Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

579. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, September 1, 1960.

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE CONTINGENCY PLAN COVERING US ASSISTANCE TO POST-CASTRO CUBAN GOVERNMENT

Note: This outline plan is valid for a period of approximately six months (through the next sugar harvest).

I. Assumptions:

1. The removal of Fidel Castro from power will follow a period of civil disorder involving riots, bombings, assassinations, guerrilla activities, inter- and intra-Service fighting among regular and irregular armed units.

2. Sino-Soviet Bloc assistance to Castro will fall short of the commitment of regular armed forces, or of actions likely to provoke war with the US. Such political and economic support as may be possible will be rendered Castro, and help may be provided through the services of individual advisers, technicians, tacticians and some “volunteers” from various countries, working through such entities as the “International Work Brigade.”

3. There will be divisions in the loyalties of various groups, some, like the militia and police, predominantly loyal to Castro, and others, like the remnants of the regular armed forces and older traditional labor organizations, mainly opposed to Castro. Castro’s chief support will be found among the Communists and groups that can be manipulated by them.

4. In whatever civil disorder may precede Castro’s downfall, the Communist-manipulated groups will be better disciplined, directed and armed; and following his fall the Communists may go underground and harass the government.

5. The departure of key figures in the Castro government will be accompanied by the looting of the public treasury and the transfer of government funds on deposit abroad.

6. The degree of property damage and destruction is difficult to forecast. At best it may be limited to the breaking of shop windows, minor bomb damage to various structures, and the sacking and burning of some shops and homes. On the other hand, it may include substantial damage to power plants, and industrial and communications installations. At worst, however, there should be enough facilities in working condition to permit the maintenance of minimum essential public services.

II. The New Government:

1. Character and Composition.

a) The new government is likely to be a coalition of various opposition groups, of fragile unity, left of center and strongly nationalistic in political orientation. It will, however, be willing to work with the US in bringing about political, social, economic and financial stability.

b) Because of the widespread support enjoyed by many of the objectives and programs of the Castro government, the proclaimed policies of the new government will be variants of these—although initial measures of implementation will probably be more responsible, and calculated to provoke less objection from the US.

2. Conditions to be Required for US Recognition.

a) Ability to maintain domestic order.

b) Willingness and ability to respect international commitments.

c) Break-off of relations with the USSR, Communist China, and countries subservient to them.

3. Difficulties in US-Cuban Relations.

a) Considering its presumably precarious popular support, the new government’s tenure will depend on its ability to restore order and reactivate the economy quickly. Its nationalistic orientation and support will make US relations with it delicate and difficult. The difficulty will be exacerbated by the ignorance and marginal technical competence of many of the Cuban officials.

III. US Policies Prior to the Castro Downfall:

1. Measures that might be taken to bring about or hasten Castro’s downfall are outside the scope of this paper. However, the following suggested actions would be desirable in order to provide a foundation on which relationships between the US and Cuba could be rebuilt.

a) Dismantling of the preferential structure of US-Cuban economic relations, including the 1902 Commercial Convention, the 1934 bilateral reciprocal trade agreement, the 1939 and 1941 supplementary agreements, and the preferential arrangements associated with US and Cuban participation in GATT.

b) Control of US-Cuban commercial and financial relationships through freezing of Cuban assets in the US and subjecting to licensing control of financial transfers and commercial exchanges.

c) It is recognized that legislation affecting the Cuban sugar quota is within the province of the Congress. However, insofar as possible, the Department of State should use its influence to discourage any further reduction in the Cuban sugar quota in order to make possible the rebuilding of the Cuban economy with a minimum of US financial aid, and to avoid creating interests in other sugar-supplying countries which could only be broken with difficulty.

d) Discreet, informal conversations at the highest level between Department of State officials and selected US business interests looking forward to the development of agreed-on lines of approach to a new Cuban government, regarding the resolution of problems involved in the return or other disposition of, and compensation for, intervened, expropriated and confiscated US properties. These conversations should also explore the feasibility and nature of programs envisaged in IV–7 (b) below. These conversations should be initiated from three to four months prior to an anticipated date of the Castro collapse.

IV. US Policies for the Three-Months’ Period Following the Castro Downfall:

1. Military Aid.

a) Military support should stop short of the commitment of US forces to defend or assist the new government. Assistance could, however, include the provision of arms and equipment, advice, and training of Cuban forces.

2. Political support in any ways that may be found appropriate.

3. Economic and financial assistance should be conditioned on:

a) The restitution of intervened properties to US owners. In the case of this class of properties, where the proceedings have been “informal” and without clear legal basis, it is believed that direct and immediate return would be essential.

b) Agreement to adjudicate on the return to US owners of confiscated and expropriated properties, or, if some other disposition is agreed on with the US Government (see 7a below), to provide appropriate compensation.

c) Assumption of debts of previous Cuban governments, including that of Castro.

d) Agreement to cooperate with the US in programs of economic development and reconstruction of Cuban national institutions. (It might be preferable for this agreement to be informal and unwritten, but as a definite understanding between the top leaders of the Cuban government and the US Government.

4. With respect to US economic and financial assistance, the present plan recognizes as essential the need for the US to “capture” the vital forces of the Castro revolution, i.e., nationalism, obsession with “independence” (both political and economic), widespread pressures for land reform, industrialization, economic diversification, and, above all, with a solution to the abiding problem of unemployment and underemployment at all levels from manual labor to the utilization of skilled, technical and professional personnel. The success of the plan will depend on the ability of the US Government and US private interests to identify themselves with Cuban desires for social, political, and economic change.

5. Financial Assistance.

a) Local currency funds for budgetary support—although Cuban government demand deposits in local banks may be sufficient to meet pressing needs.

b) Cash grant for immediate critical foreign exchange needs, such as for fuels and lubricants, until lines of credit can be reopened and the economy can function again.

c) The above proposals for financial support to the new Cuban government are limited in scope to assistance in meeting immediate needs during the first 30 or 60 days. Measures proposed are temporary ones pending action by IMF or other agencies in the nature of stand-by agreements, stabilization loans, etc.

6. Economic Support.

a) PL480 foodstuffs (Titles II and III).

b) Support of Cuban government measures designed to maintain maximum employment of both urban and rural workers.

c) Stimulate a credit-expansion program through the Central Bank.

7. Other measures.

a) Establishment of a Joint Cuban-US Commission to provide for the orderly compensation and disposition of confiscated and expropriated properties.

b) Create a committee composed of representatives of major US business interests with investments in Cuba and the US Government to study ways and means of developing programs for (i) housing, home ownership, agricultural improvement and diversification for rural Cubans, and (ii) industrialization. These studies, which should eventually evolve into a cooperative US-Cuban effort, should take into account the desirability of technical and financial assistance to Cubans, preferably in association and cooperation with major US agricultural, livestock, mining and public utility interests.

c) Stimulate a cooperative Cuban-US program to completely reconstruct, modernize and improve the Cuban educational system, from pre-primary through university levels, and including vocational and technical training.

d) Devise an information program, including freedom of media and press, and rebuild desirable images distorted or impaired during the Castro era.

8. Devise, plan and establish other cooperative US-Cuban programs that may be considered desirable or necessary.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–760. Secret. No drafting or clearance information appears on the source text. The paper was circulated for comments under cover of a September 7 memorandum from John Hoover (ARA/REA) to other members of ARA and to Marjorie Whiteman. Hoover noted that the draft had been prepared in response to a suggestion from Merchant and that after comments had been obtained, the revised draft would be circulated to E, U/MSC, S/P, USIA, and ICA.