67. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) and the Officer in Charge of Inter-American Security and Military Assistance (Spencer) to the Deputy Legal Adviser (Raymond)1
SUBJECT
- Mutual Defense Agreement with Cuba
On the basis of reports we have received from U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in Habana, it seems clear that the Cuban Government has dispersed and is utilizing against rebel forces in various parts of the country, the men and equipment of the hemisphere defense units which we are supporting under our Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed with the Cuban Government in March, 1952.2 It is considered that the Government of Cuba, by so doing, is violating Articles I and II of that agreement.
[Page 111]We consider that we must insist that the Cuban Government take the necessary steps to bring itself into compliance with this agreement. It is desirable that a formula of compliance be worked out that will take into account the practical difficulties likely to be encountered by the Cubans in re-activating the units that they have dispersed. Our failure to develop such a formula may seriously embarrass, even endanger, the present Cuban Government and result in seriously adverse Cuban Government reaction. This we desire to avoid.
The agreement provides that the Cuban Government will not devote “such assistance to purposes other than those for which it is furnished” without “the prior agreement of the Government of the United States”. It is highly undesirable politically to place ourselves in a position of being forced to consider giving such prior agreement thus permitting the Cuban Government unrestricted use of our grant assistance. However, on the basis of our interpretation of commitments which the U.S. and Cuba have assumed in the unclassified agreement of 1952, and in the secret bilateral military plan which supplements that agreement, we submit to your consideration the following formula which, if agreed to by the Cubans, we believe would constitute compliance:
- 1.
- In view of representations we have made to the Cuban Government on the measures necessary to comply with the agreement and the Cuban Government’s disagreement with our position, Article XI, paragraph 2, should be invoked. You may recall that this paragraph states “the two governments shall, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this agreement”.
- 2.
- Such consultation might have the purpose of seeking a satisfactory formula based on the last sentence of Article I of the agreement. This sentence, referring to “such equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance as the government furnishing such assistance may authorize” in accordance with “such terms and conditions as may be agreed” to promote defense of the Western Hemisphere in accordance with hemisphere defense plans in which both governments participate, states “the two governments will from time to time negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph”.
- 3.
- We believe that the consultation referred to above should have
the purpose of obtaining Cuban agreement to comply with its
commitments in the following terms:
- (a)
- An absolute interpretation of the agreement would indicate that we call upon the Cuban Government to re-integrate the hemisphere defense units with all U.S. grant equipment and supplies, all Cuban equipment and materiel serviced or supplied with MDAP facilities or parts, as well as all MDAP trained military personnel serving the unit designated by the Government of Cuba as its hemisphere defense unit under the terms of the 1952 agreement. We realize, however, that there is considerable justification for the Cuban contention [Page 112] that such action would seriously cripple that government’s capabilities to combat rebel forces, thus seriously impairing its internal security. For example, most of the pilots in the Cuban Air Force have received MAP training in the United States, and most of the planes of the Cuban Air Force are assigned to the hemisphere defense role and are served with MAP parts. The Cubans also describe the MAP trained troops as the most effective of their fighting force.
- (b)
- However, it seems clear that the purpose of the agreement is to establish a Cuban unit dedicated to hemisphere defense and certainly not to prevent all Cubans who ever received MAP training from thereafter complying with their constitutional obligation to defend the Constitution of the Republic and accept combat assignment in the nation’s armed forces. It therefore appears to follow that the obligations of each government under the agreement pertain to the hemisphere defense unit and particularly to the grant assistance supplied to that unit by the United States.
- (c)
- We consider that in the light of the above, the Cubans retain the right to transfer men and matériel to and out of such units, provided that it maintains that unit as a reasonably effective fighting force.
- (d)
- In re-establishing the unit as a reasonably effective fighting force, it would seem that the Cubans could comply with their commitments by either returning U.S. provided equipment to the hemisphere defense units or by replacing or agreeing to replace it within a reasonable period of time; and by reintegrating in the unit a sufficient number of MAP trained troops to maintain the unit’s personnel to normal strength. With respect to aircraft, the terms of the agreement preclude the use of planes or parts thereof which are supplied by U.S. grant. The Cuban Government, however, has also assigned most of the military aircraft it has purchased to the hemisphere defense unit established under the agreement. It would appear that the Cuban Government can, under the terms of Article I, withdraw such aircraft provided (1) it maintains a sufficient number of aircraft within the unit to comply with the objectives of the agreement, and (2) agrees to return to [or] replace as soon as feasible such parts or equipment as have been supplied by U.S. grant. It would seem that details on amounts, eventual disposition, etc., involved in such actions necessary to comply with the agreement, would be points to be settled in discussion and would be part of the “detailed arrangements” provided for in the last sentence of Article I.
We would appreciate your views as to whether the bilateral agreement and the supplementary secret plan provide us the flexibility necessary to consult with the Cuban Government along the lines discussed above. In view of the urgent need for reaching an understanding [Page 113] on this matter we would appreciate receiving your views as soon as possible.3