Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

53. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hoyt) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, April 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Thoughts on Cuban Situation

It seems to me that with the apparent recent failure of the Castro movement to oust Batista we have entered into a new phase in the situation in Cuba. It seems possible to me that Batista might now be receptive to another approach for reaching a formula which would provide for free, honest elections and Batista withdrawing from the scene following those elections.

I believe, however, that there are certain factors which must be developed in making an approach to Batista:

(1) The approach must be kept out of a Batista–Castro context. I don’t believe that either Batista or Castro is going to be willing to negotiate with each other.

(2) An attempt should be made to appeal to Batista on the basis of patriotism. I have long felt that Batista really wanted to govern Cuba this time as a respected elder statesman rather than as the sergeant of yore. He has never been able to achieve this, but I still believe that is what he would have liked to have done.

It may be that by pointing out to Batista that strong-arm types of government are becoming more and more passé in Latin America; that sooner or later this type of government will go in Cuba and that the best chance he has to go down in Cuban history honored rather than discredited is to really establish an effective climate for free, honest elections in which there can be no doubt that he will be out of the picture entirely following the elections and that he will respect the will of the voters. I think Batista might listen to such an appeal.

(3) In line with keeping this out of a Batista–Castro context, an appeal should be made also to the better elements in Batista’s Government and to the better elements of the Cuban public and the opposition to really get together on developing the proper climate and safeguards for elections. In my opinion, political leaders such as Prio, Varona, Marquez Sterling and Grau are just as much discredited as is Batista and therefore the appeal must be made outside of these established but discredited opposition leaders. The whole thing must be gotten on a higher plane.

I think the approach should be made and made soon. I feel that with the pressure of Castro now off Batista, the latter could not be accused of succumbing to Castro’s pressure in taking any salutary steps leading to free elections. I believe the onus is now enough on Castro that Batista is in a position to be more receptive to suggestions and approaches from responsible groups.

Undoubtedly, in this picture there is the group around Batista who have been counseling him (very badly) to take some of the measures he has. I do feel, however, that there are good elements in the Batista Government who are now pretty much fed up with the strife, bloodshed, etc., and who could be brought into play on a really healthy, sound approach.

The key of course is to get Batista to really prove his sincerity to the responsible people and the general public of Cuba. There are not very many who are going to believe that there will really be free elections unless Batista gives assurances and proof that he will retire from the scene (best thing would be for him to leave Cuba) and not remain a strong man behind a Batista-elected candidate.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2458. Drafted and initialed by Hoyt. Snow, to whom the memorandum was also addressed, wrote the following note to Hoyt on May 1: “A very interesting paper. Please confer with MID & we can talk about it when I return from Texas”.