Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

616. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1268

Havana, December 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Country Team Recommendation on Policy re Cuba (Subject to approval by Ambassador Bonsal, who is absent on consultation in the United States)

Summary

The United States faces in Soviet-supported Castro’s Cuba an intolerable threat to its prestige and its security which has to be eliminated. (1) Conciliation will not remove this threat; the Cuban Government has amply demonstrated its unrelenting hostility to the United States and its refusal to negotiate save on its own unacceptable terms. (2) Time will not cure the problem. Cuba’s economy will be subjected to severe strains as a result of internal pressures, the decrease or discontinuation of U.S. sugar purchases, and the U.S. embargo on exports to Cuba, but early economic collapse cannot be assumed. The enormous strengthening of Cuba’s military power with Soviet bloc assistance, the extension of Government control over all aspects of the economic and social structure, the massive and skillful use of propaganda, and the drastic suppression of individual liberties and perfecting of the repressive apparatus combine to make an overthrow of the Government by the counter-revolutionary opposition all but impossible without outside assistance. (3) Strong corrective measures are necessary if the Soviet-Castro threat in Cuba is to be eliminated. These should be taken by the United States with the participation or approval of its Latin American and NATO allies, if such can be obtained, and if not, by the United States alone, and should include: (a) tightening of economic sanctions; (b) massive increase of democratic propaganda; (c) strengthening and encouragement of the Cuban opposition; (d) termination of diplomatic relations with Cuba; and finally, if necessary, to achieve the objective, (e) interdiction of Sino-Soviet assistance.

The Situation

The United States is confronted in Cuba with a hostile government, violently anti-American, which has confiscated without payment the bulk of U.S. property in Cuba and seems intent on destroying all ties, economic, political and military with the United States. Economically, the Cuban Government is in the course of imposing upon Cuba state ownership, over-all economic planning on the communist pattern, collectivization of agriculture, and state monopoly of foreign trade. Politically, it is imposing a totalitarian police state on the communist model, without constitutional safeguards or democratic freedoms. Militarily, the Cuban Government is creating, and with Sino-Soviet assistance is training and equipping and indoctrinating with communist ideology a nation-wide people’s militia of considerable size. In sum the Castro regime represents the negation of many spiritual and cultural values associated with the Christian democratic civilization of the Western world.

The Castro Government, in addition to being totalitarian, Marxist and anti-American, is constantly placing Cuba more securely within the Sino-Soviet economic, political and military system and under the influence of international communism, both with respect to its external and internal policies. Under Castro, Cuba has become the newest communist satellite. As such it is a bridgehead for communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere. Already Castro propaganda incites class hatred and revolution, Castro agents encourage and finance subversion, and Castro funds and arms are available to finance and equip armed rebellion, throughout Latin America.

The Cuban opposition to Castro, which at first was composed mainly of pro-Batista elements repudiated by the Cuban people, has come to include most of the non-communist former revolutionary collaborators of Castro, who have broken with him on the issues of violation of human rights, betrayal of social reform, and prostitution of Cuban interests to those of international communism. Few key posts in the Castro regime are held by persons who are not communist or pro-communist.

For the most part the opposition, who are divided into many groups, refuse to work together, to unite under a single leader or to accept the discipline and organization essential for effective action. There is however a loosely organized main opposition group concentrated in the United States in the Miami area. It maintains contacts with an underground that extends throughout Cuba and includes armed bands operating in the mountains, principally in the Escambray in Central Cuba. The potential opposition to Castro is enormous, however, and takes in probably well over one-half of the population of Cuba.

Relations between the United States and Cuban Government have deteriorated at a more rapid rate in recent months. The Cuban Government seized the oil companies, and the United States shortly thereafter reduced the Cuban sugar quota. The U.S.-owned sugar companies, oil companies and utilities were confiscated, and the U.S.-owned banks were nationalized. The U.S. embargoed exports to Cuba, and Cuba answered with the confiscation of most of the remaining American-owned enterprises. U.S. citizens have been arbitrarily detained, and diplomatic immunities violated. American citizens apprehended with predominantly Cuban invasion groups were executed while Cubans convicted of the same offense were imprisoned.

The Castro Government has long been attacking the United States viciously in every possible manner and in every country, forum and institution to which it has access. It has accused the United States of planning an invasion of Cuba. It is continually endeavoring to provoke the United States into some act of self-defense which can be trumpeted as an aggression.

Three Possible Courses of Action

In the face of this situation, the U.S. Government appears to be confronted with a choice between three principal possible courses of action:

1. Attempt to reach with the Cuban Government a negotiated settlement acceptable to the United States.

2. Maintain the existing posture of U.S.-Cuban relations on the assumption that time and the Cuban opposition will bring about a change in the policies of the Cuban Government, or a different Cuban Government, without need for further corrective action by the United States.

3. Take further measures, preferably with the cooperation of our allies but if necessary alone, to bring about or hasten the replacement of the Cuban Government.

1. Negotiate

The Cuban Government has tried before, and now with the approaching advent of a new administration in the U.S. is trying again, to give the impression publicly that it is prepared to negotiate with the United States with an open agenda and on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The unremitting violence of its propaganda attacks upon the United States, its high-handed confiscation of more than one billion dollars’ worth of American investments in Cuba, and its intransigence in laying down impossible conditions in the few instances where it appeared that there might be a chance for negotiation, demonstrate amply that Cuba’s present leaders have no real interest in negotiating their differences with the United States. The President of Cuba reportedly indicated recently to the New York Times correspondent in Habana that Cuba’s price for negotiation is the elimination of U.S. economic boycotts and embargoes, U.S. endorsement of the Castro Government, cessation of so-called U.S. hostile propaganda, and a U.S. guarantee against military attack, even by Cuban exiles. As a prior condition for negotiations these terms are believed completely unacceptable to the United States. On the other hand it is no less clear that any negotiated settlement that would be acceptable to the United States would require such fundamental changes in the attitudes of the Cuban leaders toward the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc and in the direction followed by the Cuban Revolution to date that it must be regarded as completely unrealistic to hope for.

Any indication of readiness on the part of the United States to negotiate outstanding differences with Cuba in the absence of fundamental changes in the attitude of the Revolutionary Government would be interpreted by friends and enemies of the United States alike as weakness and would discourage the spirit of resistance among the Cuban opposition elements in Cuba and abroad. The question is also raised whether in the absence of a radical ideological change by the Cuban Government public opinion in the United States would support a conciliatory gesture toward Cuba after all the injury and abuse Cuba has heaped on the United States.

2. Continue Present Posture

Continuation of our present posture might be the best course to pursue if we could believe that normal political, economic and social forces growing out of the Cuban Revolution itself, together with existing U.S. economic sanctions and pressure from the opposition would within a reasonable time bring about a change in the Cuban Government without need for further strong measures by us. But the Country Team does not believe this.

For more than 18 months after Fidel Castro came to power the United States followed a course of patience and forbearance toward Cuba in the face of extreme provocations. This policy achieved one important result: it won the confidence of most Latin American countries, as well as other countries whose opinion we respect, in the good intentions of the United States, and gave them time in which to see the Castro regime in its true colors. As a result the United States has been able to take three sharp measures against Cuba (reduction of Cuban sugar quota, embargo of exports to Cuba, and the Guatemala–Nicaragua sea patrol) without incurring any appreciable criticism from Latin American or other friendly governments.

The Castro Government is steadily extending its control, however, over all elements of the national life, rapidly building up its military strength with Soviet bloc assistance and perfecting its repressive apparatus. A massive, skillful, anti-American and pro-communist propaganda drive is in full progress which is already having its effect on the ignorant masses and is bound to do so on the rising generation. Although for a relatively short time the opposition to Castro is expected to grow in numbers, thereafter unless it receives encouragement and substantial assistance from outside, its task will become insuperable.

The United States export embargo is creating difficulties for the Cuban economy. The extent to which it, and discontinuation of U.S. sugar purchases from Cuba, will weaken Castro will depend upon the success of Cuban efforts to obtain alternative sources of supply and markets and Sino-Soviet bloc economic assistance. Up to now these efforts appear to have been at least partially successful. While the full effects of the U.S. actions have yet to be felt, over the long term Cuba will probably be able to adjust to the situation created. Other economic difficulties growing directly out of the acts of the Revolutionary Government, including the extravagant spending programs, especially for arms, the dispersal and loss of managerial and technical personnel, the lack of development capital, monetary inflation, and mounting dissatisfaction of the working classes will contribute toward putting a considerable strain on the regime. The Country Team believes, however, that the total effect of these difficulties and strains will not be great enough to bring down the Castro regime, if the regime continues to receive strong Sino-Soviet support.

3. Take Additional Strong Corrective Measures

The adoption of such additional corrective measure as may be necessary to eliminate the Castro communist threat is believed to be justifiable on the ground of self-defense. It is hoped that our vital national security interests could be protected without violating our international commitments. Since the Castro regime is also a threat to the other American states and the inter-American system, the United States should have the support of Latin America and if possible its cooperation in the measures taken. To this end an invocation of inter-American machinery, including a further Foreign Ministers’ meeting, should be undertaken. Consultation should invariably precede any action in which we are likely to want Latin American cooperation or approval. The Cuban situation is also a threat to the defense alliance of the North Atlantic powers, and should be brought to the attention of the North Atlantic Council.

The Country Team believes that the following courses of action, a) to d), must be undertaken by the U.S., with the active participation of our allies if it can be obtained, and by ourselves, preferably with their consent, if they cannot be persuaded to participate actively.

a). Tightening of economic sanctions

Economic, commercial and financial controls similar to those applied to Communist China should be applied to Cuba and on similar legal and political grounds. The object would be to isolate Cuba from U.S. sources of supply and markets, and so far as practicable from those in countries in alliance with the United States. The support of the other American states would be important but their direct participation in such economic sanctions would not be essential. It should be sought, however, as a prerequisite to securing the active cooperation of the NATO nations, at least in imposing export restrictions on strategic items, which would seem to be essential if our export controls were to be effective.

b). Strengthening of the Cuban opposition

It is particularly important to strengthen and support the Cuban opposition, since they would have to carry the main burden of the action. Since organization of Cuban invasion forces on U.S. territory is unlawful, the United States should concentrate upon supporting responsible resistance elements in Cuba. If it approves their program and leadership, it should give them encouragement, assist them in organizing and obtaining the arms they need, and be ready to recognize them and provide direct and increasing support in the event of an uprising and their seizure of the Cuban Government or control of substantial parts of Cuban territory.

The Cuban opposition must constitute an acceptable alternative for the Cuban people. Cubans who were associated with the brutality and corruption of the Batista regime have been repudiated in Cuba, and Cubans prominently identified with the corrupt though elected governments before Batista also have little popular appeal. The strongest elements in the Cuban opposition, so far as their appeal in Cuba is concerned, consist of Cubans who support the broad social and economic objectives of the Cuban Revolution, but who are opposed to Castro because of their devotion to democracy, constitutionality and individual rights and their resistance to communism. U.S. representatives should devote their attention to encouraging united action under the leadership of such Cubans.

Among the opposition will be found individuals who have occupied top positions in the Castro Government, including several cabinet positions. A provisional opposition government composed of such individuals would have a palpable claim to recognition by the U.S. and other American states, particularly if they were able to extend their control beginning with the Escambray to a substantial portion of Cuban territory. An assessment of the opposition movement is being made in a separate despatch.²

c). Increase of U.S. propaganda

Much of the success of the Revolutionary Government today is due to its massive effort and skill in the psychological field, which must be matched and surpassed.

Most of the Cuban people have no access to the facts about developments either in Cuba or the world around them or about U.S. policy. The Cuban press, radio and television have become propaganda instruments of the Castro Government, and they are being used with telling effects.

The U.S. Government must marshall its own forces and also make use of the capabilities of the Cuban oppositionists, to get the facts to the Cuban people, to Latin America, and to the world at large. It must seize the propaganda initiative from the Cuban Government and the international communist movement and must put the Castro regime on the defensive.

Shortwave radio reaches a limited and unrepresentative audience in Cuba. Longwave radio reaches into over a million Cuban homes. The VOA should be beamed into Cuba from enough transmitters on surrounding land or sea so that jamming could not stifle it. The VOA should carry the facts—they have sufficient propaganda impact—without need for embellishment or exaggeration. The VOA would be listened to and believed. The possibility of jamming by the Castro Government of U.S. stations and anti-American broadcasts should not deter us from this course.

We must develop and utilize other means of getting the truth across, including air drops.

d). Rupture of diplomatic relations

Sufficiently vigorous measures under a) to c) to be effective could not be undertaken as long as the U.S. maintains diplomatic relations with Castro. They must therefore be severed at the moment most advantageous for our purposes. Rupture of relations should preferably be the result of an inter-American resolution, and in any event should be coordinated with friendly Latin American countries disposed to take similar action.

Some of the main advantages of a break would be lost if this move were initiated by Cuba and not by the United States or the American states. Relations could also be justifiably broken on the ground that the Cuban Government is not representative of the Cuban people but is the agent of a foreign power. Severance of relations would stimulate and hearten the Cuban opposition. It would give the United States much more freedom to undertake actions which may be necessary to get rid of the Castro Government.

The subject of breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba is examined more closely in a separate despatch.³

e). Interdiction of Sino-Soviet assistance

If other measures were not effective in bringing about a change in the Cuban Government, the United States might have to consider intensive economic warfare including para-military measures against Cuba. Particularly if there should be an uprising in Cuba, and if opposition groups should consolidate and extend their centers of armed resistance, it would be important to deny by these means to the Castro Government the assistance it might otherwise receive from the Soviet bloc. This would be an extreme measure creating the risk of war with the Soviet Union. It would be a calculated risk based on an evaluation of the security interests of the United States and Soviet commitments and objectives in Cuba. It should not be undertaken without full prior consultation with our Latin American and NATO allies, and probably not without their cooperation or assent.

Timing

The Country Team believes that the recommendations contained in this paper should be given immediate consideration.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé Affaires ad interim

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/12–560. Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but presumably was Braddock. Cleared with Gilmore, Wellman, Paul D. Bethel, (less than 1 line not declassified) and in draft with the Navy, Air, Army, and Agriculture Attachés. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.
2. Infra.
3. Document 623.