Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

254. Letter From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to President Eisenhower⁰

Paris, April 20, 1960.

Dear Mr. President: You will recall that when we talked early in March I promised to send you word on the status of some of the NATO-French problems.¹ I have waited until the last moment in order to have the benefit of opinion on latest developments and attitudes here in Paris. I must admit at the outset that the situation has not changed significantly since I saw you.

You will recall that after your reference to the air defense problem in your discussions with De Gaulle in December, I talked to him and subsequently discussed the problem also with Debre, the Defense Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and other political and military authorities of France.² This led to agreement in principle that a plan should be worked out on the basis of Metropolitan France being a separate air defense region under SHAPE, with the relationship between this Headquarters and the French DAT being essentially the same as that with the British Fighter Command. The technical authorities of this headquarters and the French military establishment worked together and arrived at a mutually satisfactory solution, carrying their work to the point of preparing the actual amendments to the paper in question, MC 54/1.³ I forwarded this technical agreement to the French Government on 5 March 1960, indicating my general approval.³ Since that time the paper has been in the office of the Prime Minister who, I understand informally and quite unofficially, has personally agreed to it, as have the other French authorities. I am informed, again very unofficially, that Debre has raised this subject twice with De Gaulle, on the 4th and again on the 8th of this month, and that each time De Gaulle has indicated that he will consider the matter later. As far as I can learn—my information may not be complete on this point—De Gaulle has not yet given real consideration to the specific proposal.

Since you were the one who really got him into this subject, it would be useful if you could apply a little pressure at this time.⁴ My suggestion is that you merely ask the status of the problem and again indicate your personal interest in the matter.

There have been no developments whatsoever on the Mediterranean Fleet question, although Debre assured me about three weeks ago that the French authorities were considering a further proposal. I believe I told you that a suggestion was made by France about two months ago which we could not accept as a basis for further consideration. Unofficially, even the French military agreed that it was not a useful proposal. I am waiting for France, but in the meantime no pressure is being applied. It is my suggestion that you not raise this point with De Gaulle and show interest but not anxiety if he raises the matter in discussions with you.

The problem of stocking atomic weapons in France is dormant as far as I know, and I believe that it would not be useful for the United States to take the initiative in reopening the subject at this time. By moving the nine squadrons out of France last summer and fall, we relieved the pressure on NATO and the U.S., and the pinch now comes on the French Forces themselves. I regret this, of course, but I think this difficulty will be resolved faster and with less acrimony if we let the French interests apply the pressure on the French Government. I hope that in the long run this matter can be settled, since bases and stockpiling in France would give us great advantages in flexibility, in depth of defense, and in the safety of critical units by virtue of wider dispersal.

The question of the medium-range ballistic missiles has preoccupied the French military authorities for some time, but I doubt if De Gaulle himself will raise this matter with you at this time. In the statement made by Secretary Gates at the Defense Ministers meeting in March, I believe the United States has taken a position with which it can live at least until there are some further developments on this side.⁵ I believe that there should be no bilateral discussions on this subject or bilateral arrangements with France or any other country until NATO has discussed it and taken, or at least indicated, an opinion or an attitude.

On atomic weapons cooperation, there has been, if anything, an increasing interest since the explosion of the two atomic devices in the Sahara, but it has not to my knowledge been of the high pressure type.⁶ The subject is normally raised on the basis that now that the French have exploded the weapons, some of the prestige requirements for independent action have been met and the development of an atomic weapons system will be extremely expensive in time, effort and money, which could be applied better to other things. The French state that conversion of this effort to other defense projects, for instance, would be possible if the United States could see its way clear to cooperate. Up to this time they seemed to have accepted the existence of the American law as a practical barrier to this type of cooperation in the near future, and by near future I mean at least the next year and a half or two years.⁷ John McCone was the last one to talk to De Gaulle on this particular subject,⁸ and from my conversations with John after his meeting, I gather that his reaction is not inconsistent with mine. He is, of course, the best witness on this point.

Gleanings from the Paris press and conversations with individuals suggest that the public feels two subjects will be given particular attention in Washington. One is the matter of atomic cooperation, and the other is the fundamental obsession with the tripartite directorate. When my contacts are asked if they look for any dramatic progress in these fields, they say very abruptly, “No.”

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]⁹

Sincerely,

Larry

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. The source text bears the President’s initials.
1. A memorandum of Eisenhower’s March 11 conversation with Norstad is ibid., DDE Diaries.
2. See Documents 249 and 250.
3. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. De Gaulle was scheduled to visit Washington April 22–26; see Part 2, Documents 165 ff.
5. At the morning session of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting on April 1, Secretary Gates set forth two alternative U.S. proposals on MRBMs for NATO for the 1963–1965 period. The first, which he preferred, called for U.S. production of MRBMs for deployment under SACEUR control. The second alternative envisioned U.S. assistance to European multilateral production of MRBMs under NATO aegis to meet SACEUR requirements. The United States would share on a limited basis the cost of technical information, technology, and certain items necessary to initiate an MRBM production capability in Europe. The text of Gates’ statement was transmitted in Polto 1970 from Paris, March 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/3–3160) Changes in the text as actually delivered by Gates were reported in Polto 1978 from Paris, April 1. (ibid., 740.5612/4–160)
6. The first two French nuclear explosions took place in the Sahara on February 13 and April 1.
7. Reference is to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended on July 2, 1958; see Document 217.
8. No record of this conversation has been found. McCone had a meeting with French atomic energy officials on April 11; see Part 2, Document 163.
9. In a letter to Norstad, April 29, Eisenhower thanked him for this letter. He said there “was no good opportunity to press the matter of air defense organization” during De Gaulle’s visit but he did discuss with him several times the idea of an inspection zone. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad)