614. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 29, 19601
SUBJECT
- Activities Against the Castro Regime in Cuba
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona, Coordinator of the Cuban Opposition Group
- “Frente Revolucionario Democratico” (FRD)
- Edwin E. Vallon, ARA/CMA
- Robert A. Stevenson, ARA/CMA
- Robert A. Hurwitch, ARA/CMA
- Frank J. Devine, ARA
At his request, Dr. Varona was received in the Department for an exchange of views on the Cuban situation. Although Mr. Coerr had been scheduled to receive him, illness prevented this and Messrs. Vallon, Stevenson, Hurwitch and Devine met instead with Dr. de Varona for two hours and twenty minutes.
Dr. de Varona mentioned that he had originally requested to see the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Mann. While recognizing that many factors might make this impossible he evidenced some unhappiness over the fact that other—and by implication, lesser—opposition leaders had been able to see Mr. Mann. When asked whom he had in mind, Dr. de Varona paused a moment and then cited Aureliano Sanchez Arango. Mr. Devine immediately responded that Sanchez Arango had requested an appointment with Mr. Mann but had never actually seen him. This appeared very considerably to mollify Dr. de Varona. In the course of the lengthy conversation which ensued, the following are the salient points which were made.
1. Damage to U.S. Prestige:
Dr. de Varona emphasized the fact that Castro was greatly damaging United States prestige throughout Latin America and the rest of the world. Other nations in this Hemisphere and in Europe found it impossible to understand how and why the United States was taking such a kicking around from so small a country on its very doorstep and particularly so when the advantages afforded to the Sino-Soviet bloc were so obvious and so great. According to Dr. de Varona the answer to this lay in prompt and effective United States action.
[Page 1133]2. Anti-Castro Propaganda:
Dr. de Varona emphasized the volume of pro-Castro and anti-United States propaganda being disseminated throughout Latin America by our enemies. He said that the FRD was doing what it could in the way of pamphlets and other propaganda output but with additional funds could do much more. He said that much more was needed and the United States Government should greatly multiply its own output.
3. Visa Problems:
Dr. de Varona said that Cuban refugees arriving in this country were most reluctant to issue strong denunciatory blasts against the Castro regime so long as their immediate families remained in Cuba. For this reason, it was frequently of great operational interest to expedite visas for family members, however it was usually very difficult if not impossible to arrange such matters. The standard answer received was that another office, another department, or another agency of the United States Government had jurisdiction.
4. Official Surveillance and Restrictions on Plane Plights from Florida:
Dr. de Varona complained that law enforcement by various authorities in the Florida area was much more strict and severe than in the days when Castro forces were operating out of the area against Batista. He termed flying planes out of Florida difficult, if not impossible; he strongly urged that the mutual interests of the FRD and United States Government militated in favor of a degree of tolerance, flexibility and “looking the other way”. Without this, operations of the FRD were very materially hampered. Here again, however, said Dr. de Varona, he and his associates were given to understand that differing government agencies were involved, thereby complicating the problem of enforcement, or more accurately, nonenforcement.
5. Financial Contributions by United States Business Firms:
The present situation in this regard is very unsatisfactory. Dr. de Varona and his associates speak with many business firms in the United States, particularly in the New York area, and find them relatively receptive to the idea of contributing to the FRD’s cause. On checking back a few days later, however, it is usually found that the attitudes of the companies have changed and that they are no longer sympathetically disposed to make contributions. It is understood that their change of attitudes usually responds to advice received from some government agency or department in Washington to the effect that their legal rights and/or position would be adversely affected by virtue of any contributions they might make. Dr. de Varona emphasized [Page 1134] that he was not speaking of any question of tax exemption or deductibility but rather the companies in question were given some cause for alarm with respect to legal or criminal liabilities which they might incur. According to de Varona, the companies apparently are afraid of violating United States neutrality laws. He said that he was not aware from whence this advice emanated in Washington but that it was most unhelpful.
6. U.S. Press Treatment of the Cuban Problem:
Anti-Castro propaganda labors under an enormous handicap in that the U.S. press, whether sympathetic to Castro or not, accords him headline treatment. Any action by Castro and his group is front paged. In contrast, anti-Castro action by the FRD or others is either ignored or buried far back in the newspaper. Dr. de Varona expressed his bewilderment at this attitude on the part of the U.S. press and wished something could be done about it.
7. The U.S. Bureaucracy:
The fragmentation of authorities and responsibilities among many departments and agencies in the United States Government is bewildering and alarming. As indicated in the foregoing items, it causes great confusion and lack of direction. Many important questions arising in the course of anti-Castro operations must always be referred to one department or another with consequent loss of time and initiative. If the United States in fact recognizes the serious threat posed to it by the Castro regime in Cuba, there is an imperative necessity for the coordination of its various agencies and for them to speak with one voice and for a single purpose.
8. The U.S. Policy of Non-Intervention:
Dr. de Varona expressed great impatience with U.S. policy of nonintervention. He explained heatedly that the USSR was already, in fact, intervening in Cuba. If the United States planned to wage a careful democracy-type war and preserve all the niceties in its struggle in the face of this threat, it stood a good chance of losing. The Soviet Union and its Communist Party have one of the world’s most practical instruments in the form of the communist international movement responsive in every country to its bidding. In like fashion, the Castro regime in Cuba now has its own “international” operating in practically every country in Latin America. There is a great need at the present time for the United States as the leader and defender of Western democracy to establish its own “international” in other countries, i.e., to create and support indigenous forces responsive to its bidding and prepared to work as actively in support of democracy as the [Page 1135] communist parties everywhere are in support of communism. He cited as an example of activities which should be encouraged and expanded the Institute of Political Education established by Figueres on October 3, 1960.
9. Prospects for Effective Action Through the OAS:
Dr. de Varona called attention to his several-page memorandum2 recently delivered to the OAS and setting forth important aspects of the Cuban problem. He admitted that the OAS could not become officially seized of such a memorandum unless or until it has been officially sponsored by a member state. He expressed optimism, however, that the Guatemalan representative on the Council of the OAS would in his own presentation make reference to the FRD memo in such a way as to incorporate the latter in the official record of the OAS. Dr. de Varona noted that in his memorandum he had called attention to the necessity of the OAS to face up to its responsibilities and undertake effective action in the Cuban case or, alternatively, to risk failure and disappearance from the scene. He went on to express considerable pessimism with regard to prospects for effective OAS action. He said that for him the San Jose Conference had been a failure and that the general role and accomplishments of the OAS dealing with problems such as the Cuban one were very slight. He noted reports that the United States anticipated the need for another meeting of Foreign Ministers, but he discounted rather seriously the prospects of winning the necessary votes and degree of support from the Latin American members of the OAS. For the United States to pin its course of action and its hopes upon the development of Latin American support in the OAS would be a forlorn hope and a serious mistake. He predicted that Paraguay, Guatemala, and Nicaragua would easily and automatically support the United States. He doubted that Mexico ever would and added that Uruguay would also find it hard to go along. Without breaking down the other countries of the hemisphere, Dr. de Varona expressed great pessimism that the required degree of support would ever be forthcoming.
10. The Cuban Refugee Problem in Miami:
This has assumed serious proportions and merits official attention by the United States Government. Although a committee has currently been named, it has not as yet done very much by way of caring for the refugees. Many of the latter arrive without clothing, personal effects or funds. On humanitarian grounds they must be taken care of and the FRD frequently “stakes them”. This represents a drain on its funds, [Page 1136] however, and it should be borne in mind that if other resources were made available to care for the refugees it would help to ease the drain on FRD funds and allow them to be used in more productive ways.
11. Transshipment of U.S. Goods Through Canada:
Official approaches should be made to the Canadian authorities in order to elicit their cooperation in preventing the circumvention of United States export controls over exports to Cuba.
12. Livestock Exports to Cuba:
Under the export control exception provided for medicines and unsubsidized foodstuffs, quantities of livestock are being exported from the United States to Cuba. This is a perversion of the intent of the loophole and something should be done about it. (Note: We did hear recently, for example, that high-grade cattle and hogs were being imported by the Cubans for breeding purposes.) Dr. de Varona also urged full U.S. embargo of Cuban products.
13. Estimate of Fidel Castro’s Popular Support:
Fidel Castro today has 25 to 30% of the Cuban people supporting him. Unfortunately, this includes the most combative type. Although some 70% of the population is probably opposed to him, it is not the fighting type. Of the 70% probably only 15 to 20% would be disposed to fight against Castro. This is because the opposition to him includes landlords, businessmen, dispossessed property owners, monied types of individuals, and professional men, none of whom consider themselves direct action individuals. (At the same time, Dr. de Varona commented that any recruiting for the fight against Castro should recognize that less than full military standards of physical health, age and fitness should be required.) In contrast, the 25 to 30% of the population which strongly supports him includes workers, peasants, and their sons, all of whom are quite prepared to go out and do battle.
14. Strength of Castro’s Armed Forces:
With regard to the militia, Dr. de Varona talked in terms of a strength of some 100,000 but said that many militia members joined up only under pressure and duress and were neither very willing nor trained to fight. Although they are becoming copiously supplied with Soviet and Czech weapons, they are still not in a position to use them. They lack the training to handle and effectively utilize the modern weapons of foreign origin placed at their disposition. The great danger is that given two to three months or more in which to become trained, they may greatly increase their effectiveness as a fighting force. Once they have mastered the tanks, cannon, and modern weapons now [Page 1137] being furnished them in quantities, it will be a vastly more difficult problem to reduce them militarily. With each passing month the militia increases in size and increases its degree of preparation. While the opposition may recruit a modest number of additional personnel each month, the GOC is in a position to press into service a thousand or more in the same period. This is a very uneven struggle with only one end in sight. Furthermore, progressive introduction of Soviet or Czech military technicians or instructors may well stiffen the militia’s willingness to fight, perhaps by placing a gun at its back.
15. Clandestine Operations in Cuba:
These are now more difficult than ever before. In earlier times, when forced out of Cuba, Dr. de Varona has been able to continue to receive cash remittances from his going business within that country. The same has been true of other oppositionists active in exile. Today, Castro has made anything of this sort quite impossible. Even the recently promulgated urban reform law has contributed to the difficulty of clandestine operations. In days gone by, Dr. de Varona and other opposition figures have been able to move about relatively freely and securely within Habana. On one occasion, for example, he maintained four separate rented premises and constantly shifted among them. In this way, he managed to elude the vigilance of Cuban authorities and at the end of each month or two would trade off all four premises in favor of new ones. Today this is obviously impossible and the totalitarian controls over properties and dwelling places through the urban reform law has given to the GOC a very effective control and knowledge with respect to the numbers and identities of persons living at each particular address. This and other factors vastly complicate the conduct of clandestine operations within Castro’s Cuba.
16. FRD Representation:
The FRD today has representatives in various cities of the United States and also in all Latin American countries except Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia.
17. Other Opposition Figures and Organizations:
With respect to other members of the forces working against Castro, Dr. de Varona either volunteered or responded to inquiries with the following information:
- a.
- Aureliano Sanchez Arango: This man is a volatile and disturbing influence who always wishes to be the undisputed leader of any enterprise in which he participates. Although he and Dr. de Varona had been quarreling for many years, Sanchez Arango had been welcomed into the FRD. He claimed control of certain assets within Cuba and also his name carries with it a certain prestige. Within the FRD, [Page 1138] however, he had been a most unstable element and a poor team player. As a result, he had recently broken with the FRD and was now going it alone. In the Miami area he is now publishing a weekly news organ which, like Batista elements, devotes some 80% of its energy to attacking Varona and the FRD and only about 20% to attacking Castro.
- b.
- Luis Conte Aguero: This man was a radio announcer and commentator in Cuba. He enjoys a certain following in the sense of a radio audience. Criticism of the Castro regime finally forced him to leave Cuba and he aspires to a leading role in the opposition group known as the Alianza. Actually, he overrates himself and his following very considerably and should be viewed in proper perspective as just a radio voice.
- c.
- Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz: He is a young man, somewhat impetuous, who is now working with us.
- d.
- Manolo Ray: This man has been active in the underground and was formerly Minister of Public Works under the Castro regime. It took him one and one-half years to see Castro for what he is and to break with his regime. To some extent, this disqualifies him as a suitable, overall leader for the opposition to Castro. Dr. de Varona has spoken with him by phone and Ray and he will probably meet sometime during the present week in Miami.
- e.
- Andres Vargas Gomez: This is a young man of good family and personal reputation but he represents no one within Cuba. The family and friends on behalf of whom he might speak would not add up even to forty persons. (He felt some progress had been made toward unifying a great number of the anti-Castro groups.)
- f.
- A.R.E.C.: This organization is made up of rich Cuban businessmen and property owners. To date it has given no financial help whatsoever to the Frente. It holds meetings and endeavors to get opposition leaders to endorse its position with regard to the economic reconstruction of Cuba but so far is like “those little palm trees that neither give fruit nor shade.” Any help from AREC would be appreciated, but Dr. de Varona made it clear that he does not expect any.
18. Anti-Castro Operations in the Sierra Escambray:
There are approximately 600 oppositionists now fighting Castro forces in the Sierra Escambray mountains of Cuba. Morale is good. Only about 300 of these are adequately armed and equipped. It is very hard to supply them. Some airdrops have been arranged but the planes encounter so much difficulty that this means of delivery is very uncertain and unpredictable. Delivery from boats is considerably more dependable but has to be effected on the southern coast of Cuba because Castro has militia groups strung out every 6–7 kilometers on the north coast. This means that the boats must go all the way around the island in order to reach the delivery zone. Lack of Mexican cooperation renders it impracticable to think in terms of sending the boats from Mexico. The Castro Government has some 8000 men stationed around the area, with small groups every few kilometers. No useful purpose is served in sending more fighting men into the Sierra Escambray [Page 1139] unless or until arrangements can be worked out for supplying them with food, arms, ammunition and necessary equipment. This is the limiting factor; otherwise the group could be quickly expanded.
19. Military Action Timetable:
It is essential that the opposition forces mount their attack against Cuba at the earliest possible moment. Every hour counts in reaching the decisions necessary to this end. Military action should be undertaken within the next two months. Time is running against us and it is an illusion to believe that economic hardship will ever by itself achieve the objective which is sought. It is impractical to talk in terms of mounting an invasion to take the Isle of Pines which is now defended by 2500 Castro fighting men. After seizing the Island, presumably at a heavy cost, the invading forces would still be faced with the major task of launching still another invasion against the mainland of Cuba. It would conserve effort and manpower and be far more sensible to direct the initial effort against the main island itself. A force of 2 to 3 thousand men should be put ashore in Cuba, should take control of an area, consolidate their hold over it, and declare themselves the new government of Cuba. The existence of such a controlled area, in the nature of a safehaven, would ipso facto encourage large-scale defections of Castro’s forces by giving the potential defectors some place to go. Significant numbers of Cubans would respond in this way. It would then be incumbent upon the United States to recognize the newly established government and actively and effectively to support it.
20. U.S. Military Intervention:
Near the end of the conversation, Dr. de Varona admitted his own belief that U.S. military intervention in Cuba would eventually prove inevitable and indispensable. When asked if he contemplated by this the actual dispatch of United States troops or just equipment he responded that he meant both. He pointed out that the Soviet Union was placing significant numbers of tanks at the disposal of the Castro forces and asked rhetorically “where would we get tanks?” He repeated his personal conviction that Castro will be overthrown only by a major military effort and that armed intervention by the United States with men and equipment would prove unavoidable.
21. In concluding his remarks, Dr. de Varona emphasized the community of interest shared by Cuban opposition forces and the United States in any anti-Castro effort. The oppositionists, he said, were fighting for Cuba, while the United States would be fighting for its own position and prestige. He called attention to the example being set by Castro with respect to private U.S. investment in Latin American [Page 1140] countries. If other countries in the area saw Castro get away Scot-free with seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. property, the temptation to follow suit would be irresistible. This as well as all the other factors attendant upon the Cuban case militated strongly in favor of prompt decisive action by the United States.