Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

July 18, 1959, 2:23 p.m.

Topol 141. Poltos 132 and 133.¹ Dept fully concurs that Spaak memorandum disturbing document and wishes prompt action taken to bring to Spaak’s attention our concern. Memorandum referred to Polto 132 not yet received here.² In interests prompt action, Dept transmitting comments below on major points which cause us concern. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

Following are points which cause us principal concern:

1. Nuclear cooperation with France. Spaak’s statement that he understands US ready to offer France same treatment as UK in military nuclear cooperation entirely incorrect and likely give De Gaulle dangerously inaccurate ideas concerning US policy and Congressional attitudes, both of which were made very clear last year at time of hearings on amendments to Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and during just concluded hearings on supply enriched fuel to France.³ [5 lines of source text not declassified] Joint Committee Atomic Energy in its July 14 report on NATO Atomic agreements⁴ reaffirmed its strict definition substantial progress and its concern over possibility spread nuclear weapons capability.

[10-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] US of course always ready to consult on our policies and actions to maximum extent which circumstances permit, but believe unnecessary and undesirable to create new machinery for this purpose. NAC already serves as forum for consultation on crises in other parts of world.

3. Global Planning. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] US has long favored NAC consultation on problems of other areas (and has indeed been leader in this), but we conceive that such consultation should be for purposes of: (a) keeping Alliance fully informed of problems outside NATO area (b) obtaining better mutual understanding each others’ policies, and (c) harmonizing policies of individual countries with respect to such areas to maximum extent possible. Any effort to go beyond this to establishment of formal NATO machinery for developing common NATO action programs toward other areas undesirable both because of greatly varying degrees of interest of NATO countries in these areas and because of effect in other areas of common NATO programs. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–1659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Cameron and Brown (WE), Miller (S/S), White (EUR), and Farley (S/AE); and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Geneva.
1. See footnote 3, Document. 216.
2. Reference is to Burgess’ proposed memorandum, transmitted in Document 218.
3. Regarding the applicability of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended on July 2, 1958, to France, see Part 2, Document 39.
4. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in transmitting its report to the Senate on July 14 (the same report was transmitted to the House of Representatives on July 15), reaffirmed its definition of “substantial progress” regarding the transfer of nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons, which it had adopted the previous year in connection with the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 enacted on July 2, 1958 (72 Stat. 276). (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Proposed Amendment to Agreement for Cooperation with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Proposed Agreements for Cooperation with the Republic of France, Canada, Turkey, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, 86th Congress, 1st session, Report No. 513, pp. 11–12)