Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

318. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/26

Madrid, December 22, 1959, 8 a.m.

PRESIDENT’S GOOD WILL TRIP¹

December 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Ambassador Lodge
  • General Goodpaster
  • Mr. James Hagerty
  • Acting DCM William N. Fraleigh
  • Col. Vernon Walters (interpreter)
• Spain
  • Generalissimo Franco
  • Foreign Minister Castiella
  • Ambassador Areilza
  • Director for North American Political Affairs, Jaime Pinies

SUBJECT

• President’s Trip; Paris Summit Meeting; Franco’s Review of World Situation; Situation in Morocco; Spanish Stabilization Program and Foreign Economic Policy; Protestants in Spain

The President and General Franco met, with the other persons listed above, first for breakfast at the Pardo Palace, General Franco’s residence, at 8:00 a.m. Then, after breakfast, the two Chiefs of State, and the persons listed above, moved to the Generalissimo’s study for their conference, which lasted about 90 minutes.

[Here follow a summary of the conversation and the President’s brief report on the background and first eight stops on his trip.]

Summary Comments on President’s Trip

The President then said that to sum up, his trip had convinced him that the mass of people know in their hearts that the whole West is trying sincerely to develop international security, a better world, peace and economic improvements for all countries that will improve the standard of living and bring about economic betterment based on integration and a desire for greater spiritual development also. In the over-all picture the President had seen very little sentiment that some kind of Communist rule would be better than this. People preferred the West and wanted to tie themselves to it—not just to the United States, but to all of the West.

Then the President turned to the Generalissimo and said he had spoken of a few countries he had visited and he would like to ask General Franco how he viewed the developing world situation, particularly concerning China and the Soviet Union and the efforts of the countries in the Western Alliance to divert the Communist effort to push forward in economic, military or political ways.

General Franco Comments on World Situation

General Franco began by saying that he believed that Communism must be fought with closest unity and be countered in a way to maintain and uplift the spirit of the people of the world through every possible means.

He said he believed that the Communist world was passing through some internal crises. He believed that there were two Russias, for example, the former Russia of Stalin and that of the post-Stalin era. Since the death of Stalin he thought there had been a slow revolution in the Soviet Union, beginning with the elimination of the police terror. Under Stalin at the top military and political levels men were constantly under the fear of purges by the police. Now this fear had disappeared, for the successors of Stalin had destroyed the power of the secret police and liberated themselves from the police terror.

At the same time the international struggle had shown the Soviets that they need to develop fully the science and techniques of the West if they are to win out in that struggle. This had made it necessary for the Soviet leaders to renounce the Communist spirit of total crisis. They were now embarked on new efforts in the field of science and technology.

In connection with this a new aristocracy was forming in the Soviet Union—that of scientists and technicians, marshalls and generals. Everywhere possible the Soviets are now exerting an effort to develop contacts with Western countries and experts and this is beginning to stimulate in certain groups, and particularly the youth of the Soviet Union, a small evolution. This might bring a change in time in the international attitude and orientation of the USSR.

These developments make the Soviet Government wish to appear more civilized and Khrushchev has attacked the situation which existed in Stalin’s time and denounced the terror of which he himself might have been a victim.

As a result of all this the Soviet policy is now running counter to the concepts of the Chinese Communists. Mao Tse-tung had considered himself Number Two Communist after Stalin and Stalin had been his teacher up to his death. Mao in his speeches often quotes entire phrases from Stalin. Attacks on Stalin by Khrushchev have been greeted coldly in China because the Chinese Communists need a reign of terror for some 30 years or so, just as the Soviet Union did, to establish their domination over the country. The Soviets have hence been given cause to worry about the future of China and this causes the Soviets to desire closer links with the West—without, however, abandoning their Communist doctrine.

At the same time the Communists are concentrating on small wars in Africa, for example, to create a favorable climate for their expansion to outflank Europe. While this is going on they are willing to accept the status quo in Europe.

But there is in Europe one important factor in this connection—that is that the countries occupied by the Soviet Union thoroughly hate the Soviets, as anyone who has had Communism at home must do, and that must be a concern to the Soviets. The West should be careful that what had happened in Hungary without any aid coming to the struggling Hungarians from the West might take place anywhere in the Soviet-dominated countries and provoke a war. This was one reason why the defenses of the West must be kept up and the freedom-loving spirit of the youth in the occupied countries maintained. The West should not want to sacrifice its friends in the occupied countries on behalf of good relations with the Soviet Union.

There was the problem of the countries which still have the old spirit of nationalism. General Franco said we must live with their caprices. After all, men of Western countries understand each other basically whereas “words can fight words”. He had seen in the press that in France there was an underground struggle against the idea of integration. What, he asked, is integration? It is a question of terminology. You can change the name and save people’s honor by calling it something else. It should be possible for reasonable men to sit around a table and come to an agreement on this subject too.

Here Franco reverted to his view that the Communists are working hard to gain influence in North Africa. He said that in Algeria particularly he believed the France was right. If France were to give up Algeria the Soviets might replace France there. The leaders of the Algerian liberation movement were receiving help and intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain. Franco said it was important to do what was possible to delay turning over this “house” to a new owner until the internal situation had improved and until better leaders had been found. He said all the educated people in Algeria were committed to France and other elements were persecuting this educated group. This brought him to the subject of Morocco where he said Spain had favored the independence movement. But it had been a disappointing lesson, for all the good people who had collaborated with Spain and the friends of the Sultan were now being persecuted by elements calling themselves nationalists, who were in fact under the influence of Moscow. The Soviets had opened an Embassy in Rabat and had over 100 agents in the country moving everywhere. Some people felt that there was safety in the fact that the Moslem religion repels Communism, but this very belief was put to use by the Communists who were enlisting Moslems to help them. Just these days there had been a crisis provoked in the Moroccan Government in anticipation of the President’s visit. As soon as the President left Morocco the real crisis would begin and only the King would be able to maintain order.

In Africa General Franco reiterated that the Communists were trying to destroy the friends of the West and create allies for themselves throughout the area.

The President said he agreed with this summary by General Franco. He was trying to support General de Gaulle and had been ever since the General came to power. He thought the General had made intelligent proposals and he had publicized his support for him. The President said he had just had long talks with General de Gaulle and that de Gaulle saw the problems exactly as General Franco saw them. The President added that he might have said earlier that the Paris Summit Meeting powers agreed between themselves and with NATO to see what they could do to stop Communist penetration in Africa, and they were starting on it right away.

Discussion of Morocco

Franco then said that in Morocco as in Asia, but even more so because of the lack of administrative capability of the leaders, there was a tendency on the excuse of nationalism to waste money on arms and a failure to face the real social problem. Hence quarrels had come up as between country and city people. The Moroccan country people were on the whole bitter in their views and felt they were being maladministered. The government took their cattle, for example, and sold it for low prices. There was persecution of the unhappy country people by the city-dwelling leaders.

Turning to the question of evacuation of bases in Morocco, Franco said that the people as a whole were not interested in this and were not pressing for it. Indeed they gained from the presence of foreign troops through social and economic benefits—but this was a battle which the political parties had launched for their own purposes. There was a danger that the evacuation of the bases would leave a magnificent platform for the Soviets to use one day, for the Moroccan leaders might turn them over to Soviet control. It was Franco’s view that the U.S. must retain its bases in Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa.

The President said that we had fought to get a delay on evacuation with the hope that if we ever have to evacuate, by the time we leave the bases, airplanes won’t be so important in war. The President wanted to ask a question of Franco: Is the King of Morocco strong enough to assert himself between the warring factions and establish a system whereby the Crown can keep order? Franco replied that he thought the King had a slightly mythical prestige among his people. It was traditional in Morocco that kings have always had the role of religious leaders—that is, defenders of the faith. The people bowed to the King and regarded him as their religious as well as their temporal leader. This was the power which the King was now expending to try to control the political parties, but some of the politicians were in contact with the Soviet Union and Communism was making inroads, especially in the trade unions which are now outwardly anti-Communist, largely because of the distance by which they are separated from the Soviet Union, but are at the same time far from being conservative.

In addition to this, the King’s health was delicate. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Morocco was in a state of unrest and it was hard for the King to rule well because of the machinations of the political parties which were particularly strong in the cities where a proletariat was growing as people came from the country to seek a better living. There are now many miserable persons without adequate work in Moroccan cities. Peace, order, work, were what was most needed in Morocco and when the people could work they were good. Franco said Spain had helped maintain peace 30 years in Morocco and the country had been disarmed except for the police. But now arms were arriving clandestinely in considerable quantities and the local cabildos were trying to create new armed forces. There was a danger of civil strife in Morocco.

To this the President remarked with a smile that he did not see much chance of his doing much good in Morocco. (The President was leaving for Casablanca within the hour.)

In reply Franco asked the President to speak to the King about the need to improve the conditions of the people, to create jobs. Franco said that when the King was in Spain as he had been twice, Franco had spoken to him of this need and offered him Spanish support. He had also asked him what was going to happen with the political parties and suggested that Morocco needs a political truce for at least 10 years—not to fight among themselves as Moroccans are now doing.

The President said this was interesting and he would try to take these things up with the King.

Spain’s Stabilization Program; entry into OEEC; U.S. aid; possible concessions to the USSR

The President then said he did not want to terminate the interview without speaking of Spain’s stabilization program. He said the American Government had been watching this effort and was very happy with it. He also wanted to tell General Franco how much the U.S. values the excellent cooperation which the Spanish Government has shown in connection with the bases. We are very much obliged to the Generalissimo about this. We hoped to continue to develop better understanding and use of the bases and of course we realized that some aid was necessary for this from us, and especially some economic aid, until Spain could stand on its own feet. There are detailed matters of course which our Ambassador is always ready and willing to attend to and work out with the Spanish Government.

The President said he was glad that Spain had joined the OEEC and believed the time would come when the association of Spain with organizations of Europe and the North Atlantic countries would be even closer. In one or two countries there was still some prejudice against Spain but the President thought that our relations had developed in about as mutually beneficial a manner as could have been hoped for. He hoped that Franco felt so also.

General Franco said that he did feel so. He thanked the President so much for his words. Spain had prepared for a long time to reach the point where it could adopt the stabilization program and was now able to do so with relative ease. He expressed his thanks for U.S. aid and especially for the President’s contribution at this stage of development of Spain and said the day would come when Europe would stand more united and stronger so that it could better do its own part in supporting the political efforts of the U.S.

The President said that we were all making progress.

Franco said that in regard to the Soviet Union the day was coming when we must make some mutual concessions and what the U.S. must give up the European countries could assume to some extent on behalf of the U.S. Franco said that we must not lose ground to the Soviets as the President, as a great strategist, knew.

The President said we would not throw our atom bombs into the sea.

President Raises Protestant Problem

Then the President said that he wanted to mention one problem which was internal both to Spain and to him. He said he had a very vocal public opinion group in the U.S.—namely, the Baptists. They had petitioned the President to bring up this subject with Franco even though it was an internal Spanish matter. They thought they had been abused because they had built a church in Spain and because of regulations they were not permitted to use it. The President said that he felt that the only thing he had a right to say about this to Franco was that he hoped Franco would reconsider this matter because in the U.S., which has so heterogeneous a population, including peoples of all religions, it was just not understood why in Spain some groups were not permitted to exercise their religion, and this fact disturbed U.S.-Spanish relations a bit.

The President asked Franco if he could look into this matter and see if he could do anything about it. He said he would be grateful and that it was the only problem he had to raise.

General Franco replied that in Spain there were almost no Protestants, not one in a thousand—he said it was a local matter and he was sure it could be overcome.

The President said that many of his Catholic friends have brought the matter up also and said that this subject had special implications in the U.S. because of our history of the separation of church and state. For General Franco to do something about this matter would strengthen U.S.-Spanish friendship. It would enable officials in the U.S. to talk more freely about Spanish-U.S. friendship.

Franco said that the trouble was with the ecclesiastical hierarchy in Spain. He will have to have them pushed by Rome. (Foreign Minister Castiella broke in to say that the Spanish Government was working on the subject.)²

Here the conversation ended.³

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1545. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fraleigh on December 31 and approved by Murphy and Goodpaster on January 11, 1960.

1. In November, when President Eisenhower’s good will trip was being planned, he was not scheduled to visit Madrid. Following representations by Areilza to the Department of State, however, it was agreed that the President would include an overnight stop in Spain December 21–22. Documentation on these developments is ibid., Central File 711. 11–EI.

   The President arrived at Torrejon Airport at 4:30 p.m. on December 21. Following the conversation reported here, the President left for Casablanca at 10:58 a.m. Background papers and documentation relating to his stay in Madrid are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1523, 1530, and 1545. For Eisenhower’s account of his conversation with Franco, see Waging Peace, pp. 509–510.

2. In a separate memorandum on this subject, Murphy reviewed what the President had said and stated that Castiella told him during the drive to the airport that a satisfactory formula for legislation on the Baptist Church would be found in the near future. (US/MC/15, December 22; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1521)
3. For text of the joint communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1960, pp. 56–57.