Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

540. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, June 30, 1960.

THE PROBLEM OF CUBA IN THE OAS

There are three forces that can be brought to bear on the Cuban situation: a) action of the Cuban people themselves to replace the Castro Government or change its policy; b) pressure through the OAS which would primarily serve to stimulate and support such action by the Cuban people; and c) unilateral action by the United States. These three pressures can be applied concurrently. The invoking of force unilaterally would, of course, be inconsistent with our treaty obligations and would create widespread disillusionment, if not hostility, throughout Latin America and other areas of the world.

However, we have undertaken during the past year to create a climate in Latin America which would enable us to take a more positive stand in defense of our legitimate interests in Cuba, as we are now doing, including especially the support of legislative authority for you to reduce the Cuban suger quota. Early reactions to this new posture have been heartening although, as expected, the Cuban Government itself is screaming invective.

The OAS contains two agencies in which the question of Cuba can be taken up. First, through the Inter-American Peace Committee, the OAS offers a medium bringing information regarding the Cuban problem to the attention of the Latin American countries whose attitudes towards this problem determine what the OAS will ultimately do about it. Second, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers provides the machinery through which important political decisions regarding the Cuban problem can be taken.

In view of our commitments to the OAS, and the need for gaining maximum Latin American support before any important policy decision is pressed in OAS meetings, we have concentrated thus far upon various steps to make the Latin American Governments more aware of the true nature of the Cuban problem, which many of them have seen in distorted and unrealistic form. One of these steps has been to assure that the Peace Committee will take due cognizance of the Cuban problem in the studies of Caribbean tensions which it was directed to make by the Santiago Meeting of Foreign Ministers last August. It became clear, however, that the Cuban problem could not be dealt with until the OAS had taken some action on the problem of Trujillo and the Dominican Republic. The Peace Committee’s report of June 6, 1960, concluding that international tensions were being aggravated by flagrant violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic, was favorably received in Latin America.² The United States is now pressing the Committee to turn its attention to Cuba, and presenting information to it for that purpose. We are making efforts to get certain Latin American Governments to submit to the Peace Committee information about Cuban intervention in their countries which can serve as the basis of further reports by the Committee.

Neither the Peace Committee, nor the Council of the OAS, offers a satisfactory means of getting basic policy decisions on a problem as controversial as that of Cuba. The next step in the OAS would have to be to convoke a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. While some Latin American Governments would like to see a conference now to deal with the Dominican problem, we feel that the process of educating the other American Republics to an understanding of the need for a firm position regarding Cuba requires further work before a Meeting of Foreign Ministers could be expected to produce useful results. However, the recent assassination attempt on President Betancourt of Venezuela, which he has publicly blamed on Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, may result in a Venezuelan call for a meeting of Foreign Ministers. We are now studying this prospect and the effect it would have on OAS handling of the Cuban situation.

Meetings of Foreign Minsters can be called either under the Rio Treaty or the Charter of the OAS, depending upon the circumstances motivating the meeting and the nature of the action to be taken. As a minimum, a Meeting of Foreign Ministers might be expected to censure the Cuban Government for its actions which have damaged inter-American solidarity and threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere, and to call upon Cuba to rid itself of Soviet influence. As a maximum, a Meeting of Foreign Ministers might produce an agreement advocating the severance of diplomatic relations or authorizing economic measures. It is not believed that a sufficient majority of Latin American Governments are yet prepared to go along with the above measures. However, the increased tempo of Cuban alignment with the Communist bloc is undoubtedly having a profound effect on the Governments of the other American Republics, and we are helping to bring evidence of this alignment, and its threat to the American Republics, to their attention. Still, as Prime Minister Beltran of Peru pointed out to you recently, the impact of the stated ideals of the Castro revolution, however fraudulent that statement has turned out to be, has been very great on the Latin American public at large.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Transmitted to the President under cover of a June 30 memorandum from Herter, in which the Secretary noted that on June 27 “we discussed the question of Cuba in relation to the OAS” and he hoped the memorandum would clarify some of the questions the President raised at that time. Regarding that meeting, see Document 536.
2. For text, see OAS doc. OEA/Ser. G/III/CIP–4–60.