Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

249. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, January 21, 1960.

PRESENT

• General De Gaulle
• General Norstad
• Colonel de Rougemont
• Lt. Colonel Vernon Walters

General Norstad thanked the President for receiving him and stated that this conversation arose as a result of talks between General De Gaulle and President Eisenhower during which it was felt that it might be useful if General Norstad talked to him on air defense and other matters. General De Gaulle then asked whether it was merely on air defense questions or on other things.

General De Gaulle said that the Atlantic Alliance was not in question, that it must be maintained as long as the Soviet threat endures, and especially now just before the Summit meetings we must not be divided.

General Norstad said he knew that General De Gaulle had been briefed by his own authorities, and he would like to touch on air defense matters, but also perhaps enlarge the picture.

General De Gaulle then said he would like to say a word about air defense himself. He said that there were two possibilities regarding war: first, there was general, strategic, nuclear war; and, secondly, something less than this which would involve fighting in Germany. The French were willing to give all the means and forces in this forward area for the battle in Germany, but if this battle were lost, the countries of Europe, France and Great Britain would still have to defend themselves. The first battle in Germany would be integrated and the second would not. There might not be much left and it might involve partisan-type fighting against occupation; but the governments should not be completely deprived of means to fight. They must preserve the national entity; and that was all.

General Norstad replied that SHAPE’s policy was to preserve this national entity at the highest possible level. He discussed in general terms the organization of A.C.E., pointing out that integration was at the level of the largest national units, that is, Army or Corps; and that, similarly, the ATAF’s contained very large national components, such as 1st CATAC and Seventeenth Air Force. General Norstad then said that the most effective part of any air defense was, of course, the strike against the sources of enemy air power, such as airfields and missile-launching sites. He indicated in a general way some of the delivery systems and indicated that France would contribute both in aircraft and in missiles, and outlined the types of missiles that would be found in A.C.E. in 1963.

General De Gaulle asked whether the range of the Redstone was 250 miles.

General Norstad then spoke of the weapons situation in general terms, giving some orders of magnitude of availability of nuclear weapons and discussed SACEUR’s atomic strike plan and means by which targets would be attacked.

General De Gaulle expressed considerable interest in this and commented that it was extremely well planned. He asked a number of questions relating to this matter.

General Norstad said that if at some later date General De Gaulle has some time available he would be happy to give him a further briefing on this subject, and General De Gaulle nodded.

The General spoke of aircraft on the alert and said he would like to come now to the air defense situation. [3 lines of source text not declassified] He then showed General De Gaulle a chart of the speed of penetration into the area of A.C.E. of enemy fighters flying at speeds of Mach 1 and Mach 2. General Norstad explained the function of the early-warning system and indicated that automatic or semi-automatic data-transmission equipment would be required, and one French-built system was under study; it was interesting because it used transistors rather than tubes, [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General De Gaulle then asked about the status of the British Fighter Command, and General Norstad replied that this was under SHAPE, but that the fighters could not be transferred outside the area of the United Kingdom without national agreement, and that this would also be true for the DAT.

General De Gaulle pointed out that the British had a different situation and were more independent. He asked under whom the DAT commander would serve, and was told that it would be under AIRCENT. He asked who AIRCENT was, and was told that it was Air Marshal Broadhurst.¹ He said that the British enjoyed their own special line of command and that he would want exactly what the British had.

General Norstad said that to do this would be an offense against judgment inasmuch as it would split the battle in the middle and did not make military sense. However, he understood that there might be political or other considerations that made this expedient for General De Gaulle and if he needed it, General Norstad would be willing to accept this and support it before the Military Committee, if this was what General De Gaulle wanted. He explained that he did not like the system because it was not the most effective one, but if General De Gaulle felt that he had to have this, General Norstad felt that, with the cooperation of the French Air Forces, something satisfactory could be worked out that he could support.

General De Gaulle said that this would still be different from what the British had and they had certain special advantages. General Norstad replied that there were none that the French could not have, that he had negotiated this matter himself, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad pointed out that CINC AIRCENT was directly under General Valluy, a French officer, who would certainly wish to insure coordination of this matter. Furthermore, CINCAIRCENT had a Deputy of Air Defense. None of these positions in NATO were assigned by countries, but generally they were given to officers of the same nationality, and for four years this Air Defense Deputy had been a French General Officer, and was currently General Pelissie of the French Air Force.

General Norstad then said that another French Officer, General Valluy, controlled a very large percentage of the nuclear weapons available to A.C.E. in time of war. General Norstad also pointed out that if an intrusion took place, basically, the decision to engage the intruder would be made by the sector controller, and if this took place over France, this sector controller would be a Frenchman under the DAT; but it was essential that all of the information, data and means for the air defense of Europe be employed as a whole in order to insure their most effective use.

General De Gaulle then asked, “Why was this not settled before I arrived, and why is it so important to you? After all, the French contribution is not large, and why do you attach so much importance to this question?”

General Norstad said that all of the other countries had agreed that the best defense can be furnished by NATO by defending it as a unit, that the French contribution to NATO was not critical, but that the defense offered by NATO to France was critical and that maximum effect would be obtained in air defense if all of the available forces were used as one. He explained that General Eisenhower, in his original terms of reference, had been assigned responsibility for air defense in the zone of the land battle. This had meant, in effect, Germany. Germany at that time was not a part of the Alliance and did not have much to say. Subsequently, in 1955, General Gruenther had been assigned responsibility for the coordination of air defense from a planning point of view. General Norstad stated that when he had been at Fontainebleau he had endeavored to obtain Netherlands, Belgian and French agreement to place at least a forward part of their areas under a common air defense set-up and they have agreed to do so. Although there had been some difficulties, due to national sensibilities, particularly as between the BENELUX countries and France, these had been surmounted. With the shrinkage of time due to the increases in aircraft speeds, the problem has become more acute, and last year he had felt obligated to accept the responsibility for an integrated air defense, an additional load he did not particularly wish to assume.

General De Gaulle then asked under whom the U.K. Fighter Command would operate, and General Norstad answered under SHAPE and that if General De Gaulle desired that this be the case with the DAT he would be willing to do it on this basis.

General De Gaulle nodded and said, “We will see what we can work out.”

General De Gaulle asked General Norstad what he thought of the recent Russian missile launchings into the central Pacific. General Norstad stated that this was an impressive achievement and that they had fallen quite close to the target, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. General De Gaulle asked whether they had been fired from the Caspian Sea area, and General Norstad indicated that he believed they had been fired from a range just north and east of the Caspian.

General Norstad then recalled the President’s recent statement concerning the reliability and accuracy of the last 15 Atlas firings.² General De Gaulle said he has no doubt concerning this. He was just inquiring to get a general idea of what the Russians had done.

General De Gaulle thanked General Norstad very warmly for coming and talking to him about these matters.

General Norstad again repeated that he would be available to give General De Gaulle a fuller briefing on the Strike Plan at a later date, if the General so desired, and General De Gaulle nodded. General Norstad said he understood that General De Gaulle did have problems. General De Gaulle said that he did indeed have problems, and that they were moving quickly. General Norstad said he hoped they were not too difficult, and General De Gaulle nodded rather sadly and said that they all wound up the same way.

He then walked to the door with General Norstad, thanking him again for this explanation, and saying again how impressed he had been with the thoroughness of the organization of the Strike Plan.

Subsequently, in an adjoining room, General Norstad said to Colonel de Rougemont that his offer was firm to place the DAT directly under SHAPE and separate the DAT from the forward area in Germany, even though this ran counter to his judgment and split the battle in the center; if this was what General De Gaulle wanted, he would accept it, defend it before the Military Committee, and attempt to work it out on this basis. He stated that he desired that his firmest language be recorded for the French minutes in this respect. He also said that he would re-work MC 54/1³ in such a way as to eliminate the expression “integration” and substitute some other phrase, such as “unification” or “centralization.” He asked that Colonel de Rougemont note this in speaking with the French national authorities.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters. The meeting was held in De Gaulle’s office in the Elysée Palace. Attached to the source text is a copy of Document 250. Walters later recalled this conversation, although he mistakenly dated it in 1959 and added information on aerial intelligence, in Silent Missions, pp. 502–503.
1. Sir Harry Broadhurst.
2. Reference presumably is to Eisenhower’s annual budget message to Congress on January 18, in which he noted that the Atlas ICBM was now operational.
3. Not found.