simple negotiation on this to complete the arrangements but that there was no problem since the cabinet had approved the establishment of the station in fact. The Secretary said we were appreciative of this decision.

The Spanish Foreign Minister expressed appreciation for the President’s kind word with regard to the Spanish economic program, and expressed confidence that US support would ensure the success of this program which our material and moral assistance had helped in getting under way. Castiella then passed to a historical economic problem—the fact that the Soviet Union still retained 510 tons of Spanish gold worth $600,000,000, which the Republican regime had sent there. He said that it had been an illegal transaction. Negrin, who had fought Franco harder than anyone, on his deathbed had admitted that this gold belonged to the Spanish people and not to any individual regime. Accordingly he had turned over the full documentation on this matter to General Franco. The Spanish Government felt that, on behalf of the Spanish people, it could not ignore this claim and accordingly planned to raise the matter in the forthcoming IBRD meeting. He handed the Secretary a note requesting US cooperation and support in Spanish efforts to retrieve this important sum which would greatly assist its economic recovery.⁵ The Secretary promised to study this matter. Castiella said that Mr. Black was informed about it.

There was a brief interchange with Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Berding who joined the group briefly to discuss the release of the President’s correspondence with General Franco, and it was agreed that the two letters would both be released in Madrid at 10:30 p.m. Wednesday, September 2, and simultaneously in Washington, i.e., at 5:30 p.m. September 2.

Finally the Secretary indicated to Castiella that we had been told through diplomatic channels that General De Gaulle would probably outline a program for Algeria to the President which we hoped it would be possible for us to support, though we as yet knew of none of the details thereof. He said it was also probable that De Gaulle would make a public statement regarding this program before the September opening of the UNGA. The Secretary said De Gaulle might have trouble with the army on the program.

In conclusion the Secretary said he hoped for the privilege of welcoming Mr. Castiella in Washington this spring. He said he indicated this spring because this forthcoming autumn the schedule was extremely crowded with the Khrushchev visit. Castiella indicated his pleasure at this prospect and said the Spanish Government would also like to welcome the Secretary to Spain at any time convenient to him.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1749. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved by S on September 2. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence.
1. See Document 315.
2. An extract from this statement was transmitted in telegram 331 from Madrid, August 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.52/8–2959)
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. For text of the agreement for the establishment and operation of a tracking and communications facility on Gran Canaria, effected by an exchange of notes at Madrid March 11 and 18, 1960, see 11 UST 1307.
5. Not found in Department of State files.

6. For text of the communiqué issued following Castiella’s conversations with the President and Secretary of State, see Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1959, p. 404.

   In a letter to Under Secretary of State Murphy, September 23, Ambassador Lodge reported that the meetings “were not only a great success, but, in my opinion, a definite step forward in the development of our policies toward Spain.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.52/9–2359)